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Introduction
Since the late 1990s, principally fueled by the staggeringly high and
ever-growing price of mass incarceration, mainstream institutions and
individuals have focused on the need for more ambitious and effective
reentry programs.' Led by the Council of State Governments, and
particularly by the codification of policy statements and recommendations
promulgated and spread by the Reentry Policy Council,2 these mainstream
reformers have managed, in my estimation, both to champion their own
ambitious approach to reentry and likely doom its chances of success.
This effect might well be characterized as predictable and even
intentional. After all, a bipartisan collection of elected and appointed
officials and the mainstream institutions and actors they collaborate with
both want to announce suitably impressive programmatic proposals and to
make certain little upsets the status quo they have created, sustained, and
continue to benefit from. They have too much at stake in "what is" (jobs,
status, power, and more) to overturn the various systems that together
provide them material and ideological sustenance. This sort of interest
analysis may be enough to expose and explain the dynamics at work. And
an estimable line of thinkers (from investigative journalists to Marxist
historians to Lower East Side bodega coffee drinkers) have helped us all to
look for these dynamics.
Yet the approach to reentry pursued by the Reentry Policy Council and
all with whom they collaborate, particularly as embodied in the 632 page
REPORT OF THE RE-ENTRY POLICY COUNCIL: CHARTING THE SAFE AND
SUCCESSFUL RETURN OF PRISONERS TO THE COMMUNITY, reveals a
perhaps deeper contradiction: The Reentry Policy Council offers a genuinely
utopian vision of reentry (not at all my vision but utopian nonetheless) and
overwhelmingly reasserts the biases that favor the current approach they aim
to overturn.4 That contradiction may well be representative of the work of
mainstream reformers and perhaps of mainstream reforms within liberal
democracies. Yet precisely because of the familiarity of this strange internal
negation, we perhaps forget to "notice" the built-in tendency. Worse still,
1. For illustrations of the mainstream literature documenting and contributing to
fiscally-driven attention to reentry, see e.g., JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME:
PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY (2003); JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING
THE CHALLENGES OF PRISONER REENTRY XXI (2005).
2. See Council of State Governments website, CSG JUSTICE CENTER, http://csgjust
icecenter.org/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
3. RE-ENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, REPORT OF THE RE-ENTRY
POLICY COUNCIL: CHARTING THE SAFE AND SUCCESSFUL RETURN OF PRISONERS TO THE
COMMUNITY (2005) [Hereinafter, REPORT OR REPORT OF THE RE-ENTRY POLICY COUNCIL].
4. In modern legal scholarship, the origins of this insight and methodology can be traced to
Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 209 (1979).
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we may accept as promising a program that, at most, offers "status quo +"
reforms and seduces us into believing we're effectively addressing
("solving") the targeted problem.
But matters are more twisted than that. Even if the Reentry Policy
Council's grandest ambitions for reentry were realized, mainstream
reformers would still barely reduce the size and the make-up of mass
incarceration in the United States. And they would almost not at all
challenge the convictions that drive the criminal justice system and other
related systems (foster care and immigration, for example) that connect
directly to how we profile, label, and deal with criminal offenders. The
Reentry Policy Council report propagates a particular preoccupation with
reentry that distracts us from directly facing the question of how to reduce
mass incarceration and fundamentally alter the criminal justice system.5
Ambitious reentry programs always have been the right and the wise
thing to do. That is true, whether you regard yourself as hugely in favor of
the "get tough on crime" (and its "War on Drugs") or hugely opposed.
Among most militant opponents, and emphatically in my own view, reentry
has always been the right and wise thing to do but absolutely never has been
or will be a substitute for dramatically and immediately reducing mass
incarceration and fundamentally altering the assumptions and aspirations of
our criminal justice system. Even if you have come to accept that, "this is
just what mainstream reformers do," even if you believe "that's the way the
world works," acquiescence in the reproduction of the current state of affairs
is its own indecent contribution to brutality. We can do away with mass
incarceration and transform the criminal justice system. Even if we cannot,
we ought to behave as if we can and contribute sweat equity to trying.
. Basic Histories and Descriptions
A. Operation Targeted Mass Incarceration and Social Control
Beginning in the 1970s, the criminal justice system (federal and states)
transformed its laws, its institutions, its policies, and its practices in ways
that caused the rate of imprisonment to multiply in unprecedented terms over
5. Opponents of the "get tough on crime" have insisted that the bi-partisan mainstream's
relatively new fascination with ambitious cost-reduction reentry should not distract from ending
mass incarceration and transforming the criminal justice system-much as others have argued,
more recently, that debates about wrongful convictions and the death penalty should not obscure
the scope and nature of mass incarceration and need for massive overhaul of sentencing. See
Douglas A. Berman, Reorienting Progressive Perspectives for Twenty-First Century Punishment
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the next four decades.6 Between the late 19th century and 1975, the rate of
imprisonment averaged 100-150 for every 100,000 members of the total
population and, by 2006 (perhaps the summit year), that rate had jumped to
750 individuals per 100,000.7 Today, the United States has the highest rate
of imprisonment of any nation in the world (greater than Russia and South
Africa, considerably greater than Europe).8
Were we to count all those incarcerated through the immigration
system (1,518,104 people),9 and were we to count all those locked up in
local jails (748,728 people),10 the number incarcerated would increase. And
were we then to count all those on parole and on probation (7,076,200
people)," the number under the direct management of the criminal justice
6. This description draws on a massive body of literature and, for only a small sample of
valuable sources, see e.g., SABRINA JONES & MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE: A GRAPHIC
RETELLING (2013); ERNEST DRUCKER, A PLAGUE OF PRISONS: THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2011); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); MARY BOSWORTH, EXPLAINING U.S.
IMPRISONMENT (2009); MICHELLE BROWN, THE CULTURE OF PUNISHMENT: PRISON, SOCIETY, AND
SPECTACLE (2009); MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2006); Conference, PUNiSHMENT: THE U.S. RECORD, 74 SOCIAL
RESEARCH: AN INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY, no. 2(2007); BERT USEEM & ANNE MORRISON PIEHL,
PRISON STATE: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS INCARCERATION (2008); BRUCE WESTERN,
PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006); THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100:
BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA (2008); THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH
OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS (2009); ROBERT PERKINSON, TEXAS TOUGH: THE RISE OF AMERICA'S
PRISON EMPIRE (2010); TRAVIS C. PRATT, ADDICTED TO INCARCERATION: CORRECTIONS POLICY
AND THE POLITICS OF MISINFORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2008); MARC MAUER, RACE TO
INCARCERATE (2006).
7. For just some of the sources offering these and related data, see GOTTSCHALK, supra note
6, at 1-6; INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT
279-92 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney Lind eds., 2002); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE:
CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 3-17
(2003).
8. See ERNEST DRUCKER, supra note 6, at 43. (As of 2008, the "U.S. rate of incarceration is
the highest in the world-756 per 100,000-a rate more than seven times that of European Union
countries and greater than that of Russia or South Africa."). For the most recent Bureau of Justice
and International Statistics, see LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERIKA PARKS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 2011 3, 6 (2011), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty-pbdetail&iid-4537 (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) and
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR PRISON STUDIES, ENTIRE WORLD -PRISON POPULATION RATES
PER 100,000 OF THE NATIONAL POPULATION, available at http://www.prison
studies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb country.php?country- 190 (last visited Oct. 23, 2013).
9. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, MAY 2011 AVERAGE DAILY
POPULATION BY DETENTION FACILITY, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/dfs/average-daily-pop-by-
facility-may2011 .pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 1013).
10. TODD D. MINTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JAIL
INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2011--STATISTICAL TABLES, NCJ 237961 (2012) available at
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/docs/BJS-JaiI-Report.pdf
11. PROQUEST, LLC, PROQUEST STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2013, at
229 tbl. 355 (2013).
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system would expand even more still. However, even these dramatically
enhanced numbers misjudge the control exercised by the state through its
criminal justice system. Every day law enforcement officers pursue varied
formal and informal "stop and frisk" programs, surveillance techniques that
far more often than not serve principally to let people know they're being
watched and, at any time, might be rousted.12
This system of enhanced mass incarceration and social control
especially targets low income, of color, and immigrant communities. So
disproportionate has been the impact on the Black population and
(especially in some areas) the Latino population that labels like "tough-on-
crime and "War on Drugs" have now among some given way to "the New
Jim Crow."' 3  How better to capture the continuation of a racial caste
system? But it's not only and it's not simply about men. Women of color
(especially Black women) have been incarcerated at an alarming rate that,
until fairly recently, had largely gone overlooked in scholarly and popular
literatures.14 And juveniles (yes, Black, yes, Latinos, but more than most
would think Asian Pacific Islanders, Natives, and poor Whites) have been
entangled in the criminal justice system in ways that, only through a
deranged vision of justice, can possibly make sense." And within all the
groups, the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender population does what
it can to survive.' 6
12. For a deeply thoughtful and utterly disquieting depiction of the Mayor Bloomberg-
endorsed racially-targeted "stop and frisk" practices of the New York City Police Department,
read Judge Shira Scheindlin's 198-page opinion and her 39-page order in Floyd v. City of New
York, No. 08 Civ. 1034 (SAS), 2013 WL 4046209 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013) holding New York
City's "stop and frisk" practices unconstitutional. Available at http://www.nytimes.com
/interactive/2013/08/12/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-decision.html.
13. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010). For a small sample of the recent literature that has offered similar
analysis, see e.g., RUTH WILSON GILMORE, THE GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS,
AND OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA (2007): ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS
OBSOLETE? (2003): Lotc Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh,
3 PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y 95 (2001).
14. For contrasting examples of accounts, see INCITE! WOMEN OF COLOR AGAINST
VIOLENCE, THE COLOR OF VIOLENCE: THE INCITE! ANTHOLOGY (2006); GREG BARAK, PAUL
LEIGHTON AND JEANNE FLAVIN, CLASS, RACE, GENDER, AND CRIME: THE SOCIAL REALTIES OF JUSTICE
IN AMERICA (2010); RACE, GENDER, AND PUNISHMENT: FROM COLONIALISM To THE WAR ON TERROR
(MARY BOSWORTH & JEANNE FLAVIN EDS. 2007).
15. For a sample of a still far-too-small but hopefully growing literature, see e.g., Francine T.
Sherman, Justice for Girls: Are We Making Progress?, fa59 UCLA L. REV. 1584 (2012); VICTOR
RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO BOYS (2011); BEHIND BARS:
LATINO/AS AND PRISON IN THE UNITED STATES (SUZANNE OBOLER ED. 2009); Angela E. Oh &
Karen Umemoto, Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders: From Incarceration to Re-Entry, 31
AMERASIA JOURNAL 43 (2005); STEVEN W. PERRY, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AMERICAN INDIANS AND
CRIME (2004); LOiC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF
SOCIAL INSECURITY(2009).
16. For difficult questions and penetrating insights about the incarcerated LGBT community,
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Perhaps the most blithely unnoticed impact of targeted mass
incarceration and social control has been the terrible damage imposed upon
families and kinship networks and neighborhoods and communities.
Unnoticed perhaps by most professionals, scholars, and by everyone in the
United States who does not have "their own" arrested and convicted and
incarcerated for the crimes they almost certainly now and then commit.'7
But those who have lived with having a loved one locked up know the
trauma. Those who live with large numbers of their neighbors locked up
and on parole and on probation-and with cops "protecting" them through
endless "stops and frisks"-experience the damage that criminologists only
in recent years have begun in any depth to try to understand.' 8
Do not for a moment believe that targeted mass incarceration and
social control did not face zealous opposition. This approach to criminal
justice rapidly became and still is an immensely powerful system, but it is
not an all-encompassing regime successfully indoctrinating everyone.
Many people within low income, of color, and immigrant communities
stood their ground. They knew the familiar feeling of being both neglected
by most systems (public education, health) and targeted by criminal justice
and child welfare and foster care.' 9 Often together with the incarcerated (to
whom they were so closely tied), they were having none of this "safety only
through incarceration" brainwashing. 20 Standing shoulder to shoulder with
see e.g., Russell K. Robinson, Masculinity as Prison: Sexual Identity, Race, and Incarceration, 99
CALIF. L. REV. 1309 (2011); Sharon Dolovich, Strategic Segregation in the Modern Prison, 48
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 2 (2011).
17. Of course, exceptions become all the more notable. See e.g., DONALD BRAMAN, DOING
TIME ON THE OUTSIDE: INCARCERATION AND FAMILY LIFE IN URBAN AMERICA (2004); Dorothy
E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities,
56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004). An earlier literature aiming to understand relationship between
family ties and post-prison success can be traced to Lloyd Ohlin's pioneering efforts to develop a
parole success prediction scale. See e.g. Lloyd E. Ohlin, The Routinization of Correctional
Change, 45 J. CRIM. L CRIMINOLOGY 7 Police Sci. 400 (1954-55).
18. TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: How MASS INCARCERATION MAKES
DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE (2007).
19. For the extraordinary work of Regina Austin and Dorothy Roberts, see e.g., Regina
Austin, "Step on a Crack, Break Your Mother's Back": Poor Moms, Myths of Authority, Drug-
Related Evictions from Public Housing, 14 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 273 (2002); Regina Austin,
"Not Just for the Fun of It! " Governmental Restraints on Black Leisure, Social Inequality, and the
Privatization of Public Space, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 667 (1998); DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED
BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 7-10, 74-92 (2002); Dorothy Roberts, Prison, Foster Care,
and the Systemic Punishment of Black Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REv. 1474 (2012). For the insights
of the next generation of gifted practitioners and scholars, see e.g., Alina Ball, An Imperative
Redefinition of "Community": Incorporating Reentry Lawyers to Increase the Efficacy of
Community Economic Development Initiatives, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1883 (2008). For an example
of my own decades-long emphasis on how low-income, of-color, and immigrant communities
have been both neglected and targeted by diverse systems and institutions, see e.g., Gerald L6pez,
Changing Systems, Changing Ourselves, 12 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 15 (2009).
20. For an enthralling examination of these relationships (as they exist and as they might)
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the incarcerated, and those living with criminal convictions and their
communities were some criminal defense and civil rights lawyers, some
epidemiologists, some journalists, some educators, some prison librarians
and chaplains, some nuns running community organizations, and (the
usually closeted) allies on the bench, within prosecutorial ranks, and in
parole and probation departments. Yes, I know cops on the beat who
always have regarded mass incarceration as madness but knew better than
to voice their views too openly.
This militant opposition fought in at least two overlapping ways. They
challenged every assumption and aspiration of the mass incarceration and
social control operations of the criminal justice systems. In courthouses, on
the streets, and in print they tried with all their might to offer full-bodied
resistance. In particular, those locked up deployed a range of informal and
formal strategies to express their fundamental objections to the fact and the
duration and the conditions of imprisonment.2 1 The incarcerated continued
to breathe life into the famous observation that "[w]hen the prisoners began
to speak, they possessed an individual theory of prisons, the penal system,
and justice. It is this form of discourse which ultimately matters, a
discourse against power, the counter-discourse of prisoners and those we
call delinquents ...
At the same time, this militant opposition aimed to develop a counter-
vision of a criminal justice system they would be willing to defend. No,
they did not want simply to turn back the clock to the early 1970s, though
the years before the Rockefeller Drug, Three Strikes, and mandatory
sentencing laws obviously hold their allure. Instead they aimed at a
practicable utopia, starting wherever they could, through shifting and
enduring collaborations, quietly working as if they lived within or might
well create some counterfactual realms.23 Openly personal and perhaps
quixotic, this militant opposition has proven resilient, if understandably
disappointed in failing yet to meet their aspirations.24
within the Black community, see Regina Austin, "The Black Community, " Its Lawbreakers, and a
Politics of identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769 (1992).
21. For an important exploration of how those incarcerated themselves led many of these
challenges, and the concerted campaign to close off legal challenges by inmates, see Margo
Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555 (2003). For a sample of literature
describing the rise of the modem "prisoners' movement," see e.g., RONALD BERKMAN, OPENING
THE GATES: THE RISE OF THE PRISONERS' MOVEMENT (1979); James B. Jacobs, The Prisoners'
Rights Movement and Its Impacts, 1960-80, 2 CRIME AND JUSTICE 429 (1980).
22. MICHEL FOUCAULT, Intellectuals and Power, in LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY,
PRACTICE: SELECTED ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS 205, 209 (Donald F. Bouchard & Sherry Simon
trans., Donald F. Bouchard ed., 1977).
23. For an illustration of a former prosecutor who writes ambitiously to offer one counter-
vision of criminal justice that reflects multiracial and multicultural hip-hop culture, see PAUL
BUTLER, LET'S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE (2009).
24. For an interview with one militant and resilient member of this opposition, see Katti
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But opponents faced a juggernaut. Operation targeted mass
incarceration and social control almost immediately took hold of the body
politic. Even in the late 20th century, being "tough on crime" had been a
conservative rallying cry since at least the 1970s. And in the 1950s and
1960s, prominent Democrats like Governor Edmund G. (Pat) Brown (1959-
1967), a former District Attorney and State Attorney General, believed
"[y]ou help people by locking them up, by putting them in institutions," and
"emphasized very strongly the more institutions the better."2 5  But
especially upon hearing, Ronald Reagan declaration a "War on Drugs,"
loyalists from both parties marketed "safety through incarceration" with
remarkable ingenuity and success.2 6
Ideological, financial, and career interests quickly became entangled
with-and dependent upon-the growth of targeted mass incarceration and
social control. Lobbyists, and legislative and executive and administrative
officials they deal with, made prison budgets virtually untouchable. Prison
guards became among the most powerful unions in the country. And the
growingly privatized penal system proved at least as rabid as prosecutors
and correctional experts and parole and probation departments in pressing
for ever more prisons and jails.
Operation targeted mass incarceration and social control has now
reigned for nearly forty years. From President Reagan through (especially)
President Clinton to President Obama, across parties and states, this
approach to criminal justice long ago became "the law." And, for so many,
the law ordains the truth and deeply embeds itself into daily life.27
Certainly, for all those who create or carry out these by now nearly
mindless routines, this approach has become "natural;" it is their default
mode. Without much or perhaps any conscious thought, people just "doing
their jobs" robotically reproduce the fantasy of incarceration zealots.2 8
Between the power of the status quo and the concerted campaigns of
invested interests, mass incarceration and targeted social control appeared
able to reproduce itself far into the future.
In the past several years, though, evidence leads some to declare the
Gray, The Run-On Sentence: Eddie Ellis on Life After Prison, THE SUN (July 2013),
http://thesunmagazine.org/issues/45 I/therunonsentence?page= 1.
25. See Jan Marinissen, "To Let the Legislature Know ": Prison Advocacy and the American
Friends Service Committee in California, 1960-1983 at 8 1985. Government History
Documentation Project, Ronald Reagan Gubernatorial Era. Berkeley, CA: Regional Oral History
Office.
26. See Alexander, supra note 13, at 27.
27. For an illustration of the literature that explores the power of law to ordain truth, see Jack M.
Balkin, The Proliferation ofLegal Truth 26 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'v 5 (2003).
28. For an article among the leading work on routinized behavior, see John A. Bargh & Erin
L. Williams, The Automaticity of Social Life, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL
SCIENCE 1 (2006).
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criminal justice system no longer impossible to change. Indeed a small but
influential band of conservatives ("Right on Crime") claims they should
and will be as tough on criminal justice spending as they are on crime.29 In
a speech before the American Bar Association, Eric Holder announced the
Obama Administration would scrutinize federal regulation of sentencing for
racial disparities and with reentry in mind. Various states have reduced
their prison population in response to legislative mandates and court orders
(perhaps most conspicuously, California finds itself doing both)."
Anyone seeing these events as the demise of targeted mass
incarceration and social control is dreadfully over-reading the evidence.
It's not just that Right on Crime, Eric Holder, and Governor Brown all
pledge their undying allegiance to being "tough-on-crime." It's that in New
York City, in 2013, the staunchly independent and too-wealthy-to-be-
bought-off Mayor, Michael Bloomberg, defiantly defends the NYPD "stop
and frisk" practices as not only fully constitutional, but precisely what
targeted (overwhelmingly Black and Latino) neighborhoods need for their
own protection. He means, at once, to insist that he is doing social justice
and that "stop and frisk" is an utterly natural and rational constraint
deployed to maximize the freedom of law-abiding residents.32
With bravado both familiar and all-too-revealing, Bloomberg is boldly
and simultaneously speaking to the dominators and the dominated in
claiming the high (the highest) ground and denying any contradiction in this
approach to criminal justice. Whether he is unable to see or unable or
unwilling to acknowledge the inherent clash within his statements and his
philosophy may be impossible to discern. For our purposes, it may not
much matter. Operation targeted mass incarceration and social control still
29. For the Right on Crime's founding principles, see http://www.rightoncrime.com/the-
conservative-case-for-reform/statement-of-principles/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2013).
30. For the full text of Holder's speech, see Attorney General Eric Holder, Remarks at the
American Bar Association's House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013) (available at
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech-I 30812.html).
3 1. For the most recent turn in California's saga, see Patrick McGreevy and Anthony York,
Analysts See hope for California prison overcrowding solution, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2013,
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/25/local/la-me-ff-prisons-20130925. For one of the first
efforts to document efforts to reduce the current prison population, see Shelley Johnson Listwan,
Cheryl Lero Jonson, Francis T. Cullen, & Edward J. Latessa, Cracks in the Penal Harm
Movement: Evidence from the Field, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 423 ( 2008).
32. Mayor Bloomberg's position, and that of the City of New York's Police Department, can
be readily discerned by reading Judge Scheindlin's opinion and order (See Floyd v. City of New
York, No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS), 2013 WL 4046209 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013) at
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/08/12/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-decision.html) or the
extensive media coverage of the Mayor's blasts against "some woman" who knows "zero" about
police work. See e.g., Mara Gay, Greg B. Smith & Daniel Beekman, Bloomberg blasts stop-and-




Winter 2014] AMBITIOUS REENTRY PROGRAMS DOOMED TO FAIL
reigns-in reality and as ideology.
B. Council of State Governments' Reentry Policy Council
As the colossal costs of mass incarceration became more transparent in
the 1990s, questions about reentry policies and practices once raised only
by the militant opposition suddenly caught the attention of elected and
appointed officials, mainstream consultants, correctional officials, and their
staffers. Especially within this constellation of individuals and institutions,
the Council on State Governments positioned itself to coordinate and lead
the effort to examine and recommend how to transform reentry programs
into an ambitious cost-reduction tool without sacrificing (and perhaps while
even enhancing) the safety presumably provided by targeted mass
incarceration and social control.
Founded in 1933, the Council of State Governments ("CSG")
describes itself as the "only organization serving all three branches of state
government."33  Encompassing every elected and appointed state and
territorial official in the United States (executive, legislative, judicial
branches and their administrative staff), CSG cultivates "the exchange of
insights and ideas to help state officials shape public policy." 34 It does so
through regional offices as well as extensive and amply funded regional,
national and international networks, where officials and consultants and
staffers routinely meet, regularly share information, and cultivate problem-
solving partnerships. Created by the states and for the states, CSG proudly
declares itself a member-driven association that reflects state priorities.
In 2001, with an acute appreciation of both the fiscal squeeze imposed
by "tough on crime" policies and the promise of reentry as a cost-reduction
and face-saving strategy, CSG created the Reentry Policy Council. Two
specific goals shaped the new venture: (1) to develop bipartisan principles
for elected, appointed officials, and all with whom they work to help frame
and address reentry issues in their jurisdictions, and (2) to facilitate the
sharing of information and coordination among systems, institutions, and
organizations implementing reentry initiatives and the funding to develop
and sustain such work.
After several years of meetings and discussion, CSG's Reentry Policy
Council published the RE-ENTRY POLICY REPORT: CHARTING THE SAFE
AND SUCCESSFUL RETURN OF PRISONERS TO THE COMMUNITY. Aiming to
provide a "comprehensive vision" of successful reentry reform, and totaling
632 pages of detailed guidance, the report encompasses a "bipartisan"
33. About the Council of State Governments, CSG JUSTICE CENTER, http://csgjust
icecenter.org/about-csg/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
34. Id.
35. See statement of CEO David Adkins, About CSG Executive Director/CEO, CSG JUSTICE
CENTER, http://www.csg.org/about/executivedirector.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
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consensus of institutions and individuals from across the country, all aiming
to make people's transition from prison or jail to the community to be safe
and successful.36
The Report indeed reflected the collaboration of "nearly 100 leading
elected officials, policy makers, and practitioners," working in "nearly
every component of the criminal justice system." 37  The collaboration
included members from a variety of fields and serving varied roles,
including judges, religious leaders, legal aid attorneys, correctional facility
administrators, academics, and law enforcement officers. 3 8 Numerous state
elected officials joined these efforts as did representatives from federal
agencies, including the FBI, Fannie Mae, and the Department of Justice.
Additionally, the Reentry Policy Council worked in partnership with 10
cooperating organizations, such as the Urban Institute, the American
Association of Parole and Probation Officers, and Association of State
Correctional Administrators.
Even before publication, the Report received glowingly generous
praise. Among the early endorsers was Fox Butterfield, a well-regarded
journalist dedicated to broadening the national debate surrounding
incarceration and recidivism rates. In a 2004 New York Times article,
Butterfield highlighted the need for better services for reentering inmates
and a smoother transition period between prisons and the community. 3 9
36. About CSG Executive Director/CE, supra note 35. Even more accurately, the Report is
632 pages long and contains 24 pages of prefatory materials (a table of contents, lists of partners,
and an executive summary) and had been outlined in advance by the Report Preview, 22 helpful
pages sketching what the Report itself would provide and accomplish.
37. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 2.
38. Those involved in the process of researching, developing, writing, vetting, editing, and
distributing the report, included State Legislators (co-chaired the initiative): Eric Bogue, Senate
Majority Whip in South Dakota; John Loredo, Minority Leader in the Arizona House of
Representatives; Jeffrion Aubry, Chair of Corrections Committee in New York State Assembly;
Facilitators of Advisory Group Meetings: David Fariman, Beth Greenland, Tom Quinn; Steering
Committee (principal writers): Michael Thompson, Elizabeth Nevins, Katherine Brown, Matthew
Schwarzfeld (Council of State Governments); Carl Wicklund (American Probation and Parole
Association); John Blackmore (Association of State Correctional Administrators); Richard Cho
(Corporation for Supportive Housing); Christine Siksa (National Association of Housing and
Redevelopment Officials); Laura Skufca (National Association of State Alcohol/Drug Abuse
Directors; William T. Emmet (National Association of State Mental Health Program Directors);
Scott Cheney (National Association of Workforce Boards); Kay Farley (National Center for State
Courts); Corina Sold Brito (Police Executive Research Forum); Amy Solomon (Urban Institute);
Expert Advice & Text Contributors: Jim Austin, Tony Fabelo, Adam Gelb, Dr. Robert Greifinger,
Gail Hughes, Dr. Lambert King, Arlene Lee, David Lewis, Stefan Lobuglio, Debbie Mukamal,
Mario Paparozzi. Hugh Potter, Roberta Richman, Ed Rhine, Anne Seymour, Carol Shapiro and
her staff at Family Justice, Faye Taxman, Jeremy Travis, Vicki Turetsky, Ashbel T. Wall; Funding
Support: Department of Justice, Department of Labor, Department of Health & Human Services,
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, JEHT Foundation, Open Society Institute. REPORT OF THE
REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3.
39. Fox Butterfield, Repaving the Long Road Out of Prison, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2004,
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Propelled by the recession and the cost of incarceration, prison
administrators and policy makers (including President Bush), had
regenerated interest within bipartisan mainstream circles. One very
promising new effort Butterfield lauded was the Council of State
Government's Reentry Policy Council. 40 Having convened the nation's
best experts, the Reentry Policy Council was developing a thorough and
detailed guide that would contain "recommendations on how states can
better help newly released prisoners find jobs, get decent places to live, and
re-establish relationships." 4'
Widely disseminated through the CSG's extensive networks, the
Report immediately received accolades among bipartisan mainstream
reformers interested in cost-reduction and safety-enhancing reentry. So
prominent did the Report almost instantly become, that it served, in part, as
support for the passage of the Second Chance Act. The Act, a first-of-its-
kind federal legislation designed to provide greater services to prisoners
returning to their communities, awarded federal grants to government
agencies and nonprofit organizations implementing strategies designed to
reduce recidivism by improving outcomes for people returning from
prisons, jails, and juvenile facilities.42 Dollars from the Second Chance Act
(coupled with others leveraged from federal, state, local, private, and
philanthropic sources) permitted CSG to launch The Justice Center, a
national non-profit that serves all states by promoting cost-reducing data-
driven criminal justice (particularly reentry) practices. 43
Today, the Justice Council oversees the National Reentry Resource
Center, the Reentry Policy Council, and the Justice Reinvestment Initiative.
Working in formal partnership with the Urban Institute, the American
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/04/us/repaving-the-long-road-out-of-prison.html?
pagewanted=all&src-pm, (last visited Sept. 13, 2013). For another example of Butterfield's work
during these years, see e.g., Fox Butterfield, Study Finds Big Increase in Black Men as Inmates
Since 1980, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2002, at A14 (commenting upon empirical findings that include
that more Black men are incarcerated than in colleges or universities).
40. Id.
4 1. Id.
42. Editorial, Shrinking the Prison Population, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/l1 /opinion/l lmon2.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2013). Signed
into law on April 9, 2008, the Second Chance Act (P.L. 110-199) grant programs are funded and
administered by the Office of Justice Programs in the U.S. Department of Justice. Within the
Office of Justice Programs, the Bureau of Justice Assistance awards Second Chance Act grants
serving adults, and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention awards grants
serving youth returning from the juvenile correction facilities.
43. About the Justice Center, CSG JUSTICE CENTER, http://csgjusticecenter.orglabout-jc/
(last accessed Oct. 18, 2013). The Justice Center traces its origins to the CSG's Eastern Regions
Conference Justice Program, which CSG developed in response to an "unprecedented surge in the
region's prison population and a corresponding increase in state spending on the construction and
operation of prisons." CriminaUustice, EASTERN REGIONAL CONFERENCE,
http://www.csgeast.org/policy/criminaljustice.aspx (last visited Sept. 11, 2013).
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Association of Correctional Administrators and the American Probation and
Parole Association (all served earlier as cooperating agencies on the
Reentry Policy Council), financially supported by diverse funds, the Justice
Council aims to build the most extensive library of reentry resources, to
further evidence-based research in the field of reentry, and to facilitate the
exchange of information. In order to achieve these goals, the National
Reentry Resource Center provides training and technical assistance to a
wide-variety of state governments, nonprofits, service providers, and
correctional institutions. Ultimately, the Center hopes to be become a
library for "what works" for reentry policy." Currently, the Resource
Center is gathering information to create an online "dashboard" to track the
progress of statewide reentry programs and its website already displays an
interactive map that identifies the reentry programs in each state.45
Meanwhile, the Reentry Policy Council and its RE-ENTRY POLICY
REPORT continue to gather lavish praise. Mainstream reformers in Texas
and Kansas credit the work of the Reentry Policy Council and the Justice
Center as instrumental to their policy changes over the past decade.46 The
Office of Justice Assistance, a branch of the Department of Justice, offers
the Report of the Reentry Policy Council as the guide for reentry policy
makers everywhere.47 Scholars glowingly describe the Reentry Report as a
"landmark document."48 Congress seeks out the Reentry Policy Council to
44. What Works in Reentry Clearinghouse, CSG JUSTICE CENTER, http://whatworks.csg
justicecenter.org/ (last visited October 18, 2013).
45. National Criminal Justice Initiative Map, CSG JUSTICE CENTER, http://csg
justicecenter.org/reentry/national-criminal-justice-initiatives-map/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
46. Shrinking the Prison Population, supra note 41.
47. Reentry Initiative, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, available at https://www.bja.
gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?Program ID=75 (last accessed May 9, 2012); Jessica S. Henry, The
Second Chance Act of 2007, 45 CRIM. LAW BULL. Art 3 ("The result was a national Reentry
Policy Council that issues a highly influential report in 2005, and has been instrumental in
developing effective policy and programs surrounding reentry.").
48. Edward E. Rhine & Anthony C. Thompson, The Reentry Movement in Corrections:
Resiliency, Fragility and Prospects, 47(2) CRIM. L. BULL. 177 (2011); For a sample of the many
articles and books favorably referring to the Reentry Policy Council's Report, even before its
publication, see Ann Cammett, Deadbeats, Deadbrokes, and Prisoners, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY
L. & POL'Y 127 (2011); Jessica S. Henry, The Second Chance Act of2007, 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 416
(2009); Mark A. R. Kleiman & Kelsey R. Hollander, Mass Incarceration: Causes, Consequences,
and Exist Strategies: Reducing Crime by Shrinking the Prison Headcount, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
89 (2011); Martha Henderson Hurley, Restorative Practices in Institutional Settings and at
Release: Victim Wrap Around Programs, 73-JUN FED. PROBATION 16 (2009); Eugenia Schraa,
Delegational Delusions: Why Judges Should Be Able to Delegate Reasonable Authority Over
Stated Supervised Release Conditions, 38 FORDHAM URB L.J.899 (2011); Hon. Joan Gottschall&
Molly Armour, Second Chance: Establishing a Reentry Program in the Northern District of
Illinois, 5 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 31 (2011); Christine S. Scott-Hayward, The Failure of
Parole: Rethinking the Role of the State in Reentry, 41 N.M. L. REV. 421 (2011); Mona
Lewandoski, Barred from Bankruptcy: Recently Incarcerated Debtors in and Outside Bankruptcy,
34 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 191 (2010); William J. Rich, The Path of Mentally Ill
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provide briefings on the successes of cost- and recidivism-reduction
programs and the need for continued federal funding. 49 And the New York
Times cites the Reentry Policy Council as proving that reentry can in fact
50succeed in lowering recidivism rates.
Offenders, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 89 (2009); Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of
Markets: Prison Labor and the Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L.
REV. 857 (2008); Doug Jones, A Cruel and Unusual System: The Inherent Problems of the
Practice of Outsourcing Health Care of Prisons and Jails, 27 CHICANA/O-LATINA/O L.REV. 179
(2008); Christy A. Visher, Returning Home: Emerging Findings and Policy Lessons About
Prisoner Reentry, 20 FED. SENT'G REP. 93 (2007); Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert:
Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment to Constitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. Ill
(2007) (cited in note 124); Catherine Megan Bradley, Old Remedies Are New Again: Deliberate
Indiference and the Receivership in Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 703
(2007) (cited in note 218); Laura 1. Appleman, Retributive Justice and Hidden Sentencing, 68
OHIO ST. L.J. 1307 (2007); Andrew Brunsden, Hepatitis C in Prisons: Evolving Toward Decency
Through Adequate Medical Care and Public Health Reform, 54 UCLA L. REV. 465 (2006); Ben
Iddings, The Big Disconnect: Will Anyone Answer the Call to Lower Excessive Prisoner
Telephone Rates?, 8 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 159 (2006); Lorenn Walker, Ted Sakai, & Kat Brady,
Restorative Circles - A Reentry Planning Process for Hawaii Inmates, 70-JUN FED. PROBATION
33 (2006); Kamala Harris, Holding Offenders Accountable: Why Reentry Matters, 40-JUN
PROSECUTOR 32 (2006); Ralph Kirkland Gable & Robert S. Gable, Electronic Monitoring:
Positive Intervention Strategies, 69-JUN FED. PROBATION 21 (2005) (listed in cited references);
John V. Jacobi, Prison Health, Public Health: Obligations and Opportunities, 31 AM. J.L. &
MED. 447 (2005); ANDREW CUOMO, URBAN AGENDA: THE NEW NEW YORK AGENDA (2011)
(see page 266); USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO REDUCE VIOLENT OFFENDING (Joel A. Dvoskin,
Jennifer L. Skeem, & Raymond W. Novaco eds., 2011); LIOR GIDEON & HUNG-EN SUNG,
RETHINKING CORRECTIONS: REHABILITATION, REENTRY, AND REINTEGRATION (2010); D.
RICHARD LAWS & TONY WARD, DESISTANCE FROM SEX OFFENDNG: ALTERNATIVES TO
THROWING AWAY THE KEYS (2010); JOEL T. ANDRADE, HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE RISK
ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT: NEW APPROACHES FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS
(2009); RALPH J. DICLEMENTE, JOHN S. SANTELLI, & RICHARD A. CROSBY, ADOLESCENT
HEALTH: UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING RISK BEHAVIORS (2009); GARY F. CORNELIUS,
THE ART OF THE CON: AVOIDING OFFENDER MANIPULATION (2008); ANNE CAROLYN
GRUNSEIT, SUZIE FORELL, & EMILY MCCARRON, TAKING JUSTICE INTO CUSTODY: THE LEGAL
NEEDS OF PRISONERS (2008); KLAUS SERR, THINKING ABOUT POVERTY (2008); CAROLINA
VILLAGRA PINCHEIRA, HACIA UNA POLiTICA POSTPENITENCIARIA EN CHILE (2008); AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS, SECOND CHANCES IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION AND REENTRY STRATEGIES
(2007); PUBLIC HEALTH BEHIND BARS: FROM PRISONS TO COMMUNITIES, Robert B. Greifinger,
Joseph A. Bick, & Joe Goldenson eds., (2007); BRENDA J. BOND, ORGANIZATIONAL
MANAGEMENT OF OFFENDER REENTRY: THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL CHALLENGES OF CHANGE
(2006); WHO TO RELEASE?: PAROLE, FAIRNESS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Nicola Padfield ed.
(2005); JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF PRISONER
REENTRY (2005); JEREMY TRAVIS, AMY L. SOLOMON, & MICHELLE WAUL, FROM PRISON TO
HOME: THE DIMENSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRISONER REENTRY (2001).
49. For a report of a recent briefing, see Second Chance Act, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
ASSISTANCE, (APRIL 24, 2013), https://www.bja.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?Program_1D =90(last
visited Oct. 18, 2013).
50. Shrinking the Prison Population, supra note 42.
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II. Summary of the Reentry Policy Council Report
Almost anyone who reads the full 632 pages of the Reentry Policy
Council Report will be impressed. The Report feels remarkably
comprehensive, powerfully characterized, and logically entailed. The
stories and arguments make a convincing case that the extraordinary budget
crises require policymakers to make certain that people do not return to
prisons and jails after release. To provide precisely that guidance, the
Report offers big analytical categories that make sense on their own terms
and connect lucidly to other large categories. Each category entails sensible
sub-categories, and categories and subcategories together yield policy
statements.
Each policy statement is a prescriptive principle, both conceptually
impressive and suitably researched. Individually, each policy statement
targets the problem it addresses, complete with recommendations that
provide the steps to be taken to implement the particular policy. By
providing means to target a goal, each policy statement equips policy
makers with a place to begin rather than feeling paralyzed by the enormity
of reentry.5' "Agents of change" (the term the Report uses to include
everyone at local, state, and federal levels involved with reentry) can
actually use the Report to understand and do what they must to dramatically
improve reentry process and results.52
At the same time, the policy statements collectively entail a
comprehensive vision for the safe and successful transition of a person from
prison or jail to the community. That vision reveals the interrelationship
between all policy statements and recommendations. The Report does not
endorse a one-size-fits-all approach: Each community must ground the
vision in the particulars of its own problems and resources. But after two
years of work by an "unprecedented, bipartisan collection of nearly 100
leading elected officials, policymakers, and practitioners," the Reentry
Policy Council fearlessly guarantees its Report as entailing "policy
statements and recommendations that, if implemented, will ensure the safe
and successful return of individuals from prison or jail to the community."
That robust confidence reflects the scientific methods that shape,
measure, and (as necessary) serve to improve every policy statement and
recommendation the Report provides the nation's state and local
policymakers. Programs and strategies must reflect, the Reentry Policy
Council resolutely asserts, an "evidence-based" approach: interventions and
treatments that have been proven effective "through a rigorous scientific
51. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 8.
52. Id at 2.
53. Id.
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process. "54 With the precision provided by science, the Report radiates a
jubilantly conquering attitude: If every step is followed to the letter, the
nation can finally solve the reentry challenge, providing us both cost-
effective and safety-enhancing answers that have escaped earlier well-
intentioned but less-than-fully exacting and thorough efforts.
For the skeptical and even the cynical, the Reentry Policy Council
evinces a reassuring savvy in the course of the 632 pages. On every front,
the Report appears to identify likely obstacles and complications. And, in
advance, the Reentry Policy Council provides suggestions for how to deal
with-even perhaps preempt-these impediments and difficulties. To
further ease the mind of doubters, the Report reveals a brand of technocratic
pragmatism-one befitting the best scientific policymakers-in announcing
the need always to learn and amend as evidence reveals ways to advance on
advances. If critics are not silenced, they ought to appreciate just how
formidable a constellation of experts drew up this Report and continue to
work for and with the Reentry Policy Council.
Perhaps it's no accident that the Report makes frequent mention of the
importance of faith-based communities and religious role models for
recently released inmates. In a grand sense, the Reentry Policy Council
provides the same sense of comforting uplift often associated with
organized religion, communicating to worried souls that they are, at last, in
safe hands. In bad and even terrible economic times, the Report offers
people hope-hope with roots in science rather than in the unsupported
recipes of earlier eras or the heated contentions of opponents of mass
incarceration. Like charismatic leaders of a powerful movement of experts,
the Reentry Policy Council captivates its audiences with the promise of
answers, expecting slowly but surely to convert nonbelievers to its side.
Make no mistake. The Reentry Council Report is, I think, significant
on several related grounds. The Report reflects the acknowledgment among
bipartisan elected and appointed officials that the costs of mass
incarceration are so monumental and so impossible to conceal any longer
that they must offer a compelling, comprehensive, and detailed codification
of how we can and should change reentry precisely in order to reduce costs
and still provide the safety many link to the last thirty-plus years of "tough
on crime" policies. In a fashion characteristically true of policymakers in
United States, that codification aspires to change the very status quo that it
principally reinforces through its formulations of and prescriptions for
addressing the problems. Perhaps like all such codifications, the Reentry
Policy Council's Report can be understood as, at once, alluringly
convincing from certain perspectives and transparently unpersuasive from
still others.
54. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 624.
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What I hope you at least will consider is that what looks like a game
plan for transforming reentry serves far more effectively as a reaffirmation
of the ideological presuppositions supporting the current criminal justice
system. That choice by the Reentry Council obscures what we actually face
and what credibly we must do even to begin to fundamentally alter reentry
and the various systems implicated in its implementation and insures that
things shall remain pretty much as they are now. I will focus my attention
on how the Report can and should be interpreted as reinforcing-yet
again-institutional arrangements and political principles that doom its
proclaimed ambitions.
But my efforts to reveal the conscious and unconscious and unstated
and half-buried and off-handed biases upon which the Report has been so
stylishly designed should not be understood as a refusal on my part to
recognize certain discernible utopian ambitions. At least some involved
with the production, dissemination, and implementation of the Reentry
Policy Council's detailed recommendations might well regard (and I
believe at least a small number do regard) the Report as ushering in a role
for reentry utterly denied over the past thirty or more years. These idealists
accept as uncontestable certain practical constraints and political
convictions that (beyond being patently unacceptable for me) enfeeble their
own utopian aspirations.
The Report
In order to create something like the effect of reading the entire
Report, I shall aim with great fidelity to provide a summary of the Reentry
Policy Council's work. It's far-fetched, I realize, but I aim for a degree of
verisimilitude. As a result, that summary will itself be long and meticulous.
What follows will be my own effort to expose certain central biases driving
the Report. That will be, by design, pointed and evocative. That allocation
of space is highly conscious. Unless you have some feel for the Report's
ambitiousness, you cannot possibly understand why it has been so
influential and so little challenged. Either what I have to say in exposing
particular predispositions will give you pause about the Report's actual
transformative power or I will have failed.
A Brief Overview
The Report aspires to serve as a broad-based policy guide to help
"policymakers and practitioners" (elected and appointed officials and
practitioners working in criminal justice, health, housing, workforce
development)-and others interested-plan out a reentry initiative. Tucked
into each policy sections are several different recommendations to help
administrators and policy makers implement the goals and principles of the
program. Along with these recommendations are small blurbs included
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from reentry programs. The blurbs detail examples of collaborative reentry
initiatives from around the country. Each of these small blurbs corresponds
to a program that is indexed by state in the back of the Report.
The Reentry Policy Council divided their policy statements into three
separate sections. The first section of the Report aims to guide
policymakers and practitioners through the process of creating a coalition
among agencies, an infrastructure for collaboration between these
organizations, and a common understanding of the reentry needs in their
community. Next, the Report follows the path of a typical inmate through
the reentry process, framing the journey through two dozen suggestions for
policy goals or changes to the reentry system. Beginning with admitting
procedures and ending with responses to parole and probation violations,
the bulk of the Report provides practical proposals for improving the
variety and quality of care that inmates receive in prison and outside, with
the express goal of a reduction in recidivism. Then the Report focuses on
systematic changes to housing systems, employment agencies, health care
providers, and social services providers. The Report bunches these
systematic improvements under the title of "reentry" because these services
provide the foundation for the post-release transition period for many
returning inmates. Finally, the Report includes a substantial national index
of different projects and organizations that have attempted to create
effective reentry programs.
Several claims tie the Report together and shape the policy statements
and recommendations for each of the topics addressed. Reentry reform will
be best achieved, the Report asserts, through reentry initiatives that bring an
extensive coalition of actors together to reshape the nature of incarceration
and help transition inmates back into the community.55 Programs should
provide evidence-based services and those services must be frequently
evaluated. Providing more effective treatment for inmates suffering from
mental illness, physical impairments, and drug addiction will substantially
alter the landscape of reentry. Broader collaboration between agencies will
provide more effective treatment and more complete supervision of
inmates.
Framing The Problem
At the end of 2003, the population of prisons and jails in the United
States eclipsed 2,200,000.56 Approximately 97% of those incarcerated in
prisons and virtually every person locked up in jail will eventually be
released. In 2004, nearly 650,000 people were released from prisons and
55. REPORT OF THE RE-ENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at xxiv.
56. Id. at xxviii.
57. Id. at xix.
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over 7 million different individuals from jails. And those numbers are
growing.58  But reentry-the transition from prisons and jails back to the
community-has largely failed. Roughly two out of every three people
released from prison in the US are rearrested within three years of their
release, and over half return to prison for a new offense or a violation of their
terms of release.59
With the possible exception of health care, spending on corrections has
increased faster than any other item in state budgets. Nationally, corrections
expenditures have gone from $9 billion in 1982 to $60 billion in 2002. Many
states already cannot afford these costs and, for the first time, bi-partisan
leaders agree that there is not enough money in state budgets to pay for the
current upward trends triggered by the "tough on crime measures" that
brought significant community safety over the past quarter century. In order
to reduce the costs of incarceration without endangering (and possibly even
enhancing) public safety, reentry must be approached comprehensively and
scientifically. Through evidence-based policies and recommendations, and
through the ability of a wide range of experts to work with one another,
across systems, institutions, and public, private, and civil boundaries,
policymakers will ensure that people do not return to prison or jail after
release.
Part I: Planning a Reentry Initiative
The Reentry Policy Council identifies two key elements for building a
foundation for reentry reform: convening the right people and analyzing the
right data.60 According to the Report, this process already has been initiated
across the country. Because every state and U.S. territory has received a
grant under the Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative, the Reentry
Policy Council concludes that, across the nation, somebody has convened
some committee of stakeholders to analyze reentry problems.6 ' Beyond this
federalized approach, the Report speculates that many state and local
governments may have convened separate working groups and tasks forces
to study the problem. 6 2  Capitalizing on these overlapping efforts, the
Report aims to guide already engaged stakeholders towards effective
collaborations as well as funding and evaluation of data-driven initiatives.
58. REPORT OF THE RE-ENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 3.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 17.
6 1. Id.
62. Id.
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A. Convening the Right People and Getting Them to Work Together
The single "most important common denominator shared among
jurisdictions that have launched a successful reentry initiative," declares the
Report, "is that some collaboration between representatives of at least two
independent organizations preceded the development and implementation
of the program or policy." 63  To begin forging such connections, the
Reentry Policy Council recommends recognition of the complexities of the
different systems and familiarity with the culture, funding, philosophy,
structure and oversight of each system. 4 After learning about different
overlapping systems, policymakers and practitioners should identify key
stakeholders and engage them in discussions regarding reentry. 65  The
Reentry Policy Council urges opening a dialogue among leaders in the
system. More specifically, the Report proposes identifying individuals
whose authority spans more than one organization or agency and who can
help foster collaboration across boundaries.
To signal the importance of expansive collaboration, the Reentry
Policy Council focuses an entire policy statement on incorporating reentry
into the mission and work plans of targeted organizations. This process can
be as difficult as it is essential.68 According to the Report, policymakers
and practitioners will find it to be a struggle to overcome reluctance within
many actors being asked to work collaboratively on reentry and prison
reform. 69  Limited budgets and scarce resources often force reentry
concerns to the bottom of many priority lists.70 To make matters worse,
institutions often work in isolation and rarely interact with others.7
Overcoming this reluctance, policymakers and practitioners must
target and convince quality community-based organizations to work with
correctional staff inside facilities and in their neighborhoods.7 2 In order to
determine the quality, they must assess an organization's demonstrated
ability to collect data, to comply with performance indicators contractually
imposed, and to provide an effective service delivery system adhering to
existing evidence-based practice.73 To avoid predictable biases, they must
ensure that procurement rules do not inadvertently favor larger
63. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 18.
64. Id. at 19.
65. Id at 20.
66. Id. at 21.
67. Id. at 22.
68. Id. at 47.
69. Id. at 38.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 44-45.
73. Id. at 46.
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organizations (with established rapport with facilities) over smaller
organizations (especially those not already connected to funders).74
Develop relationships with leaders in the community, urges the
Reentry Policy Council, to help gather information about local institutions
and to help link correctional facilities to communities. In order to connect
those released to geographically convenient services, policymakers and
practitioners must determine whether and how effectively organizations are
providing "neighborhood-based services,'"n and they should facilitate
community-based organizations' access to prisons and jails, of course
* 78without compromising security concerns.
Policymakers and practitioners must work to change the cultures of
criminal justice, health providers, and human services organizations to
make them more amenable to collaboration. Leaders of these entities must
begin to recognize, insists the Reentry Policy Council, that their mission
includes the safe and successful return of prisoners to the communities from
which they came.7 9 To help shift the orientation of these institutions and
encourage greater collaboration, policymakers and practitioners must
appreciate how each organization's mission relates to reentry and how
returning prisoners can be included in the service population.80 To do so,
review the quality of services provided by organizations to determine
whether the services need to be more accurately targeted and whether the
performance measures should be revised to fairly evaluate efforts to work
effectively with particularly challenging groups of people.8
That may be easier said than done, says the Reentry Policy Council.
To make these determinations requires well-informed professionals, and
two-thirds of states, require no professional qualifications for parole board
82members. To remedy this knowledge gap, states adopt professional
qualifications for parole board members, develop trainings for judicial
officers who set conditions of release during sentencing,83 and appoint only
qualified professionals to make these release decisions.8 4
Exhortations and inducements should be part of what policymakers
and practitioners offer leaders of quality organizations, especially those
evincing reluctance. Highlight that the organizations may already be
74. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 48.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 42.
77. Id. at 43-44.
78. Id.
79. Id at 38.
80. Id. at 39-40.
81. Id
82. Id. at 52 (citing PETERSILIA, supra note 1).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 51-52.
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serving people with criminal records and that reward (both intangible and
tangible) may follow from explicitly coordinating with correctional officials
and programs.85 Correctional officials, says the Report, can guarantee to
organizations a high level of participation by reentering inmates, especially
through the use of incentives and sanctions governing the correctional
system's probationers and parolees. 6  And they can highly recommend
ways technology may be cost effective in connecting community-based
service providers to incarcerated patients and clients. 87  To help recruit
community organizations to target reentry population, policymakers and
practitioners can require that all contracts with private service providers
who work inside correctional facilities include provisions for services to be
provided after the inmate leaves the correctional facility.
To ensure seamless transitions during post release, sufficient
supervision of transitioning inmates, and effective service delivery,89 the
Report demands that systems work together, which will require individuals
to learn about the organization of and operation within other systems,
develop over-arching approaches to governance and common benchmarks
for achievement. 90 One element of this demand focuses on short-term goals
and effectively managing the reentry initiative. Another longer term
aspiration aims to train providers to work together to provide services
seamlessly to inmates during transitions between incarceration and the
community. To facilitate this brand of coordination, the Reentry Policy
Council recommends creating and maintaining forums for project oversight,
information sharing, and communication across agencies and
organizations.91 High-ranking officials should create a type of super
structure with an oversight team that establishes within a jurisdiction
ultimate authority over all collaborative reentry efforts.92 This team
requires a coordinator, who organizes meetings, monitors the
implementation of programs,93 and effectively communicates with the chief
executive of the jurisdiction. 9 4
The oversight committee should represent a variety of stakeholders
85. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 49-50, (citing LAUREN E.
GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Probation and Parole in the
United States, 2002, US Department of Justice, NCJ 201135 (Washington, DC: 2003), available
at http://www.policyalmanac.org/crime/archive/probation&parole2002.pdf.
86. Id at 49-50
87. Id. at 51.
88. Id. at 50.
89. Id. at 74.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 75.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 76.
94. Id
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(including community leaders)95 and facilitate routine communication to
keep all subcommittees updated.9 6 The Report does not stop there,
however. The Reentry Policy Council encourages intersystem training that
can foster greater cooperation and linked information systems. 97 It further
recommends a staff member to serve as a "boundary spanner," helping
inmates navigate across multiple agencies and follows the individual during
and following their incarceration." To formalize commitments to these
arrangements, partnering agencies should sign memoranda of
understandings (MOU), identifying the allocation of shared resources, the
accountability measures for each agency, and the expectations of the
combined efforts. 99  Finally, the Reentry Policy Council recommends
establishing goals and benchmarks common to all parties and agencies.'oo
B. Gathering Information
The Report recommends that stakeholders and organizers understand
the nature and the scope of the local reentry issues and develop familiarity
with local release policies, the characteristics of returning prisoners, and the
resources and the capacity of the community.101  The Reentry Policy
Council cautions against relying solely on national data and encourages
communities to make financial investments in research on their local
reentry issues.102 The Reentry Policy Council thus provides a "roadmap" to
build a state- and local-level knowledge,'o recommending that
communities understand "who" is being released from prison.10 4
Policymakers and practitioners will want to learn about the nature and
needs of their population. 05  Important factors include demographic
information, percentage of population with gang affiliations, types of
criminal histories, types of health concerns, level of employability, housing
needs, and substance abuse problems.10 6  Often the department of
corrections will already collect this data,'07 making access relatively easy.' 0
This knowledge should include a compilation of federal, state, and
95. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 77.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 78.
98. Id at 84.
99. Id at 85.
100. Id. at 86.
101. Id. at 23.
102. Id. at 23-24.
103. Id. at 25.
104. Id. at 26.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 26-27.
107. Id at 27.
108. Id
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local policies influence and govern reentry. 0 9 To gather such information,
the Report steers policymakers to three types of sources: Sentencing
statutes, statutes governing the decision-making process for release and
post-release supervision, and regulations governing the objective and
conditions of probation or post-release supervision. In urging policymakers
and practitioners to grasp the importance of geography, the Reentry Policy
Council insists researchers can discover the neighborhoods that have high
concentrations of returning inmates, whether services exist in those areas,
and any other co-occurring problems in those communities that need to be
addressed. 0
Never taking its eye off recidivism,"' the Reentry Policy Council
suggests that learning the characteristics of those most likely to reoffend
can help target resources to the neediest populations."12 Policymakers and
practitioners should examine how prisoners prepare for reentry while
incarcerated as well as how community corrections officers supervise and
aide individual in the transition from prison back into the community." 3
Focus on the percentage of prisoners in work release programs and the
percentage of prisoners making use of services in the community."14
Collect information on the steps that prepare prisoners and their families for
release, when prisoners travel home if their places of incarceration are
located far from their communities, and how prisoners are prepared for
employment after their release."'
109. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 28.
110. Id at 33. For more information relating to this kind of specific locational information,
the report offers several guides and examples such as the Reentry Mapping Network, the Perry
School Community Services Center Asset Mapping Project, the National Institute of Justice
Mapping and Analysis for Public Safety Program, the Northwest Regional Educational
Laboratory, and Community Mapping, Planning & Analysis for Safety Strategies (COMPASS)
(pp. 30).
The report also states that this kind of information "has been effectively used to target
services for and surveillance of parolees; to inform interventions to fight gang-related gun
violence; and to improve the delivery of service for victims" (30, citing to Keith Harries,
Applications of Geographical Analysis in Probation and Parole,4 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN
PROBATION AND PAROLE ASSOCIATION, 26-31 (2002); ANTHONY BRAGA ET AL., NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE: THE BOSTON GUN PROJECT'S OPERATION
CEASEFIRE (2001); and DEBRA A. STOE ET AL., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE USING
GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEM TO MAP CRIME VICTIM SERVICES (2003)).
Ill. Id.
112. Id
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C. Funding
The Reentry Policy Council directly addresses funding reentry
initiatives, services, and programming. According to the Report, the single
biggest obstacle to developing and implementing reentry programs is lack
of money.' 16 As result, the Reentry Policy Council provides suggestions for
effectively using the current funds, increasing the level of funds spent on
reentry, and reducing the need for funds through better controlling rates of
incarceration.
The Report focuses on making the most of current spending levels,
thereby recommending using limited funds only on evidence-based
programs that have been proven effective.l17 Concentrate dollars on
individuals just prior to or just after their release, for money can be most
effective during these periods of greatest need.' 18 Utilize volunteers from
community and faith-based groups to supplement staffing and to increase
program capacity.1 9 Volunteers can serve as good role models for healthy
behavior and can help bridge the divide between correctional facilities and
the outside community. 12 But because volunteers cannot be substitutes for
professionals, they can require costly trainings and oversight,12 ' and can
clash with corrections officers because of differing perspectives,1 2 2 the
Report recommends assigning an agency representative to coordinate
volunteers and act as a liaison between correctional staff and volunteers. 123
The Reentry Policy Council recommends that institutions determine
how funding sources intended for the same populations can be coordinated
and leveraged effectively to serve reentry purposes.124 This approach would
avoid attempting to raise new targeted reentry funds, which the Report
views as difficult. Instead, correctional facilities and service providers
should take advantage of funding that already exists by combining funds to
support reentry initiatives.125 The Report provides an eight-page guide to
nontraditional funding sources that could be used towards reentry services,
such as Public Housing Choice Vouchers and Community Development
I16. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 53.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 55.
i19. Id at 68-9. Here, the report fails to cite to any literature or data. Instead it gives two
examples: Women's Mentorship Program, Rhode Island Department of Corrections;
Shadow/Mentorship Program, Islamic Health and Human Services (MI).
120. Id. at 69.
121. Id. at 70.
122. Id.
123. Id
124. Id at 56.
125. Id. at 57.
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Block Grants monies.126
Beyond managing money more resourcefully, the Reentry Policy
Council suggests managing the growth of the prison population better.127
The Report states that "changes to policies that govern prison admission
and length of stay can in fact quickly create a major stream of revenue."l28
These policy changes usually mean a combination of more flexible release
dates, modifications to existing sentencing regulations, and graduated
sanctions for violators of parole and probation.' 2 9 The important feature of
these sorts of changes will be ensuring that savings will be reinvested in the
reentry system, instead of filling budget gaps or building new highways.130
Policy makers should work to guarantee that prison savings are spent on
reentry initiatives.
126. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 58-65.
127. Id. at 67.
128. Id The report offers an illustration of such measures taken in Connecticut. Due to
legislation passed in May 2004 by the General Assembly, "of the $60 million allocated for the
anticipated contract to send inmates out of state, the majority of these funds [were] returned to the
general fund . . . $16 million were redirected to fund additional probation and parole officers,
halfway houses, and the New Haven Community Foundation, charged with establishing a pilot
project to assist a handful of neighborhoods expanding their capacity to receive people released
from jail." Id. at 68. The report also cites to Michigan as an example of a state legislatures
changing sentencing laws. On December 25, 2002, former Governor John Engler signed into law
a piece of legislature repealing some mandatory sentencing laws for certain drug offenses. (Id. at
72-3) In advocating for administrative changes in prison admissions, the report cites to a study by
Michael Jacobson that states that "28% of all prison admissions are either probation or parole
violators and at least half of these violations are technical-offenses for which someone could not
be sentenced to prison." (Id. at 72-3)
129. Id. at 67-73.
130. Id. at 67-8.
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D. Evaluationl31
A pivotal assumption and aspiration for the Reentry Policy Council's
the presumed value of using tested methods-"evidence-based" and "cost-
benefit analysis" to use the rhetoric the Report comfortably embraces and
unabashedly champions. This theme influences many of the
recommendations throughout the Report, including the Reentry Policy
Council emphasis on creating procedures to measure and evaluate program
outcomes during implementation. 132 These evaluations should answer three
key questions: Is the program producing the desired results? Is the program
generating the greatest possible impact? Is the program the most efficient
use of public funds?133 The Reentry Policy Council recommends rigorous
evaluations of the program's process, which examine the underlying theory
and implementation behind the program. Programs should be subjected to
separate evaluation of outcomes to determine whether the program has
achieved the intended effect,13 4 and program outcomes should, when
possible, be measured afainst an experimental or random sample to
properly compare the data.
The Report demands analysis of both the broad overarching foundation
of the program and the individual components. The Reentry Policy Council
131. The report provides the nonprofit East County One-Stop as an example of a success-
measuring program. It simply states that the organization "formed a committee to identify criteria
to measure success in serving high-barrier populations." Id. at 86. The report also offers two
examples of agencies that could help "define, measure, and report on the success of a reentry-
initiative." Id at 88. It refers to the Little Hoover Commission in California and Washington
State Institute for Public Policy. The report cites to Mary Ann Scheirer, Designing and Using
Process Evaluation in HANDBOOK OF PRACTICAL PROGRAM EVALUATION (Joseph S. Wholey,
Harry P. Hatry, & Kathyrn E. Newcomer eds., 1994) in its defense of the use of process
evaluations in examining "program design and implementation." Id. at 92.
In terms of undertaking a cost-benefit analysis with respect to any reentry initiative, the
report cites to ADELLE V. HARRELL & BARBARA SMITH, THE URBAN INSTITUTEEVALUATION OF
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUPERIOR COURT DRUG INTERVENTION PROGRAM (1996), stating
that linking the analysis to the impact evaluation "leads to the estimate cost of each successful
client." Id. at 93. The report also gives an example of an correction agency's in-house research
and evaluation unit, the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles. Id. at 94. In discussing the
effectiveness of substance abuse treatment programs, the Report cites to the Correctional Program
Assessment Inventory (CPAI), which can "help corrections administrators determine whether a
given program has an evidence base." Id. at 182.
For an example of the adoption of "evidence-based programs" see WASH. STATE INST. FOR
PUB. POLICY, OUTCOME EVALUATION OF WASHINGTON STATE'S RESEARCH-BASED PROGRAMS
FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS, (Jan. 2004), where the Washington State Legislature passed the
Community Juvenile Accountability Act (CJAA) to establish "research-based" programs in the
state's juvenile courts.
132. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 87.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 87, 92.
135. Id. at 92.
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recommends developing a sound "logic model" to build a shared
understanding of the programs objectives, strategy, activities, and the
relationship between the program's components and partners.13 6 A logic
model visually represents the framework of a program by describing the
components of the program, the sequence of activities, and the relationships
between each of these activities and their impact on the community.'"7 In
an effort to further scrutinize the program's progress, the Reentry Policy
Council recommends administrators develop measures to continuously
monitor staff performance and to determine whether goals are being met.138
After both process and impact evaluation, the Report recommends
requiring a cost-benefit analysis to quantify whether a program is operating
efficiently. 39 Do a program's benefits outweigh its costs? Especially in
fiscally difficult times, cost-benefit studies must ensure efficient allocation
and expenditure of funds. Because such studies are expensive and typically
beyond the means of many local community-based organizations and
agencies, the Report emphasizes the need to develop relationships with
cost-benefit analysts employed by correctional institutions and colleges and
universities.1 40
E. Educating the Public About Reentry
In an attempt to gain public support for reentry programs, the Reentry
Policy Council urges policy makers, practitioners, and advocates to
prioritize public education efforts. These education initiatives should
inform the public of the needs of the reentering inmates and the risks of
ignoring this population. Education should highlight the benefits of the
successful initiatives to public safety and the community.14' The Report
notes that policy makers must be able to represent that this type of effective
supervision has been implemented in their communities.14 2 Building this
type of credibility may be hard, and communities may have to employ
substantial changes to convince the public of their ability to effectively
supervise parolees.14 3
The Report suggests informing the public that prolonging the
incarceration of every prisoner or returning every violator of probation or
parole to prison or jail is neither good policy nor fiscally responsible
136. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 89.
137. Id. at 90.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 93.
140. Id
141. Id. at 95.
142. Id. at 97.
143. Id at 98.
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behavior.'" In California, the shift from funding schools to funding prisons
is a stark example of the fiscal consequences of mass incarceration.145 The
public should also be informed of the large and growing number of people
with criminal records in the community.146 The public should be aware that
these individuals are routinely apart of everyone's daily life and must be
effectively re-entered back into society.147  Overall, individual stories can
help put a human face on the problems facing re-entering prisoners.148
Finally, the Report recommends helping the public appreciate that
preparing people in prison or jail for their release and providing support for
them upon their return makes families and communities stronger, safer and
healthier.14 9  The public must understand that prisoner reentry affects
everyone and the true need to reshape the reentry system.'50
Part II: Review of the Reentry Process: From Admission to Return to
the Community
A. Program Planning
This section outlines the journey of an inmate from admission into a
correctional facility to reintegration back into the community. The Report
describes goals for each of these stages and offers recommendations to
achieve these goals. Several policy ambitions routinely surface in the
policy statements. Improving the quality and quantity of treatment services
to inmates, both pre- and post-release, reappears throughout the Report.
Educational training and work-orientated training programs make regular
appearances throughout the policy's suggestions, usually coupled with the
recommendation that these services match the needs of the local job market.
The Report attempts to consider community needs alongside the needs of
the returning inmate throughout every facet of the reentry process,
144. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 98. The report cites to the
statements of governors Mike Huckabee (R-AR) and Bob Riley (R-AL) to demonstrate the budget
pressures in their corrections systems. In addition, the report cites to Joan Petersilia's
"COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS" IN CRIME: PUBLIC POLICIES FOR CRIME CONTROL (Oakland: ICS
Press, 2004) to argue that slashing the already struggling jail and prison-based programs is not the
solution. However, the report does not illustrate or suggest ways in which public leaders and
lawmakers can or should educate the public on what is either "good policy" or "fiscally
responsible behavior."
See also Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, 26 CRIME &
JUSTICE 479 (1999).
145. Id. at 99.
146. Id. at 100.
147. Id
148. Id. at 101.
149. Id. at 101-2.
150. Id
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ultimately making an argument for rethinking the role of community
supervision.
B. Intake
The connection between intake procedures and the reentry process is
not necessarily intuitive, at least according to the Reentry Policy Council.
However, the Report presses institutions to understand the relationship
between intake and reentry."s' The earlier staff, administrators, correctional
institutions, and offenders themselves begin to think about reentry, the more
thorough and comprehensive planning and programming can reshape the
entire prison dynamic. 152  Better in-take procedures will better measure
prisoner needs and connect them with suitable providers and community-
based organizations.15 3  These community organizations can provide
services to inmates in the facility and after release.
According to the Reentry Policy Council, research on the current
intake practices of correctional facilities shows significant room to improve
admission procedures. Current screening and assessment tools are often
limited in scope, only focusing a security risks and immediate health
15 1. A large part of this change in focus refers to the use of assessment practices in order to
use the intake process to develop more effective reentry programs. The report cites to Prison
Intake Systems: Assessing Needs and Classifying Prisoners, (Patricia L. Hardyman, James Austin,
and Johnette Peyton) to support the "efficacy of validated assessment practice." Id at 112.
Additionally, the report cites to a small body of literature to suggest that the most effective
treatment programs are those tailored to an offender's individual traits, which can be measured
through these assessment tools. DON ANDREWS AND JAMES BONTA, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
CRIMINAL CONDUCT (Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing, 2004); Francis T. Cullen and Paul
Gendreau, "assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Practice, and Prospects" in Criminal
Justice 2000, vol 3: Policies Processes, ad Decisions of the Criminal Justice System, US
Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice (Washington, DC: 2000). Id.
In explaining that appropriate intake processes should also be developed for short-term jail
settings, the report offers the orientation program in the Hampden County Jail and House of
Correction (Mass.) as an example (Id. at 118). During this five-week orientation program,
inmates undergo screening processes, attend daily classes and then, based on their screenings,
participate in intensive programming.
The article A Reentry-Centered Vision of Criminal Justice, argues for a reentry-focused
criminal justice system, not just making reentry part of the intake process. By requiring actors at
the forefront of the criminal justice system to consider reentry goals, the article argues that
individuals will be better able to reenter into their communities later. Michael Pinard, A Reentry-
Centered Vision of Criminal Justice, 20 FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER, pp 103-109 (2007).
Faye S. Taxman, The Cattle Call of Reentry: Not All Processes Are Equal, 10 CRIMINOLOGY &
PUBLIC POLICY 925 (2011) also provides an interesting article on the need of a culture change and
the creation of an environment where individuals coming into the justice system can change from
the outset.
152. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 109.
153. Id
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needs.154 Yet, even this focus on risk assessment does not yield effective
information gathering. Often, correctional departments use security risk
assessments that have not been shown to predict the behavior of the
populations being assessed.155
The Reentry Policy Council's Report provides a path to better
integrate the reentry needs of inmates during the initial intake process. To
understand areas of improvements, corrections administrators should begin
with a comprehensive review of their intake procedures.' 56 The Report
suggests utilizing both a short and easily administrable screening
instrument, as well as, longer and more focused assessments of prisoner's
needs.157 Abbreviated instruments should help connect short-term inmates
with community-based organizations that can provide them information and
support after their release.158
The Report provides a lengthy list of subjects to be addressed during
intake procedures, including security level, mental health, substance abuse,
physical health, education and vocational history and learning style,
housing, family information, social services involvement, and financial
stability.159 An effective intake assessment or series of assessments must
effectively learn much without mindlessly aiming toward an unachievable
comprehensiveness.
The Report emphasizes the connection between elements of the intake
interview and the reentry process. Understanding, appreciating, and
treating the mental health, physical health, and substance abuse needs of
each inmate is a critical element of post-release success. The intake process
should focus on identifying individuals who require further assessment for
health or substance abuse problems. Inmates should receive effective
employment and educational assessments to measure the type of
educational or vocational training that will best prepare the inmate for
future employment.6 o Specialists should review each inmate's history to
maximize public benefit opportunities and to help manage the inmate's
personal debt, including court fines and child support. 16 1
An inmate's family relationships will be a critical element of the
reentry process. Ultimately, the intake process should attempt to
understand the interplay between the inmate's family life, their risks, and
their needs upon reentering their community after incarceration. The policy
154. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 111.
155. Id.
156. Id at 113.
157. Id.
158. Id at 118.
159. Id. at 114-15.
160. Id. at 126-28.
161. Id. at 128-29.
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committee emphasizes the importance of accurate risk assessments for each
individual prisoner to address both the inmate's initial security
classification and to provide appropriate correctional programming.162
Understanding the interplay between dynamic and static factors can provide
better information about an inmate's security risk and help secure more
effective programming.'6 1
Beyond simply covering all of the essential materials, the Report
pointedly urges administrators to demand that the screening tools and
assessments provide quality information. Correctional facilities should
employ only tools validated by research,'" validated both by the developers
of the tools and the prison administrators using them in their own
facilities.'16  The Report emphasizes focusing on two main criteria: 1) does
the instrument make sense to those who use it, and 2) does the instrument
have the capacity to predict the risks and to measure needs based on
statistical associations? 6 6 Tools should be tested and validated for different
populations, as variations in gender and race could change the predictability
and value of the tests.' 6 7
The policy lists a series of practical considerations that should be
factored into the development of intake processes. For example,
correctional facilities should adopt tools that can be modified for use
throughout an inmate's incarceration to provide easily comparable data
from different decision points.' 6 8  Similarly, community-based
professionals, such as service providers, law enforcement and victim's
advocates, should partner with correctional facilities to reduce redundant
assessments and to share critical information.' 6 9  Information gathered
should be disseminated to appropriate staff and service providers
throughout the health and human services arena, and in order to comply
with confidentiality requirements, inmates should be advised of their legal
rights and given the option to sign a waiver.17 0  Finally, the Report
emphasizes the importance of proper training for officers involved in the
admission process, including insuring that only trained correctional officers
should administer the tests and that these officers must have a cultural
competency to work with diverse communities and female inmates.' 7'
162. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 119.
163. Id.
164. Id at 133.
165. Id at 134.
166. Id at 133.
167. Id at 134.
168. Id.
169. Id at 136-37.
170. Id at 139.
171. Id. at 135-37.
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C. Program Plan
Program planning represents the backbone of the policy goals for the
prison side of the reentry problem. A program plan should help an inmate
makes the "best use of his or her incarceration to improve the likelihood of
success upon reentry." 7 2  To create such plans and to coordinate their
implementation, an interdisciplinary team should create a step-by-step plan
for each individual inmate to succeed after their release,173 all of which is
meant to provide structure and coordination in the midst of the current
haphazard system of prison services. The counsel's analysis of current
correctional facility failings connects the lack of individual planning in
correctional facilities with the lack of adequate services to inmates by these
facilities. According to the Report, fewer than half of state correctional
facilities have a program planner on staff.174  Without these planners,
correctional officers often make ad-hoc decisions regarding planning for
inmates, governed by availability in programs rather than applicability of
the program for the inmate.'75  While this type of inappropriate
programming will not reduce recidivism, appropriate program can be
extremely beneficial for inmates and help their reentry process. 176
Creating and implementing individualized plans requires coordinating
efforts both within correctional facilities and the broader community.
Correctional facilities should create program-planning teams based on the
individual needs of each inmate and reflecting culturally and gender
competent capacities. 77 These teams should consist of a variety of service
providers (mental health care providers, community-based service providers
and work force experts) and the person who has been incarcerated in order
to create a step-by-step plan to prepare for release.178 Teams should include
and gather input from the inmate's family, victim's family, and other
community members, and should consider the individual inmate's
strengths, weaknesses, and background. 179 Ideally, the team leader who
directs the implementation of the plan should have specialized background
or receive specialized training to address the inmate's primary service needs
172. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 141.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 142.
175. Id.
176. Id. The report cites to a study where inappropriate treatment actually increased
recidivism rates of participants by six percent. Don A. Andrews, "The Psychology of Criminal
Conduct and Effective Treatment," in JAMES MCGUIRE, WHAT WORKS: REDUCING RE-OFFENDING
(West Sussex, England: John Wiley & Sons, 1995).
177. Id at 146.
178. Id. at 43-44, 49.
179. Id. at 144.
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and, later, connect the inmate to community service providers. 80
Correctional facilities should centralize record keeping, including
developing a statewide system of sharing data and methods by which all
involved regularly communicate.is'
D. Treatment: Physical Health Care
Considerably improving the quality and consistency of treatment
programs provided inmates is a goal repeated throughout the Report. The
Reentry Policy Council first tackles the physical care services. Jails and
prisons face several formidable responsibilities.'8 2 Inmates have complex
health needs and are far more likely than people of comparable ages to have
chronic illness, communicable diseases, and severe mental disorders.' 83
Correctional facilities are constitutionally required to provide expensive
medical care services.18 4  Yet the incarcerated population also presents
exceptional opportunities for professionals to tackle among the most
difficult public health problems. Inmates suffer perhaps disproportionately
from communicable diseases provide a setting where public health officials
might learn more about diagnosing, treating, and preventing the spread of
contagions throughout communities. 8 5
An important way to eliminate physical health barriers to reentry is to
engage community-based health care services prior to an inmate's
release.186 By connecting patients with outside medical care immediately
after the intake process, a prison can provide medical care that would be
prohibitively expensive on site, and the prison can reduce the costs of
duplicative intake and diagnostic processes.' 87  A greater link between
community-based providers and prisoner increases the likelihood prisoners
will continue to receive treatment after release.'88 Telemedicine provides
180. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 153.
181. Id at 152.
182. Citations from the report: National Commission on Correctional Health Care, The
Health Status ofSoon-To-Be-Released prisoners: A Report to Congress, vol. 1 (Chicago: National
Commission on Correction Health Care, 2002); "Elderly Inmates Swell Prisons, Driving Up
Health Care Costs," ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 28, 2004.
Other literature: Kamala Mallik-Kane & Christy A. Visher, Health and Prisoner Reentry: How
Physical, Mental, and Substance Abuse Conditions Shape the Process of Reintegration. Urban
Institute, February 2008.
183. REPORTOF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL,supra note 3, at 157.
184. Id. at 157-58. The report does not cite caselaw but instead the National Commission on
Correctional Health Care, The Health Status of Soon-To-Be-Released Prisoners: A Report to
Congress (vol. I (Chicago: National Commission on Correctional Health Care, 2002)).
185. Id. at 158.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 159.
188. Id.
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an avenue to engage community based organization because, according to
the Report, providers can deliver medical services without transporting
inmates to medical facilities outside of the prison or jail.' 89 Community-
based organizations can provide education, disease prevention, and good
health promotion to inmates, who can be particularly cooperative with
medical directives.190
The Reentry Policy Council champions the principle that coordinating
medical treatment reduces reentry problems. The Report recommends
maintaining medical records so that all service providers have up-to-date
information regarding inmates and that the records are easy to transfer once
the inmate leaves.1 91 Ideally, medical records would be available
electronically so that both institutional and community members could
access the information.192 Co-occurring medical problems would receive
more effective treatment with better coordination between service
providers. 19 3  The interaction between drug abuse, mental health, and
physical health is complex; treatment of one disorder will often affect the
others, 194 and coordination between service providers could help treat
conditions often worsened by treating these problems independently. The
Report suggests that correctional facilities should ensure that even short-
term inmates receive basic medical care and transition planning services to
address their needs upon release. 195  Even for short-term inmates,
correctional facilities should assess the individual's needs, plan for
treatment, identify community programs, and coordinate the transition from
incarceration to the community.196
E. Treatment: Mental Health Care
According to the Report, people with mental illnesses are significantly
over-represented in prisons and jails, and co-occurring substance abuse is
common among this population.' 9 Inmates with mental illnesses are more
likely to have a criminal record of violent offenses and more likely to have
189. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 160.
190. Id. at 161-62. The report does not cite to any studies of the effectiveness of
community-based organizations within this capacity. It does, however, provide examples of such
programs such as the HIV Coordinators at the Massachusetts Department of Public Health/County
Sheriffs Department and the Get Connected, Centerforce program in California which serves
individuals newly admitted to San Quentin State Prison, Central California Women's Facility, and
Valley State Prison.
191. Id. at 162.
192. Id. at 163.
193. Id. at 164.
194. Id. at 165.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 166.
197. Id. at 168.
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been victims of sexual abuse and physical abuse.'98 Mentally ill inmates are
more likely to be homeless as well.' 99 The Report states that 60% of state
prisoners with mental illnesses receive services in state prisons, and 11% of
the totally population in jails nationwide receive mental health services.200
However, the Report notes that only 66 % of states report helping inmates
with referrals after their release, and some of those efforts amount to
nothing more than handing inmates a list of possible service providers.2 0'
To create a higher likelihood of continued care during an inmate's
reentry, the Report recommends engaging community-based mental health
care systems in both pre- and post-release care.202 One way to engage
community systems is telemedicine, which uses technology such as e-mail,
telephone, and video conferencing to connect inmates with treating
physicians.203 This option, at least according to the Report, allows
correctional facilities to offer a wider range of medical care, without the
expense of travel or maintaining specialists on staff.2 0 4
Beyond providing more access to care, correctional facilities should
put a wide variety of medications on formularies to provide the most
effective treatment to mentally ill inmates, including some of the more
expensive medications used to treat mental illness. 2 0 5  These facilities
should also focus on providing a wide range of therapies, including training
in basic skills, trauma treatment, peer or community support groups, and
treatment that focus on co-occurring problems.206 Specifically for co-
occurring substance abuse problems, mental health providers should
develop protocols, such as a comprehensive assessments and a system of
coordination between service providers, to better address the individual
needs of each inmate.207
F. Substance Abuse
Drug treatment programs figure prominently in the Reentry Policy
Council's plan to connect better services to more inmates.208 According to
studies, two-thirds of jail inmates were actively involved with drugs prior to
their admission, and 55% of state prison inmates admit to using drugs or
198. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 168.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 169.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 170-71.
203. Id at 171.
204. Id. at 171, 174.
205. Id. at 172.
206. Id. at 173-74.
207. Id. at 175-177.
208. Id. at 179.
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alcohol during the commission of the crime that resulted in their
incarceration. 2 09 Despite this high incidence of drug and alcohol use, the
Reentry Policy Council reports that in 1997, 10% of state prison inmates
reported receiving formal substance abuse treatment. 2 '0  For jail inmates,
only 3% of the population received these types of formal services. 2 1 1 For
the Reentry Policy Council, this gap between inmate need and treatment
presents a missed opportunity. Inmates who receive treatment in prison and
during their post-release have lower recidivism rates and lower drug relapse
rates than the inmates without treatment.2 12 Furthermore, this treatment is
cost effective. For every dollar spent on substance abuse treatment, three to
209. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 180. For these statistics,
the report cites to Christopher J. Mumola, Substance Abuse and Treatment, State and Federal
Prisoners, 1997, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics (Washington, DC: 1999),
NCJ 172871; Doris James Wilson, Drug Use, Testing, and Treatment in Jails, Department of




212. Id. at 181. The report here cites to Gerald G. Gaes et al., "Adult Correctional
Treatment," in MICHAEL TONRY AND JOAN PETERSILIA (EDS.), PRISONS (CHICAGO, IL: University
of Chicago Press, 1999). It goes further to say that inmates who participate in treatment while and
post incarceration are more likely to have better outcomes, citing to Lana D. Harrison, "The
Revolving Prison Door for Drug Involved Offenders: Challenges and Opportunities," 47 CRIME
AND DELINQUENCY, NO. 3 (2001). The report also suggests the effectiveness of therapeutic
communities, citing specifically to a study that found that 25% of inmates who received treatment
in prison and in the community afterwards were reincarcerated "while 64 percent of aftercare
drop-outs and 42% of untreated prisoners went back to prison within three years of their release
(181) (the study cited to was Kevin Knight, D. Dwayne Simpson, and Matthew Hiller, "Three-
Year Reincarceration Outcomes for In-Prison Therapeutic Community Treatment in Texas," 79
THE PRISON JOURNAL (1999): 337-351). For the report's cited literature on therapeutic
communities, see D. Dwayne Simpson, "National Treatment System Evaluation Based on the
Drug Abuse Reporting Program (DARP) Follow-Up Research," in Frank M. Tims and Jacqueline
P. Ludford (eds.) Drug Abuse Treatment Evaluation Strategies, Process, and Prospects, National
Institute on Drug Abuse, Research Monograph No. 51 (Bethesda, MD: 1984); Robert L. Hubbard
et al., "Treatment Outcome Prospective Study (TOPS): Client Characteristics Before, During, and
After Treatment," in Frank M. Tims and Jacqueline P. Ludford (eds.), Drug Abuse Treatment
Evaluation Strategies, Process, and Prospects, National Institute on Drug Abuse, Research
Monograph No. 51 (Bethesda, MD: 1984): National Institute on Drug abuse and National
Institutes of Health, Drug abuse Treatment Outcome Study (DA TOS), 1991-1995 (Bethesda, MD:
1996); Harry K. Wexler, Gregory P. Falkin, and Douglas S. Lipton, A Model Prison
Rehabilitation Program: An Evaluation of the Stay' N Out Therapeutic Community: Final Report
to the National Institute of Drug Abuse (Albany, NY: Narcotic and Drug Research, Inc., 1988).
The report states that the longer the treatment lasts, the better the outcome of treatment is likely to
be (citing to ROBERT L. HUBBARD ET AL., DRUG ABUSE TREATMENT: A NATIONAL STUDY OF
EFFECTIVENESS (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1989)).
See also Stephen J. Bahr, et al., What Works in Substance Abuse Treatment Programs for
Offenders?, 92 THE PRISON JOURNAL (2012) (Amongst other things, researchers reported that
drug use and crime were lower among individuals whose treatment was followed by an aftercare
program).
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seven dollars will be saved in crime-related costs. 2 13
The Report recommends administrators should analyze the types of
need in their population, the number of inmates currently receiving
treatment, and the nature and effectiveness of their treatment.214 In
determining the effectiveness of their programs, administrators should use
established reporting methods and validated research tools to ensure their
215
programs provide appropriate services. Facilities should develop quality
control mechanism to ensure that programs continue to provide successful
treatment. Given limited resources, facilities should focus on providing the
most effective programs to the neediest inmates.216 Inmates with chronic
substance abuse are more likely to benefit from treatment than recreational
217
drug users or nonusing sellers. Facilities should implement only
evidence-based treatments that make the best use of available resources.218
The Reentry Policy Council makes several broad suggestions for types
of treatment facilities should consider implementing. Treatment programs
that anticipate reentry challenges can often help inmates remain sober after
their release.219 Similarly, treatment programs that stress helping a person
change their behavior (including multiple levels of care) 220 and using the
leverage of the criminal justice system provide the most effective services
to individuals in the criminal justice system.22' Studies have showed that
therapeutic communities that create highly structured residential units
where participants live for at least a year can be particularly effective for
incarcerated substance abusers.2 22  Self-help or peer-support groups are
213. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 181. The report cites to a
study that estimated that "for every $1 spent on treatment, approximately $7 could be gained in
future savings (181) (citing Dean R. Gerstein et al., Evaluating Drug Recovery Services: The
California Drug and Alcohol Treatment Assessment (CALDATA), State of California, Department
of Alcohol and Drug Programs (Sacramento, Calif., 1994)).
214. Id at 182.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 184.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 185.
220. Considering treatment as a continuum, "multiple levels of care" simply refer to
different intensities of treatment which can range from early intervention to intensive inpatient
care (see pg 5 of "Quick Guide for Administrators: Substance Abuse Treatment for Persons with
Co-Occurring Disorders" by U.S. Department of Health ad Human Services). LOOK at Faye
Taxman, "Unraveling 'What Works' for Offenders in Substance Abuse Treatment Services,"
National Drug Court Institute Review II, no. 2 (1999): 91-132.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 186. In Clifford A Butzin, et al., Treatment during transition from prison to
community and subsequent illicit drug use, 28 JOURNAL OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 351
(2005), the author cites to a small body of literature that supports the positive outcomes from the
use of therapeutic communities. (Hiller, M.L., Knight, K., & Simpson, D.D. (1999) Prison-based
substance abuse treatment, residential aftercare and recidivism. 94 ADDICTION, 833-842; Inciardi,
J. A., Martin, S. S., Butzin, C. A., Hooper, R. M., & Harrison, L. D. (1997). An effective model of
39
popular among inmates and a relatively inexpensive substance abuse
treatment, but studies suggest such programs provide inconsistent results.223
prison-based treatment for drug-involved offenders. 27 JOURNAL OF DRUG ISSUES. 261-278;
Knight, K., Simpson D. D., & Hiller, M. L. (1999). Three-year reincarceration outcomes for in-
prison therapeutic community treatment in Texas. 79 PRISON JOURNAL, 337-351; Martin, S. S.,
Butzin, C. A., Saum, C., &Inciardi, J. A. (1999). Three-year outcomes of therapeutic community
treatment for drug-involved offenders in Delaware: From prison to work release to aftercare. 79
PRISON JOURNAL, 294-320; Pelissier, B, et al. (2000). TRIAD Drug Treatment Evaluation
Project final report of three-year outcomes: Part 1. Washington DC: Office of Research and
Evaluation, Federal Bureau of Prisons; Wexler, H., et al. (1999). Three-year reincarceration
outcomes for Amity in-prison therapeutic community and aftercare in California. 79 PRISON
JOURNAL, 321-336.) However, the original article cites to the difference in outcome measures
between these different studies (measuring recidivism versus actual drug use). Thus, it strives to
examine the "impact of work-release treatment upon subsequent use of illicit drugs" and "the
impact of treatment in the context of other variables associated with recidivism and relapse for
those in correctional treatment." In looking at contextual variables, the article cites to Gendreaur,
P., Little, T., & Goggin, C. (1996), A Meta-Analysis of the Predictors of Adult Offender
Recidivism: What Works, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 575-607; Laub, J. H., & Sampson, R.J. (2001),
Understanding desistance from crime. In M. Tonr ed., Crime and justice (pp. 1-69), Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
223. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 187." Therapeutic
communities are usually residential programs with 9-to- 18 month courses of treatment, followed
by continuing contact during a variable period of reentry. Therapeutic-community programs are
designed for people with major behavioral and social impairments, including a history of serious
criminal behavior. [They] involve highly structured blends of milieu psychotherapy, behavioral
modification, an internal hierarchy of jobs and progressive responsibilities, and a variety of
medical, educational, and vocational services . . . [In prison, these programs] involve separation
from the general prison population for 6 to 12 months, sometimes with period of community
reentry in a halfway house." (846) Dean R. Gerstein, Ph.D. & Lawrence S. Lewin, Treating Drug
Problems, N ENGL J MED 1990; 323; 844-848. According to the report, therapeutic communities
within a corrections system have "increased professional staff and less client control over clinical
issues" as opposed to other communities. Id. at 186. For examples of several therapeutic
communities see the report, page 186. In contrast, self-help programs like Alcoholics Anonymous
(AA) involve a more individualized process where the participants try to personally achieve
recovery while regularly reporting their progress and struggles. See Bahr, et al., What Works in
Substance Abuse Treatment Programs for Offenders? 92 THE PRISON JOURNAL 155-174 (2012).
The Report does not cite to any studies regarding therapeutic communities. It gives
examples of several programs but does not articulate any success rates or other data. The Report
does cite to Kevin Knight, et al., "Legal pressure, treatment readiness, and engagement in long-
term residential programs," JOURNAL OF OFFENDER REHABILITATION 31, no. 1/2 (2000) in stating
that residential treatment programs foster an attitude which researchers "have shown correlates
with continued engagement in treatment in the community." The Report also fails to cite to
studies on the effectiveness of self-help groups.
Literature on these programs: Stanley Sacks, et al., Randomized trial of a reentry modified
therapeutic community for offenders with co-occurring disorders: Crime outcomes, 42 JOURNAL
OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 247 (April 2012) ("study to determine the effectiveness of a
reentry modified therapeutic community for offenders with co-occurring substance use and mental
disorders"); Stephen J. Bahr, et al., What Works in Substance Abuse Treatment Programs for
Offenders?, THE PRISON JOURNAL 2012 92; Steven S. Martin, et al., Three-Year Outcomes of
Therapeutic Community Treatment for Drug-Involved Offenders in Delaware: From Prison to
Work Release to Aftercare, 79 THE PRISON JOURNAL 1999, 294; Cynthia A. Robbins, et al.,
Substance Abuse Treatment, Anticipated Maternal Roles, and Reentry Success of Drug-Involved
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Any program pursued by correctional officials should engage the
community-based substance abuse providers. And in order to offer
224culturally competent services, correctional officials should strongly aim
to staff programs with former substance abusers and community
members.225
G. Children and Families
The increased rates of incarceration translate into more parents being
locked up and more children growing up while their mothers and fathers are
away in prisons and jails.2 26 The Reentry Policy Council reports that only
about half of correctional agencies report policies or programs that help
families maintain supportive relationships.227 Without such programs,
families often face an uphill battle to stay in contact with incarcerated
relatives. Prisons are often hundreds of miles away from an inmate's last
residence, collect calls are expensive, and security protocols limit the
interaction during visitations, which can often be uncomfortable and
humiliating for parents. 2 28  To deal with these challenges, the Policy
Counsel recommends providing greater services to family members and,
when appropriate, helping to reestablish and strengthen family
relationships. 29 Research suggests that incarcerated parents can influence
their children in positive ways. 23 0  Not coincidentally, programs that
strengthen family relationships can reduce recidivism rates, increase the
likelihood of a successful reentry, and lower rates of physical and emotional
problems for incarcerated inmates.23 1
The Reentry Policy Council outlines practical ways for correctional
facilities to help inmates develop closer relationships with their families.232
For example, correctional facilities should gather detailed information about
Women Prisoners, 55 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 2009: 388; Wayne N. Welsh, A Multisite
Evaluation of Prison-Based Therapeutic Community Drug Treatment, 34 CRIM JUSTICE AND
BEHAVIOR 1481, 2007; Clifford A. Butzin, Treatment during transition from prison to community
and subsequent illicit drug use, 28 JOURNAL OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 351 (2005).
224. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 188.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 191.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 192.
229. Id. at 190.
230. Id. at 192.
231. Id
232. For an example of literatures developed at about the time the Report was being
finalized. See e.g., Christy A. Visher& Jeremy Travis, Transitions from Prison to Community:
Understanding Individual Pathways, 29 ANNU. REV. SOCIOL., 89-113, (2003) (the article
acknowledges the importance of understanding family in order to understand reintegration of
former prisoners).
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an individual's family needs and strengths during the intake process. 2 33
Using this information, prisons and jails should provide services that
address individual family needs. The Reentry Policy Council
acknowledges that some families will be uncertain about fostering a
relationship with the incarcerated relative. 2 34 Correctional facilities should
make referrals available to hesitant families and those services should
remain available to families throughout the incarceration and reentry
period.235
Beyond providing supportive services, the Reentry Policy Council
highlights ways that correctional institutions can strengthen the bond
between inmates and their families through continuous contact. The Report
focuses on this bond as a way to ease the reentry process because families
can be an important resource for incarcerated individuals, both during
incarceration and afterwards.236 Increasing the connection between inmates
and their families can help provide an individualized safety net and support
system. Prisons and jails can improve the quality of visitations by
providing family orientated visiting areas that allow parents to play and
interact with their children.237 States can decrease the financial burden of
these trips by providing visitor assistance programs that subsidize the cost
of transportation or lodging.238 The state can provide alternatives to collect
calls to encourage phone conversations between inmates and their
relatives.239
Incarceration impairs the ability of parents to participate in legal
proceedings concerning their children. As a result, the Report provides
suggestions to help increase parental understanding of court processes and
to facilitate involvement in these cases. According to the Reentry Policy
Council, correctional staff should learn the relationship between
incarceration and loss parental custody in their states and help inmates stay
informed.240 The Reentry Policy Council suggests that staff encourage
inmates to modify their child support payments to take into account their
changed circumstances. 2 4 1  Additionally, inmates should have the
opportunity to participate in court proceedings involving their children,
including custody, kinship care, child support and paternity cases. 24 2
233. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 193.
234. Id. at 195.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 196.
237. Id. at 197.
238. Id. at 197-98.
239. Id. at 197.
240. Id. at 196.
241. Id. at 198.
242. Id. at 200.
42 [Vol. 11I
Winter 2014] AMBITIOUS REENTRY PROGRAMS DOOMED TO FAIL
H. Behavioral and Attitude Programming
Beyond providing family services, the Reentry Policy Council expands
the standard definition of treatment to include behavior modification and
other attitude adjustment techniques that can help inmates learn to live in
their communities without reverting to criminal behavior. According to the
Reentry Policy Council, research suggests that some people have cognitive
deficiencies that are commonly linked to pro-criminal attitudes.243 Coping
mechanisms developed in prisons can create cognitive patterns that are
unhealthy for individuals living in the community. 2" Prisons decrease life
management skills, which become essential during post release. This
research suggests that programs that address cognitive deficiencies have
been associated with reduced recidivism and can provide cost effective
solutions to behavior problems faced by correctional institutions.2 45
The Report offers suggestions to correctional facilities regarding ways
that staff can employ cognitive therapy programs that focus on recidivism
reduction.2 46  Community and faith-based instruction can often be
instrumental in efforts to increase motivation and help transition inmates
back into the community. 247 Community mentoring has also been effective
to reduce recidivism. 248 Programs that teach daily skills can also play an
important role in efforts to re-shape improve inmate behavior, attitude and
motivation. 24 9 The Report relies on the research findings that often inmates
lacked these basic skills before their incarceration, and long periods of
incarceration will cause further deterioration. 2 50 At the same time, the
Reentry Policy Council promotes victim impact panels as a useful method
to help inmates understand the effect of their behavior and take
251responsibility for their actions.
The Reentry Policy Council's research suggests that these treatment
252tools should be used on both willing, and unwilling inmates. Moreover,
facilities should consider focusing services on high-risk inmates, as those
253inmates can derive a greater benefit from services. Finally, community-
based organizations should follow up on inmates who were unresponsive to
treatment, as studies show that those who do not receive treatment in prison
243. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 202.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 203.
246. Id. at 203-04.
247. Id. at 205.
248. Id. at 206.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 206-07.
251. Id. at 209.
252. Id. at 207.
253. Id at 208.
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may be more amendable to community services after release.254
I. Education, Vocational Training, and Work Training
In an effort to expand focus to fundamentals of life on the outside, the
Reentry Policy Council provides suggestions to improve the skill level of
the incarcerated population with the goal of helping inmates obtain regular
employment after their release. According to studies, there is a high
demand for training among the prison population; only 46% of incarcerated
individuals have high school diplomas.25 5 While many inmates were
employed during the months before their arrest, wages among inmates are
generally low. 2 56 The Report states among jail inmates employed during
the months before their arrest, the median income was less than 1,000 per
month, yet, with this high need, prisons and jails struggle to provide
adequate services. 25 7  Thirty-three percent of jurisdictions offer no
educational services at all.258 However, studies show that providing
educational and vocational training can lower recidivism rates and increase
employment.259
Coupled with the educational training, the Report recommends that
correctional facilities provide opportunities for inmates to gain work
experience to ease their transition back into their communities. 260 Just over
half of the prison population works while incarcerated, and only one-quarter
of jails offer institution based jobs.26 1 Worse still, the Research Policy
Council's research shows that many of these "work experiences" are
detached from the needs of the labor market, and rather reflect the needs of
correctional facilities.262 However, studies suggest that recidivism rates still
drop among inmates receiving these services,263 and that such programs
reduce tension and idleness within correctional facilities.2 6
The Report acknowledges that the level of appropriate education will
vary depending on the individual inmate. In many cases, jail and prison
inmates require education in basic skills, such as English-language training
and basic literacy.2 65 The universal goal of correctional facilities should be
254. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 208.




259. Id. at 213.
260. Id. at 221.
261. Id. at 222.
262. Id. at 222-23.
263. Id. at 223.
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265. Id. at 213.
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providing an eighth-grade education to all inmates.2 66 High school
equivalency or a comparable degree should be available.2 67 The Reentry
Policy Council recommends that individuals who meet the requirements
should have the opportunity to complete post-secondary courses. A
partnership with local educational institutions (including public, private,
and for-profit schools) can help provide prisons and jails with educational
opportunities for their population. 2 68 Correctional facilities should consider
developing a system to allow inmates access to online distance learning and
email without jeopardizing security.269
In addition to offering basic educational skills, prisons and jails should
tailor their training programs to fit specific needs of the community labor
market.2 70 The Reentry Policy Council suggests that research should be
conducted to determine the needs of the job market and correctional
facilities should regularly verify that course offerings are keeping up with
the current job market and technological advances.27' Inmates should be
particularly encouraged to participate in these sorts of job training programs
and cognitive therapy to prepare themselves for these sorts of services. 2 72
Given limited resources, correctional facilities should develop a system to
* * 273prioritize allocation of programs among inmates.
To help improve job training programs, the Reentry Policy Council
suggests providing work assignments that address the needs of the local job
market and working in tandem with institutional vocational training.2 74
Again, the Report emphasizes that program planning should be utilized to
ensure that every inmate receives training and education that will make her
more employable after release.275 Corrections facilities should attempt to
cultivate relationships with local industry, which can best identify training
needs and provide positions to inmates after their period of incarceration
has ended. 27 6 Similarly, pre-apprenticeship programs can provide inmates
eligibility to enter apprenticeship programs after release and help give
inmates a clear career path to follow. 27 7  Community-based volunteer
programs can provide training and working experience for inmates.278
266. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 214.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 219.
269. Id. at 219-20.
270. Id. at 215.
271. Id. at 216.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 220.
274. Id. at 223-24.
275. Id. at 224.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 225.
278. Id. at 226.
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J. Making the Release Decision: Advising the Releasing Authority
Following the timeline of an inmate's incarceration, the Report focuses
next on the release decision. To contextualize the decision process, the
Reentry Policy Council recommends developing a multi-factored and
evidenced-based assessment of each individual inmate to help inform all
boards and government officials involved in release decisions. Despite the
general shift away from discretionary release, the Reentry Policy Council's
research suggests that individuals released through a discretionary system
are more likely to successfully complete a parole term, even accounting for
the type of offense and prior record. 27 9 The Report suggests that the
absence of discretion decreases incentives for good behavior, program
planning, and treatment during incarceration.2 80 Not unimportantly for the
Reentry Policy Council, discretionary release gives opportunities for
victims and their families to continue to participate in the criminal justice
process.281
Despite these shrinking possibilities to exercise discretion over release
dates, the Report seeks to use any opportunity to improve the process that
determines release dates. The Reentry Policy Council suggests that a
transition planning committee should convene to oversee the inmate's
progress in the implementation of the programming plan and to collect
other information to advise the releasing authority, including public safety
information, programming plans, and staff updates, family situation, and
victim preferences.282 A validated and comprehensive risk assessment
should be conducted to determine the dangers the incarcerated individual
poses to the community.28 3 Transition teams should make sure to consider a
variety of factors (employment, housing, marital status/family,
physical/mental illness, substance abuse, community functioning,
personal/emotional orientation) to determine both the safety of releasing the
individual and the conditions that should be set for that release.2 84
The Reentry Policy Council recommends looking past the
characteristics of the individual to the characteristics of the community to
make the decision to recommend release. While collecting this information,
transition team members should invite victims to provide input on the
release of the defendant.2 85 The transition team should gauge the support an
inmate will receive from the community, both from family members and
279. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 231.
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service providers.286 The team should combine the risk assessment with
these other outside factors to create a written report that analyzes the
information and provides a recommendation. 28 7
Utilizing the correct factors represents only part of the release decision
equation. Releasing authorities should reconsider, suggests the Report,
their release decision practices for inmates with the most serious offenses.
Ensuring that high-risk inmates are released with community supervision,
instead of denying release until inmates max out on their sentences, will
provide enhanced structure and services upon release.2 88  The Report
contemplates structuring the mandatory release programs to ensure that
these high-risk offenders are only released with community supervision
provisions. 28 9  Only conditions tailored to an inmate's strengths and
weaknesses should be imposed by the review boards,290 preferably relying
291on evidence-based methods in creating a menu of options.
Conditions should be realistic-with only evidence-based treatment
programs ordered.292 Releasing authorities should review an inmate's debts
(restitution, child support, court fees, fines) and incorporate them in release
orders.293  To document rationales, releasing authorities should record in
writing the reasoning behind all discretionary decisions.294 Finally,
jurisdictions should ensure that mechanisms exist to allow changes and
modification of orders for longer supervision.2 95
Managing the Key Transition Period
After the release decision has been, the inmate enters into the transition
period. Making a concerted effort to reject the traditional method of reentry
planning, which focuses all resources and energy on the weeks just prior to
release, the Reentry Policy Council views this transition period as one stage
in an integrated process. During this period, planners should focus on
issues that could not have been addressed earlier, such as searching for
permanent employment and housing. Overall, the Report emphasizes that
all transition planning should have an "eye towards permanency., 2 96
286. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 239, 241.
287. Id. at 242.
288. Id. at 247.
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Housing
The Reentry Policy Council stresses as a goal finding housing for
inmates before their release. According to their Report, more than 10
percent of those coming in and out of jails and prisons are homeless, and
the numbers are even higher for mentally ill inmates. 297 The reasons for
this high level of homelessness should be familiar. Affordable housing is
scarce. 298 Many affordable housing programs do not admit individuals with
criminal records.299  Inmates often struggle with returning to live with
relatives because these families will often face losing their own subsidized
homes.30 0 Transitions and affordable housing programs are often successful
at helping inmates reintegrate, but the demand for space in these programs
far exceeds supply. 30 1 Lack of housing directly affects success rates for
inmates reentering their communities. According to a Vera Institute study,
parolees admitted to homeless shelters were seven times more likely to
abscond after the first month than parolees with stable housing. 302
The Report recommends transition planners familiarize themselves
with housing options in each community, maintain inventories of available
housing, and connect these resources to inmates. 30 3  Planners must
understand the legal restrictions for public housing and the implications of
criminal histories on eligibility. 30 4 Developing and routinely updating a
housing resource guide can help distribute information between community
organizations, transition planners in correctional facilities, and inmates.305
Using this information, transition planners must determine each inmate's
need on an individual basis, taking into account a variety of factors.306 All
housing plans should be developed well in advance of an inmate's release,
and transition planners should help educate each inmate about finding and
maintaining housing, including their legal rights as tenants in the private
market.307
When assessing an inmate's family.for possible housing, the Reentry
Policy Council recommends that planners evaluate the feasibility, safety,
and appropriateness of the family situation.30 8 Lack of meaningful contact
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and family violence can present significant barriers to reunifying the
family. 3 09 When considering reunifying a family with a history of domestic
violence, transition planners should carefully weigh the housing options
against the interest and history of the parties involved. 310  Once a family
plan has been developed, transition planners should work to coordinate
release with the family and to provide supportive services through
community organizations.3 11
One of the obvious impediments to securing housing for newly
released inmates is funding. Individuals will have to pay rent regularly,
along with a security deposit and usually some additional month's rent.3 12
Transition planners should help inmates secure financing from both public
assistance programs and, if available, stipends.' The Reentry Policy
Council provides several examples of creative funding methods to increase
the amount of available supportive housing for post-release inmates.3 14 The
Report even provides ideas for circumventing stricter restrictions attached
to popular funding streams, such as the McKinney-Vento Act.
The Report discusses various types of housing that should be
considered for post-release inmates. Transition teams should work with
local Public Housing Authorities to determine the eligibility and availability
of section 8 housing. 3 16 Private sector and nonprofit housing developers
and organization can often provide housing at reduced rates.3 17  The
Reentry Policy Council proposes creating specifically designated reentry
housing, which would provide counseling, benefits advocacy, family
reunification, and case management to help former inmates reintegrate into
* * *318their communities.
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Continuing Care
In addition to finding housing opportunities, the Reentry Policy
Council emphasizes the importance of establishing continuity of care during
the transition period. Treatment regimes that begin in jail, for example,
must continue after release.3 19 Without this continuity, inmates face the risk
of serious health repercussions. 32 0 Often, communities have few resources
devoted to connecting recently released prisoners to services and medical
care.3 2 1 To combat this problem, correctional facilities have begun to foster
partnerships with community-based service providers to ease the transition
and studies have shown that collaboration between government officials
and mental health workers can decrease the recidivism and hospitalization
rates from program participants.3 22
To ensure that care continues after individuals are released,
correctional facilities should prepare a prerelease medical history summary
for each inmate.323 This summary should address the inmate's physical and
mental and substance abuse history, should be given to the inmate, and, if
the inmate consents, shared with local community service providers.324
Correctional institutions, through discharge planners and others, should
work with community-based organizations and the inmates to develop a
transition plan that secures post-release treatment of pinpointed inmate
needs.3 25  That plan should include providing inmates with sufficient
medication (not just a prescription) upon release to last, according to
protocols outline in the Report, until their follow-up appointment.326
K. Workforce Transition
A crucial element of the transition plan is connecting an inmate with a
job at the point of release. The Report directs policymakers and prison
administrators to consider ways to increase employment opportunities
available to formerly incarcerated individuals (including programs
providing tax benefits and bonding for employers).327 The Reentry Policy
Council supports legislative and judicial action to reform laws that, without
any direct link to public safety, restrict the employment of those living with
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a criminal conviction. 3 28 Individuals should bring lawsuits under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act, says the Report, to combat the use of arrest records
during job screenings. 32 9 States should discourage employers and licensing
boards from using categorical bans against workers with criminal
records. 30 Instead, the aim should be to treat applicants individually in
making discretionary hiring decisions. In an attempt to further encourage
employers to hire newly released inmates, states can create certificates of
rehabilitation that lessen the effects of employment bans in certain job
sectors.332 Community corrections officers should help assist employers by
acting as intermediaries between employers and workers.333
On a related front, the Reentry Policy Council recommends tackling
the problem of unemployment among formerly incarcerated individuals
through effective transition planning. But the obstacles are many. Very
few prisons and jails provide job placement services, 3 34 and only a handful
of communities offer kindred programs. 3 35  Even were this situation to
begin to change, the limitations on jobs available to formerly incarcerated
individuals make the process difficult to successfully manage. And, despite
research cited in the Report demonstrating that most inmates would benefit
from pre-release programs effectively designed to enhance job skills, few
prisons and jails offer such education. 3 36
Still, the Reentry Policy Council recommends that transition planners
initiate job searches for individuals before the individual inmate enters the
community. 33 7  One Stop Job Centers can provide support services for
newly released inmates. 3 3 The Reentry Policy Council points out that One
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Stops may not provide the comprehensive services needed for newly
released inmates, but suggests that correctional facilities provide targeted
information to inmates by opening satellite One Stops centers within
correctional facilities.3 39  For example, correctional facilities should
consider providing a computer with limited internet access to allow inmates
to access job postings on the internet 340 Prisons and jails should bring
employers into facilities.34 1 Networking events encourage inmates to begin
early planning for their release.342 Correctional facilities should continue to
encourage relationships between inmates and community or faith-based
organizations, which after release often help inmates with job searches.343
The Reentry Policy Council proposes that correctional facilities should
use work-release programs as a transition between work inside the facility
and post-release employment.344 Such programs create connections
between employers and facilities, provide forums to educate employers
regarding the benefits of hiring formerly incarcerated individuals, and help
train inmates for future employment.34 5 From the employers' perspective,
the correctional facilities usually absorb the risk, pay for transportation, and
can guarantee workers for jobs where there may be a labor shortage. 34 6 The
Report recommends that worker release programs partner with community
service organizations. 347  These opportunities allow inmates learn new
marketable skills and build stronger bonds in their communities. 34 8
Correctional facility staff should work to encourage public acceptance of
these types of programs, as often success of work-release programs depends
on community support.349
Finally, transition planners should provide information packets to
existing inmates. This information would ideally include written referrals
rmance%2520Measurement/o2520System%2520-%2520Final%2520Report.pdf, Ronald
D'Amico, FINDINGS FROM A STUDY OF ONE-STOP SELF-SERVICES: A CASE-STUDY APPROACH,
Social Policy Research Associates, (December 2009), available at
http://wdr.doleta.gov/research/FullText Documents/ ETAOP_2011-16.pdf; Edward G. Cebrien
(ed.), The Workforce Investment Act, New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc. (2012); David J.
Wright & Lisa M. Montiel, WORKFORCE SYSTEM ONE-STOP SERVICES FOR PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
AND OTHER LOW-INCOME POPULATIONS, Rockefeller Institute of Government (2010); Career
Resource Centers: An Emerging Strategy for Improving Offender Employment Outcomes,
Transition and Offender Workforce Development Bulletin, Department of Justice (2010).
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regarding prospective employers or employment resources before release.350
Correctional facilities should provide each exiting inmate with official
documentation of their skills and experiences, including credentials and
letters of recommendations. 35 1
L. Victims and Families
The importance of a community-centered approach becomes
heightened as planners prepare to transition an inmate out of incarceration.
The Reentry Policy Council advises transition planners to consider the
needs of all relevant stakeholders (families, victims, members of wider
community) during the period prior to release.352
Research shows that a large number of inmates are released into
communities with limited resources.353 These communities often offer
lower employment rates, greater public health risks, higher levels of family
distress, and higher percentages of homelessness.3 54 The very families
inmates return to are often ill-prepared to help handle the challenges. 55 Yet
family support can provide crucial help to inmates upon reentry, as studies
cited by the Report confirm, and engaging family members in reentry
planning can "improve reentry outcomes." 356 At the same time, the Reentry
Policy Council emphasizes preparing victims for the release of the
perpetrators. Research shows that victims are often not notified either of
the release of victimizers or of the ways those released will be continually
held accountable for their actions. 357
To enhance preparedness, the Report divides the parties affected by the
release of an inmate into three groups: victims, families, and community
members. 3 5 8 The Reentry Policy Counsel recommends that correctional
facilities should ensure that family members receive notification of the
prisoner's impending release.3 5 9  Transition planners should encourage
family members to utilize community-based family service providers, who
can help educate families on the needs and responsibilities their relative will
have after release. 3 60 The Reentry Policy Council envisions a complex and
coordinated system of community networks to provide counseling, safety
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planning, and other services to these families as they prepare for release.
This family services team should assess the needs and strengths of each
family to create a plan for the inmate's release. 3 62 If possible, a family case
manager should be assigned to help and monitor the family throughout the
363reentry process.
The Report separately focuses on child support as a subject for policy
makers and correctional facilities to consider reform. The Reentry Policy
Council suggests policies be created that are responsive to the needs of
recently incarcerated parents.3 6 Hefty child support debt can often push
365
parents back into illegal activities. Child support system could
emphasize, for example, the regularity of the payments over the size of the
payments.6 And systems could increase the amount of money passed
directly through to families receiving government assistance instead of
reimbursing the state.367
To address the needs of the broader community, the policy counsel
recommends notifying key representatives of an inmate's release. States
often have mandatory notification for certain crimes and in specific
situations.3 69  In considering notification beyond statutory mandates or
information regarding particularized threats, the Report recommends that
the transition team should work in conjunction with local law enforce to
come to a consensus. 37 0  This decision should be made by established
criteria, including a risk assessment and a review of the individual's
criminal history. Correctional officials should seek community impute to
determine this set of criteria.3 71
M Benefit Identification
The Reentry Policy Council focuses on providing better access to
public benefits as way to assist inmates during the transition period.
According to the Report, the system of public benefits provides a critical
safety net for recently incarcerated individuals. Unfortunately, the benefits
are often hard to obtain. First, the application process often involves a long
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delay.372 This will leave individuals without help during the crucial
transition period. Even more seriously, many inmates will be ineligible for
benefits. The Reentry Policy Council outlines the numerous restrictions
that prevent individuals from receiving public benefits after criminal
convictions. To respond to these problems, the Report highlights two goals.
First, correctional facilities should help obtain benefits for inmates exiting
their institutions.7 Second policy makers should reconsider the policies
that ban convicts from receiving federal benefits.37 4
For correctional facilities, the Reentry Policy Council created a list of
recommendations to connect more inmates with benefits. To start,
correctional staff (and those with whom they routinely deal) must be
familiar with public benefits policy and should help inmates take advantage
of these benefits. Interagency collaboration and effective screening of
applicants can help ensure that eligible individuals submit prompt and
complete application. 37 5 Institutions should ensure that documents issued
by the department of corrections can be used as valid documentation for
obtaining proper identification, which is often necessary for benefit
applications.37  While most inmates are not eligible for benefits while
incarcerated, veteran's benefits are an important exception. 37 7 Correctional
facilities should ensure that all eligible veterans are receiving benefits as
soon as possible.378  Similarly, while many inmates will not qualify for
TANF benefits because of restrictions against individuals with certain
criminal convictions, individuals leaving prison may be eligible for non-
reoccurring payments, often exempt from these types of regulation. 37 9
Inmates should be advised of their eligibility regarding these funding
opportunities.
Beyond institutional changes in correctional facilities, the Report
suggests that state policy makers should limit the harm of federal guidelines
restricting public benefits for individuals with criminal convictions. States
should ensure timely access to Medicaid after release by suspending,
instead of terminating, Medicaid during incarceration. 380 TANF regulations
should be revisited. One easy fix that states could employ would be
adopting a narrow interpretation of the "in term violation of parole or
probation," a condition that restricts benefits for many newly released
372. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 333.
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beneficiaries. Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) have discretion in
implementing federal housing policies. PHAs should consider adopting
standards that consider individual circumstances rather than categorical
restrictions.382 States should also ensure that parents and children do not
lose their Medicaid coverage when their TANF cases are closed due to
criminal convictions.383
N. Supervision Strategy
The Report encourages policy makers to re-prioritize the standard
conditions of release and develop a supervision strategy that encourages
compliance. According to the Reentry Policy Council research, only 45
percent of parolees completed their parole term.384 The completion rate was
70% in 1984.85 Moreover, the routine reaction of many departments to
increase the intensity of supervision after small violations has not reduced
recidivism.386  Instead, research shows that a mixture of treatment and
supervision more effectively changes behavior and reduces crime.38 The
Reentry Policy Council reports that validated assessment tools can help
design treatment and supervision strategies to better meet individual
need.8 Importantly, the Report cites studies of criminal supervision in
Boston and D.C., which demonstrate conditions clearly communicated to
and agreed upon by inmates have a higher compliance rate.38
To help reshape the current system of community supervision, the
Reentry Policy Council suggests engaging community members, including
community corrections, law enforcement, and community-based
organizations, to serve on a transition planning team.390  These team
members should work to plan and coordinate all aspects of a prisoner's
reentry.391 The team should rely upon information compiled by correctional
officials throughout the inmate's stay at the correctional facilities. This
information should be gathered using validated tools to determine risk
assessments, parole decisions, and post-release needs. 39 2
Community corrections officers should be assigned to each individual
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well before his or her release date.393 The Report suggests connecting
inmates to community corrections officers sometime between one year and
three months before the inmate's release, depending on the resources of the
community corrections department and the needs of the inmates.394 Local
law enforcement can provide additional supervision for newly released
individuals.9 To better connect state prison inmates to their communities,
correctional institutions should consider moving prisoners to county jails
prior to their release. 396  Finally, prior to release, every inmate should
receive a written copy of his or her terms and conditions prior to release and
a lucid explanation each provision and the entire document's impact.3 97
0. Community Supervision and Post-Release Life
Because the vast majority of inmates will live with some level of
community supervision, and because a wide range of bipartisan elected and
appointed officials and all with whom they work have been made acutely
aware of the extremely costly and uneven practices that pervade state and
local agencies, the Report focuses particularly on reforming community
supervision system.398 That is a tall order. Over the past thirty years,
caseloads have increased dramatically and are rarely assigned by
geography.3 99 Officers monitor individuals in vastly different parts of a
community.400 Because research suggests that early supervision is
exceedingly important to ensure that individuals successfully complete their
parole,40 1 the Report recommends concentrating resources on the period
directly following release.402 The degree of contact should correspond to
the level of risk presented by the individual. 40 3 Throughout the supervision
period, strategies should change to reflect the shifting needs of the
individual, his family, and the greater community.
The Reentry Policy Council recommends that community corrections
officers should become familiar with the community in which their
supervisees live and provides suggestions to help accomplish this goal.404
Establishing numerous satellite offices can facilitate a greater connection
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between officers and communities.4 0 5 Wireless, web-based technology can
allow officers to access information and case files from varied locations.406
Developing community-based networks can help create a larger team to
supervise and to support individuals. Community corrections officers can
establish connections with local law enforcement to better monitor their
paroles.407 Officers should foster relationships with parolee's family,
friends, religious leaders, and service providers. 40 8 These relationships can
provide community corrections officers with information regarding the
parolee's history and progress.409
Digging deeper still, the Reentry Policy Council recommends that
community corrections officers should routinely assess the success of each
inmate's transition.410 Modifications should be made to take into account
achievements and failures,4 11 and they can include decisions to increase or
decrease supervision, which should be made using objective and validated
assessments tools. 4 12  Community corrections officers should conduct
ongoing assessments of the risks posed by the offender to the community.4 13
Assessments and supervision should be conducted with the understanding
that people often require an adjustment period and that relapse behavior
does not always mean past offenders will commit new crimes.414 The
supervision strategy should incorporate responses to an inmate's failure to
meet the established goals.415 In a potentially huge cost-saving alteration of
existing practices, these responses should attempt to react to parolee
setbacks without immediately relying on incarceration to remedy the
situation.416
Beyond understanding the risks posed by inmates, the Reentry Policy
Council strongly urges community corrections officers to understand and
monitor physical health, mental health, and substance abuse problems.4 17
Continuity of care remains a big problem during transition. High caseloads
may reduce the attention community corrections officers can give to their
parolees. 4 18 To make matters worse, within the geographical boundaries of
their own communities, parolees will likely have access to very few health
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services to treat these illnesses.4 19
Community corrections officers should receive training in the special
needs of supervisees with mental illnesses.4 20 To facilitate communication,
individuals should be encouraged to release their medical records to their
supervising officers.42 1 Officers should provide a system of graduated
sanctions for violations of mental health treatment programs. Importantly,
officers should not punish parolees who cannot receive the treatment they
need because service are unavailable or transportation prohibitively difficult
or expensive.422 Officer should offer positive incentives to encourage
parolees to follow practicable treatment plan.423
The Report suggests officers should be aware of the special needs
surrounding supervisees with substance abuse problems,424 indeed, should
425monitor these individuals and know how to help them seek treatment.
The Reentry Policy Council contemplates that officers will understand that
those will substance abuse problems will often relapse during their
transition period and should develop plans to deal with those relapses.426
Individuals with substance abuse issues, emphasizes the Report, should be
regularly tested and community-based organizations can partner with
officers to test and treat drug abuse.42 7 Corrections officers should ensure
that immediate services are provided to individuals after a positive drug
test.4 28 Overall, the Reentry Policy Council suggests monitoring individuals
and providing a combination of sanctions and incentives to motivate good
behavior.429
Drawing on the lessons of widely accepted research, the Report
specifically highlights housing and pointedly urges community correctional
officers to help newly released inmates secure a permanent place to live.
Policies and programs should be implemented to ensure that people leaving
prisons do not enter emergency homeless shelters or become homeless.4 30
Individuals living in homeless shelters after release are much more likely to
commit new crimes. 431 Emergency homeless shelters are expensive for the
432state. Transition planners and community corrections officers should
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work to prevent newly released individuals from residing in these shelters.
Ultimately, the goal should be connecting the inmate with stable, long-term
housing.
Reflecting evidence both formally empirical and convincingly
anecdotal, the Reentry Policy Council calls upon the community corrections
offices to help addresses the difficulties facing newly released inmates
entering the job market. The obstacles for obtaining and retaining viable
employment are both many and layered.434 Debilitating stigma surrounds
individuals with criminal records.4 35 Ex-offenders often have minimal job
skills and education.436 They may struggle with employment logistics, such
as the proper documentation, consistent childcare, and reliable
transportation.4 Finally, physical health, mental health, and substance
abuse issues prevent ex-offenders from finding and maintaining full
employment.4 3
The Reentry Policy Council suggests updating community corrections
policy to encourage rather than discourage employment.43 9 Officers should
learn to assist people with criminal records to surmount the legal and
logistical obstacles to employment.440  Once individuals obtain
employment, the Report recommends officers help minimize sigma by
making themselves as inconspicuous as possible during visits to the job
site."1
Finally, the Report addresses the controversy surrounding the
consequences of parole and probation violations aiming to balance the
importance of providing consequences to reoffending supervisees against
the convincingly documented price of re-incarcerating individuals for minor
(often technical) violations. The Reentry Policy Council recommends
giving community corrections officers a range of options. These options
should both reinforce positive behavior and address noncompliance.4  For
noncompliance problems, the Report urges graduated responses, including
443both sanctions and incentives, delivered in a timely manner.
In doing so, the Reentry Policy Council follow a large number of
mainstream experts who for years have argued that a huge percentage of
those incarcerated are there because of technical parole violations that are
433. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 381.
434. Id. at 383.
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not new crimes and do not predict future criminal behavior.44 Already in
1997, according to the Report, fewer than 1 in 3 parolees returned to prison
had committed a new offense.4 5 To make matters worse, parole systems
often lack consistency in the applications of sanctions, often with
inexplicably large gaps between technical violations and punishment." 6
Treatment orientated responses and rewarding positive behavior, conclude
studies cited in the Report, can often be more effective than re-
incarceration.47
P. Sanctions
The Report suggests creating an organized structure to guide the
implementation of sanctions for community corrections officers.448
Sanctions should include treatment- and program-based options.449
Mitigating and aggravating factors should be considered.4 50 Parole officers
should consider revocation and re-incarceration as the most serious option
available for addressing violations.4 51 Even when incarceration is
employed, officers should consider using short-term, "shock" incarceration
as a sanction, rather than revoking parole for the full term.452 The Reentry
Policy Council cautions officers to remember that maxed-out inmates will
be released unsupervised into the community. 453 According to the Report,
releasing inmates without any type of supervision often presents a more
serious risk than allowing an inmate to remain on parole or probation after a
technical violation.4 54
The Reentry Policy Council recommends that individuals in violation
of their conditions should be assessed, using appropriate tools designed to
consider an individual's particular issues, for the level of response
needed.455 For technical violations, community corrections officers and
judicial officers should restructure the conditions and expectations to
correct the behavior.456 Not every violation should be considered equally
serious. 4 5 7  For all but the most serious violations, community-based
444. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 391.
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446. Id. at 392-93.
447. Id. at 392.
448. Id. at 393.
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responses should be employed to help the offender retain positive
connections in the community. 4 58
Corrections officers should collaborate with community-based service
providers and family members to develop specialized approaches to handle
violations, while still remaining sensitive to legally required
confidentiality. 4 59 Community representatives should be given a role in
designing a system of graduated responses that addresses the needs of their
neighborhoods.4 60 Crime victims should be informed of the imposition of
graduated responses. 46 1 Along with sanctions, community corrections
officers should ensure that meaningful and positive reinforcement to
encourage compliance and pro-social behavior.4 6
Q. Epilogue
At the end of Part II, the Reentry Policy Council reminds readers that
many barriers to successful reintegration will exist long after parole or
probation restrictions are removed.463 Higher education grants are hard or
impossible to procure for individuals with drug convictions.464 States often
restrict individuals with certain criminal convictions from becoming foster
or adoptive parents.465 Nearly all states place some restrictions on voting
466
for individuals with certain criminal convictions. Yet the Report does not
address these or many other possible policy changes because the Reentry
Policy Council asserts that there is no "consensus regarding the merit or
usefulness."A67 Indeed, the Report avoids assessing the merits of removing
such barriers and merely notes the relevance of these so-called collateral
468consequences to the reentry process.
Part III: Elements of Effective Health and Social Services
In the introduction to the third section of the Report, the Reentry
Policy Council asserts that reentry success is predicated on providing
effective health and social services to former inmates after incarceration
and yet acknowledges that such services are not at all consistently available
458. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 398.
459. Id. at 399, 403.
460. Id. at 400.
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or accessible. 46 9  The final section of the Report provides goals and
recommendations to improve these services. The Reentry Policy Council
focuses specifically on a variety of systems that affect returning inmates,
including housing, work force development, substance abuse treatment,
mental health care, children, and family services and physical health care.
A. Housing
The Report encourages communities to develop affordable rental
housing, maximize existing housing, and eliminate barriers to the creation
of affordable housing.470 The Reentry Policy Council begins by describing
the overwhelming lack of housing that plagues many communities and the
effect that housing shortages can have on those returning from prison or
jail.4 7 1 The deterioration and gentrification of affordable housing has
created a housing crisis, not least for those inmates returning to their
communities.472 The housing shortage is even more serious for those
needing specialized housing with supportive services.473 The Report
identifies key issues preventing the creation of affordable housing. In
particular, public funds for housing, never plentiful, have declined severely
and financing must often be leveraged from private investors.474
In an effort to give readers a working understanding of the subsidized
housing system, the Report identifies the federal and state housing agencies
and programs that exist to support and fund housing development.4 75
Beyond the HUD programs, the Reentry Policy Council discusses the
federal tax incentives, such as the Housing Tax Credit Program.476 Housing
advocates should educate policy makers, states the Report, regarding the
affordable housing shortage and the need for supportive housing for
individuals with special needs.477 The Resource Policy Council
recommends the Corporation for Supportive Housing's Resource library as
a helpful guide.478
To help overcome possible hurdles to creating more housing
opportunities, the Report advises policy makers on ways to take full
advantage of existing funding sources for housing developments. The
Report suggests that coordination between government entities and private
469. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 13, at 411.
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citizens can help maximize available resources by identifying overlapping
and inefficiently used funds. 47 9 Because HUD mandates coordination for
jurisdictions applying for Community Development Block grants, many
public and private actors already engage (if only by coercion) in
cooperative efforts encouraged by the Reentry Policy Council. 48 0 Beyond
the standard forms of subsidized housing funding, the Report recommends
utilizing non-traditional resources to help expand affordable housing.4 81
Funding streams dedicated to health, mental health, and homelessness
assistance can sometimes be commandeered for housing related purposes. 4 8 2
Non-housing agencies can provide other valuable resources (unused
buildings or land).483 The Report provides suggestion for community
outreach to help overcome any community resistance that affordable
housings often face.484
B. Work Force Development
The goal, states the Report, is to equip all job seekers with the skills to
find and maintain stable and sufficiency-enabling employment and, at the
same time, to fulfill the needs of the local business community.4 85 Even in
the best of circumstances, it can feel daunting to try helping former inmates
achieve stable employment within an economy that provides few job
opportunities to low-skill workers.486 Yet the Reentry Policy Council
emphasizes the strong link between recidivism and unemployment, and the
crucial need to implement policies to increase employment if reentry is to
succeed.487
First, the Report outlines the problems that face reentering inmates in
the current economic climate and the solutions that exist to help these
inmates. Many people seeking permanent fidl-time employment wind up
forced to settle for far less. Currently available jobs are often part time,
low-skill, low-pay service jobs.488 At the time of the Report, the economy
had experienced very modest job growth. The growth, however, had
primarily been concentrated in service and retail jobs, both
characteristically offering minimum wage salaries and part-time hours.489
479. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 419.
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To highlight the predicament, minimum-wage employment offers an
income both too low to keep a single parent and child above the poverty
line and too high to qualify for public benefits.490
In describing the background of the major players in the field of
employment-related services, the Reentry Policy Council focuses primarily
on the national workforce systems and programs. Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families (TANF), the Workforce Investment Act (WIA), the United
States Commerce Department, and the Employment and Training
Administration are depicted as the major sources of resources for
employment-related services. 49 1 The Report highlights "One-Stop" centers
and "Workforce Investment Boards" as potentially valuable forces in
employment-based services, and yet concedes services offered by such
492centers and boards can vary widely across the country. The Reentry
Policy Council mentions additional public and private institutions providing
employment services, including the public university and community
college system.493
In an attempt to improve the services available to reentering prisoners,
the Report suggests increasing collaboration within and across systems,
primarily government sectors involved with providing aid to unemployed
workers (local Work Force Investment Boards, One-Stop centers, and
community employers).49 4 The goals of this collaboration would include
meeting the business needs of the community, improving outreach to under-
represented and marginalized communities, fostering economic
development, and creating a comprehensive vision of workforce
development for the community.495 The Reentry Policy Council encourages
a market-driven approach that presupposes and requires business need to
provide the foundation for any training or job placement program.496
The Reentry Policy Council urges all job programs to be alert to
obstacles to employment.497 According to the Report, "high performing
One-Stops" have established partnerships with a variety of service
providers, including substance abuse, mental health, and family counseling,
to help overcome obstacles preventing prospective employees from
securing and maintaining employment. 4 98 Employment services should be
located in neighborhoods where need is highest. 49 9 Ideally, these locations
490. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 425.
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should house all necessary employment services under one roof 500
Programs should be monitored and evaluated, through assessments of job
placement rates, retention rates, and earning gains, to ensure the quality and
effectiveness of services. 0 '
C. Substance Abuse Treatment
In light of the pervasiveness of substance abuse among the prison
population, concludes the Report, the need for treatment is "the rule, rather
than the exception. 502 Research suggests that substance abuse
programming reduces recidivism. 50 3  As a result, the Reentry Policy
Council argues that ensuring that proper treatment is provided to the post-
release population is essential for a "safe and successful reentry."
504
Acknowledging that the major problem is that such services are not being
505provided, the Report cites three major gaps in treatment. First, many
individuals exhibit symptoms but deny the need to seek services.506
Second, many individuals know they need services, but either make no
effort to seek treatment or seek treatment without success. 50  Finally,
individuals are often treated for abuse at a lower level of intensity than their
condition demands. 0 s The Reentry Policy Council holds responsible state,
federal, and private insurers for these treatment gaps. 50 9
In formulating the recommendations for increasing the quality of
services provided in communities, the Reentry Policy Council aims to fulfill
the White House's drug policy guidelines, which target a 10% reduction in
current use of illegal drugs in two years, and a 25% reduction in drug use in
five years. 510 To meet these goals, the Report recommends encouraging
service providers to utilize evidence-based methods of treatment.' Three
key elements are often missing from treatment: 512 Program (1) are not long
enough (partly due to insurance and Medicaid limitations on payments),5'
(2) do not offer the most intense therapy (often requiring in-patient
500. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 432.
501. Id. at 433.
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treatment), 514 and (3) do not always offer evidence-based treatment
regimens (instead relying upon less effective methods)."1  Precisely to
increase the quality of the programs, the Reentry Policy Council
recommends that service providers make an investment in a quality
substance abuse workforce, including actively recruiting and providing
higher than current levels of compensation to qualified candidates. 5 16
Shifting emphasis, the Reentry Policy Council provides suggestions
for governmental policy makers attempting to engage in drug reform. The
Report recommends that policymakers require existing and new treatment
programs to track a wide range of outcome variables (criminal activities,
drug relapses, and employment status).517 Policy makers should ensure,
too, that funding and services are better coordinated and that states be given
greater flexibility in spending federal money. 18 Finally, public awareness
campaigns should promote an understanding that addiction is a preventable
and treatable disease. 5 19 These education campaigns can help reduce stigma
surrounding those struggling with substance abuse and will encourage
seeking and supporting those who seek treatment. 5 20
D. Mental Health Systems
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, 16% of the jail and
prison population suffers from a serious mental illness.52' Many of these
individuals suffer from co-occurring issues, including substance abuse,
histories of physical or sexual abuse, and homelessness. 522 The health
professions have developed highly effective medications and rehabilitation
models. But often these interventions are not directed toward those most in
need, who already may avoid the stigma of seeking treatment. 523
In a sweeping statement, the Reentry Policy Council recommends that,
upon release, former inmates should have access to individualized,
accessible, coordinated, and effective community-based mental health
524treatment services. To meet these ambitious goals, the Report provides
concrete examples of ways to improve services. The Reentry Policy
Council encourages state mental health agencies to develop and maintain
514. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 439-40.
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partnerships with other service providers to reduce fragmentation and
ensure a full spectrum of effective care.525 In order to combat many states'
tendency to encourage service providers to provide affordable treatment,
even if ineffective, the Report urges providers to maximize the resources
available to those offering demonstrably helpful care.526
Evidence-based practices should be utilized in conjunction with the
New Freedom commission established by President Bush.5 27 The Report
advocates training mental health workers in cultural competency,528 in
guiding patients to successfully apply for public benefits,529 and developing
community education programs to help de-stigmatize mental illness.5 30
Families and patients should be included in the mental health planning and
service delivery, both in treating individual patients and working with
policy makers to re-shape the care provided in the community.
E. Children and Family Service
Policy makers should promote interagency efforts to enhance human
services programs that support families and to ensure the availability of
effective community-based programs to serve that population. 5 32  The
Report highlights the heavy burden placed on family members, often
grandparents, when parents are incarcerated. Children without available
relatives face placement in foster care.533 Many of these families find
support through public benefits programs (TANF, Medicaid, food stamps)
during a parent's incarceration. 5 34  When parents return from jails and
prisons, the need for services and support often only increases, illuminating
why domestic violence and family counseling and early childhood
programs can prove vital.535
Human service agencies should provide better access to services. 5 36
The Reentry Policy Council suggests increasing the number of satellite
offices that are co-located with other types of supportive services,
streamlining intake to reduce redundant paperwork and repetitive office
525. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 450.
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visits, and facilitating a range of programs that create better outreach and
referral services.537 Human services should conduct family assessments for
individuals needing services and should take a "family-centered" approach
to improve service delivery.538 Program staff should develop service plans
in consultation with family members, and providers must remain aware of
the burden services can impose upon families.539 Program providers should
consider effective alternatives to sanctions, which often burden the most
disadvantaged families, already struggling with compliance.
The Report provides a special list of suggestions for child welfare
systems. 54 0 The federal government should reprioritize funding for child
welfare to encourage states to provide more services.5 41 Courts should
improve judicial oversight of child welfare cases, including parental access
to proceedings.542 States should implement policies to encourage kinship
care arrangements rather than foster care settings with strangers, and these
kinship families should receive supportive services. 54 3 The child welfare
service mandate should be expanded to include and improve services
specifically designed for families of incarcerated parents through
544collaboration with corrections departments. Finally, permanency
planning should take into account the special challenges of families,
especially families with parents who have prison sentences long than the
statutory presumption for termination of parental rights.545 The Report
emphasizes that all parents should be given a fair opportunity to reunite
with their children.546
On this front too, the Reentry Policy Council stresses the importance
of information sharing and interagency cooperation.54 7 Developing
collaboration between service providers and harmonizing policies can help
achieve an expansive network of coordinated services.54 8 Similarly, human
service agencies should partner with community-based organizations to
improve service access and delivery. 549  Such partnerships can help
individuals who live just above eligibility thresholds for public benefits or
family members not directly served by social services but in need of
537. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 463.
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support.so
F. Physical Care System
In the arena of physical health care, the Reentry Policy Council strives
to increase positive health outcomes, cut costs, and reduce the transmission
of communicable diseases by improving access to and raising the quality of
existing public and private care.551 For newly released inmates, accessing
quality health care can be challenging, 5 52 particularly when medical care is
prohibitively expensive for many in the United States. 553  The Report
highlights the inequity of medical access by describing the disastrous health
effects of denying medical treatments and screenings to uninsured
individuals and families (except for emergency medical visits). 55 4
Moreover, the Report outlines the different interactions between federal,
state, and local health agencies. 555
The Reentry Policy Council recommends improving access for the
working poor by increasing cost containment strategies and maximizing
insurance coverage. 5 56 Policymakers should assess different cost-control
approaches, such as malpractice reform, group purchasing of services,
better regulation of drug companies, or a reduction of Medicare or Medicaid
benefits. Overall, saving money on health insurance payouts would drive
down premiums and make insurance more affordable.
Beyond these big policy goals, the Report provides still more practical
suggestions for improvements in medical services provide to low-income
communities. The Reentry Policy Council recommends that community-
based health care providers offer comprehensive medical treatment,
including health promotion, screening and dental cares.55  The Report
suggests better coordination between primary care providers and mental
health and substance abuse services to help better treat co-occurring
disorders. 559 Service providers should implement empirical evaluations to
regulate the quality of the care. Federal and state policy makers can
encourages these evaluations though monetary incentives, such as the pay-
for-performance system of immunizations in Rhode Island.6 o Ultimately,
550. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 469-70.
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the Report recommends that public health departments establish strong
bonds with personal health care services to improve patient care and protect
public health.56'
III. The Biases Driving The Report
I aim to make explicit certain predispositions supporting and shaping
the Reentry Policy Council's Report. With a 632-page document, I shall
not attempt to be wholly comprehensive. Instead, I will highlight only
certain biases. These predispositions-and their ideological tilt-will
suggest how the Reentry Policy Council's own utopian ambitions may be
doomed, and why targeted mass incarceration and social control are
buttressed by the Report's prescriptions.
You might think that many bipartisan mainstream reformers would
want to see predispositions brought to the surface and examined. Deep
biases can prove pivotal to diagnosis, framing problems, offering policy
statements and recommendations, and anticipating and dealing with
identifiable challenges. How better, then, to freshly scrutinize the design
and implementation of the Report? How better to evaluate the likelihood of
giving localized life to each and every policy statement and
recommendation? How better to help insure a real shot for a
comprehensive vision of reentry that, if implemented, the Reentry Policy
Council regards as guaranteeing success and that so many others regard as
potentially transformative?
But even the utopians among mainstream reformers will not likely
react that way. In publicly disassembling the architecture of the Report, I
am violating the unspoken norm that pervades the Reentry Policy Council
and all those in good standing with them: At all costs, you do not identify,
much less acknowledge, CSG's responsibility for creating and continuing to
sustain the cruelly reactionary (and, yes, fantastically expensive) "tough on
crime" movement that generated the very gigantic reentry problems we now
face. You do not bring to the surface for all to see the race- and class- and
gender- and geography-skewed ideological biases that provide the
foundation for both the highly promoted and widely acclaimed Report and
the targeted mass incarceration and social control to which the Reentry
Policy Council's vision of reentry responds.
For anyone related to the Reentry Policy Council visibly to take
seriously analyses about CSG's responsibilities and continuing ideological
biases would risk ostracism in one form or another. Those who make up
the Reentry Policy Council do not want to be seen as openly considering
what the Report artfully buries, obscures, or treats as brute facts without
origins. Those who care about remaining in good standing with the Reentry
561. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 481.
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Policy Council's expansive national networks do not want to endanger their
credit rating in grant application processes, their individual reputation in the
consultant-contract game, their capacity to cut various informal and formal
side-deals.
Even apart from keeping your job and your income streams flowing,
those within and associated with the Reentry Council (perhaps especially
the idealists) need to be regarded as imaginative and critical thinkers within
acceptable boundaries. They do not want to be perceived as offering or
even considering visions, approaches, categories, stories, or arguments that
others within their bi-partisan circles regard as "off-the-wall." That's a way
to lose a seat at the table, reputation, a voice anyone seeks out-even if you
continue to earn a paycheck.
Off-the-wall variously means unacceptable, unthinkable,
unimaginable, or plain whacko. That's not because anything inherent about
an "off-the-wall position," say, is straight-out crazy. To the contrary, off-
the-wall says almost everything about an ideological center of gravity and
almost nothing about soundness or past or future appeal.562 Indeed what it
means to be a knowledgeable insider (in the Obama Administration or the
CSG or you name it) is the very capacity to recognize-to just
"know"-what will and will not be perceived as off-the-wall. Make
no mistake, though, off-the-wall is typically a belittling put-down and, at
least where ideological discipline proves central to good standing, can
foreshadow ostracism.
Of course, what is "off-the-wall" can change over time and become
acceptable to consider and even adopt. Stunning historical examples
abound. Think only of formally prohibiting sexual harassment or
constitutionally forbidding states from making sodomy illegal. Indeed, the
Reentry Policy Council's Report itself such a transformation and one far
more rapid than most. By the 1980s, ambitious reentry programs became
nearly unspeakable within bipartisan mainstream institutions, not least
CSG. The "tough on crime" leaders and masses had condemned
rehabilitation as utterly incompatible with the punishment the criminal
justice system should deliver. And these leaders and masses, including
CSG, regarded reentry programs as inextricably linked to (an expression of)
rehabilitation. In an abbreviated span of time, ambitious reentry went from
"off-the-wall" to intelligible to credible to persuasive.
But reentry has been embraced by bipartisan mainstream reformers
562. For one of the insightful accounts of "off-the-wall as it functions in constitutional
debate, see Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the Constitution:
The Case of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 27, 28 (2005) (explaining how social
movements help shape the contours of constitutional reasoning, moving claims from being "off the
wall" to being central examples of constitutional common sense).
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only or at least principally because it embodies, they hope, both cost
savings and safety. Any questions (categories, stories, arguments, and the
like) reflecting a more frontal attack on targeted mass incarceration and
social control are still perceived, at least by those most powerful within the
bi-partisan mainstream reformers, as off-the-wall. By contrast, for the past
four decades there has been almost nothing anyone could say in favor of
targeted and severe punishment (of adults and children) that anyone would
regard as disqualified as an argument or disqualifying about the speaker.
In 2013, some heavyweight conservative (Bill Bennett, Newt Gingrich,
Ed Meese, Paul Ryan) may perhaps have enough special standing to pose
serious questions about targeted mass incarceration and social control. But
those who work for and are associated with the Reentry Policy Council will
only follow and never lead. That may not make them any different from the
Supreme Court. But the big point is that avoiding "off-the-wall-ness" about
criminal justice reform-about the status quo-is what people have
strongly internalized as central to their loyalty oath and remaining "in the
game."
A. Choosing to Operate Comfortably from Within the Reigning
Vision of Problem Solving
It should come as no surprise that the Report proceeds from within-
and can be justly regarded as an expression of-the reigning vision of
problem solving. What else should we expect of bi-partisan elected and
appointed officials and their staffers and their preferred working colleagues?
Still making explicit this vision reveals strong preferences-default modes-
that influence every aspect of the report, from the formulation of the
problem to the policy statements to the particularized recommendations.
Further, by contrasting the reigning vision with an available alternative-
what I call the rebellious vision, I wish to make plain that another choice
could have been made. That is certainly not to say I have any reason to
believe this alternative vision of problem-solving practice was ever seriously
considered by or even appreciated among idealists working for or in
collaboration with the Reentry Policy Council."'
563. My outline sketch of the reigning and rebellious visions-and the relationship between
the two-can be further studied in what now has become a substantial literature, across
disciplines, if often using different labels. For only some of the exemplary scholarship about
lawyering, see, e.g., Muneer 1. Ahmad, Interpreting Communities: Lawyering Across Language
Difference, 54 UCLA L. REV. 999 (2007); see also Sameer M. Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective
Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 355 (2008); Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner's
Reflections on Political Lawyering, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297 (1996); Luke W. Cole,
Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law,
19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992); Luke W. Cole, Macho Law Brains, Public Citizens, and
Grassroots Activists: Three Models of Environmental Advocacy, 14 VA. ENVTL L.J. 687 (1995);
Bill Ong Hing, Coolies, James Yen, and Rebellious Advocacy, 14 ASIAN AM.L.J.1 (2007); Bill
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In the reigning vision, experts rule. They behave as if they can see
panoramically. In framing problems and choices, identifying and
implementing worthy strategies, and deciding how much and whose feedback
qualifies as necessary for effective monitoring and evaluation, these experts
collaborate principally and often exclusively with one another. They issue
mandates and formulate policies and distribute protocols and determine
strategies. Those on the receiving end of these directives, typically comply.
That's how they come to be regarded-and can continue to be respected-as
doing their jobs as workers and as citizens and as clients and as patients and on
and on.
The reigning vision pervades most systems in which we work and live.
If you look closely enough, you can spot this vision deeply embedded in the
Ong Hing, Nonelectoral Activism in Asian Pacific American Communities and the Implications
for Community Lawyering, 8 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 246 (2002); Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal
Identification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity, Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability,
and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1807 (1993); Shin Imai, A Counter-Pedagogy
for Social Justice: Core Skills for Community-Based Lawyering, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 195 (2002);
Shauna I. Marshall, Mission Impossible?: Ethical Community Lawyering, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 147
(2000); Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative Lawyering, 6 CLINICAL L. REv. 427
(2000); Ascanio Piomelli, Foucault's Approach to Power: Its Allure and Limits for Collaborative
Lawyering, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 395; William P. Quigley, Reflections of Community Organizers:
Lawyering for Empowerment of Community Organizations, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 455 (1994);
Dean Hill Rivkin, Lawyering, Power, and Reform: The Legal Campaign to Abolish the Broad
Form Mineral Deed, 66 TENN. L. REV. 467 (1999); Laura L. Rovner, Disability, Equality, and
Identity, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1043 (2004); Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal
Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1731 (1993); Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering
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RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997)). For some early and some later work
of my own analyzing how the rebellious vision challenges the reigning vision, see, e.g., GERALD
P. L6PEz, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE
(1992); see also Gerald P. L6pez, Economic Development in the "Murder Capital of the Nation",
60 TENN. L. REV. 685 (1993); Gerald P. L6pez, Shaping Community Problem Solving Around
Community Knowledge, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 59 (2004).
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Criminal Justice, Public Health, Philanthropic, Finance, and Educational
Systems. You can recognize the ideological biases of the reigning vision in
Racial, Gender, and the Sexual Orientation Systems that shape and reflect
housing and labor and credit markets. Even more broadly, you can identify
how the reigning vision shapes relationships with professionals and in
everyday encounters.
Through these systems, we learn and teach which people should be
and should not be regarded as experts. We learn and teach which people
should be and should not be regarded as worthy collaborators. Who gets
classified as an expert and as a worthy collaborator can vary some from
context to context. And you can find some "exceptions" almost
everywhere. That is, in fact, one way the system legitimates itself as open
to merit. Still, across contexts, within the reigning approach, we typically
pick ahead of time those worth listening to and learning from. In most
systems, we pick elites.
That makes total sense, at least in the reigning vision's account.564
Some are suited to rule. They are an aristocracy of talent and expertise
("wolves"), who rise to the top through competitive struggle. Unlike most
people, they understand the intricacies of interests and issues and can
manage the messy, conflict-ridden, and enervating complexities of making
big decisions. As a matter of "merit," those suited to rule should be and
indeed are the central actors in work and life, across systems, institutions,
organizations, and relationships, rule by elites equips us all to work more
effectively and live more securely. Or at least we're so encouraged to
believe.
It is desirable (not condemnable) that the reigning vision does not ask
people to do more than they can do. Most people are suited to be ruled.
Their role is to benefit from the wisdom of experts and, periodically, to
express their views about the performance of those in power (voting at
election time, responding to polling calls, selecting lawyers and doctors,
and the like). Otherwise they should get out of the way. That limited role
for most permits everyone, in the reigning vision's portrayal, to enjoy the
luxuries of a compellingly rational division of labor and allocation of
resources.
A vision of problem solving practice and of democracy should most of
all protect us through our experts from infringements and threats rather than
otherwise express any deeper aspiration we may all have to shape how work
and life should be pursued. Equality and participation can be understood as
constitutional ideals, but the everyday "truth" of working and living
564. This passage draws, in particular, on Ascanio Piomelli's illuminating account of the
relationship between democratic theory and lawyering theory; see Ascanio Piomelli, The
Democratic Roots of Collaborative Lawyering, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 541 (2006).
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involves smartly limiting the roles of most and ceding authority to experts
is just the only way to go. From the perspective of the reigning vision,
radical participatory and egalitarian "self-governance" in our relationships
and in our governance systems is a Pollyannaish aspiration-mistaken, out-
of-reach, utopian. Far worse, it's a downright dystopian objective: an
imaginary place where everything would be as bad as it could possibly
be.565
It's not just elites selecting and defending the selection of elites. The
systems, institutions, organizations, and professional and everyday
relationships imbued with the reigning vision engender remarkably broad
allegiance. Loyalties can be detected among those obviously benefitting all
the way to those who endure routine subordination. Some proudly defend
rule by experts; others prove unable or unwilling openly to confront
systems they perceive as too entrenched to alter; others still stomach
disrespect they rage about at various moments. I will not pretend to
catalogue the ways in which we all can prove capable of accepting and
reinforcing what already is. (Fascinating fields of research study these
phenomena.5 66) What should be obvious is how often-not always, but
often-we settle for what the reigning vision offers as the best possible
options for how to work and how to live together.
In mounting a challenge to the reigning vision, the rebellious rival
unites key fundamentals in pursuit of radical democracy, where equal
citizenship is a concrete everyday reality and not just a vague constitutional
promise. In the rebellious vision, everyone collaborates in problem solving,
seeking out and sharing knowledge about existing problems, available
resources, and useful strategies. Varied problem solvers connect those who
face problems with those in public, private, and civic realms who help
address them, building networks of valuable know-how among diverse
problem solvers and helping shape and meet common goals.
Whenever problems remain unaddressed even after making such
connections, problem solvers attempt to fill voids by scavenging around for
resources, leveraging what is available with what may never have been
tried, and assembling, as needed, one-time troubleshooting squads or more
permanent full-fledged partnerships. Committed routinely to monitoring
and evaluating strategies, rebellious practitioners aim always to enhance
565. Though the roots of this derisive view can be traced hundreds of years in the United
States and thousands of years in democratic theory, the modern trashers of radical participatory
and egalitarian self-governance include, prominently, RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM,
AND DEMOCRACY 112 (2003).
566. For a good example of "system justification literature", a lineage that appears to be
directly traceable to Gramsci, compare John T. Jost et al., Non-Conscious Forms of System
Justification: Implicit and Behavioral Preferences for Higher Status Groups, 38 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 586, 593 (2002), with ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM
THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS (1971).
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problem-solving capacity. Problem solving rebelliously pursued melds
street savvy, technical sophistication, and collective ingenuity into a
compelling practical force.
Working in this way aims to produce, and depends upon, networks of
co-eminent institutions and individuals collaborating with one another. Such
collaborators consistently engage and learn from one another, neither bottom-
up nor top-down, but every which way at once. They revise, time and again,
provisional goals and methods for achieving them; search constantly for how
better to realize institutional, network, and individual aspirations; monitor
and evaluate, "warts and all," what's working and what's not; use feedback
to shine new light upon both future possibilities and current practices.
In this way of working, rebellious problem solvers collaborate as
equals. They do so in response to known limitations. Most centrally, they
work together as co-eminent practitioners precisely to deal with bounded
rationality"-with how our limited capacity to store and retrieve
information necessarily impinges upon our ability to frame and address
problems. 56 7 And they collaborate as equals in pursuit of articulated
aspirations. Most pivotally, they mean through their working
relationships-and through the organizations, institutions, and systems in
which they labor and sometimes manage-to try to make radically
democratic and egalitarian life a real-life experience and not just flashy
rhetoric. 68
Understood and undertaken in this fashion, problem solving does not
presume that anyone knows so much or sees so well to make the calls alone
about any or all problems. Not the president, not the Black nationalist, not
the quantitative analyst, not the Queer activist, not the lawyer, not the
incarcerated woman, not the world-famous philosopher. Nor does it
presume the effective response to bounded rationality inevitably must
567. To return to origins of and radical challenges presented by bounded rationality, consult
the stunning work of Herbert Simon, along and in collaborations with Allen Newell. See, e.g.,
ALLEN NEWELL & HERBERT A. SIMON, HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING (1972); see also HERBERT A.
SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (4th ed., 1997) (1947).
568. The portrayals are vast and varied, across scholarly and popular literatures, fiction and
nonfiction, and for only a tiny sample of what I have found valuable, see JOHN DEWEY,
LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION (1935); JOHN DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY: A STUDY OF
THE RELATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION (1929); FRANK 1. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND
DEMOCRACY (1999); HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE ATTACK OF THE BLOB: HANNAH ARENDT'S
CONCEPT OF THE SOCIAL (1998); HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION
(1967); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA (1999);
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE
SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY (1987); Warren C. Haggstrom, For a Democratic Revolution:
The Grass-Roots Perspective in TACTICS & TECHNIQUES OF COMMUNITY INTERVENTION 220 (John
E. Tropman, John L. Erlich & Jack Rothman eds., 4th ed. 2001); Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of
a Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167 (1987); Bernice Johnson Reagon, Coalition Politics: Turning
the Century, in HOME GIRLS: A BLACK FEMINIST ANTHOLOGY 343 (Barbara Smith ed., 1983).
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translate into mind-numbing routines. Monstrously monotonous assembly
lines (the sort often associated with but extending far beyond Henry Ford)
need not be how we organize work or life. Together, working as coequal
collaborators, we are capable of producing a better world than the one we
were born into and encounter so frequently today. And we should.
This way of problem solving aims to support and reinforce-and, now
and then, take the lead in demonstrating how we might live together in a
fully robust democracy. That goal cannot be achieved easily, much less
automatically. That's not the way aspirational political ideas or everyday
politics works. Instead, we do what we can. We seize opportunities, small
to large. We see just how far we can extend and broaden and deepen our
way of working and living. In this fundamental sense, rebellious variations
of problem solving and radical democracy do parallel and enrich one
another. Trying collectively to secure cooperation in the midst of
unavoidable complexity, difference, and vulnerability-a synonym for
rebellious vision of working-takes as its point of departure and declares as
its goal engaging equals in understanding and enhancing life.
Having described the two visions, the very notion that the Reentry
Policy Council would ever seriously contemplate the rebellious vision
seems itself off-the-wall. Fair enough. Yet it is crucial to realize that all
those involved with the preparation of the Report encountered people and
proposals embodying that vision. And they chose actively to ignore or
reject its possibilities. They consciously decided not to regard and to
include as equals and as equally vital participants in the formulation of their
Report a particular set of people, people with direct experience with and
strong views about every topic addressed and snubbed in the Report, a set
that includes inmates, those living with criminal convictions, their families
and kinship networks, those working in community-based organizations,
and all those openly opposed to targeted mass incarceration and social
control.
Perhaps naming those excluded as equals and as equal participants is
to make the case why the Reentry Policy Council would reject the
rebellious vision. Why would the Reentry Policy Council include as co-
eminent problem-solving practitioners the least qualified and the most
incompetent people? Why would anyone in their right mind include them
as among those 'in charge" of anything, much less the formulation and
execution of comprehensive and ambitious and effective reentry? Including
these people in equal numbers and with equal voice in the formulation and
execution of the Report would be to turn over an important project to the
clinically pathological and the politically crazy ("Inmates running the
asylum.").
Most within the bipartisan circles might even be inclined to label this
approach to problem-solving practice and democratic life Pollyannaish and
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even dystopian.5 69  Those networks of bipartisan mainstream reformers
within and supporting the Reentry Policy Council regard themselves as duly
elected and appointed representatives in the business of protecting the
people against bad government. Authorized by periodic vote (and, in
modern times, informed by endless polling), they do for the people what the
people have no business (or taste for) doing for themselves. To do any less
or any differently would be to abdicate responsibility.
There is absolutely nothing to apologize for in embodying this
approach to work and life. The reigning vision of problem solving has a
distinguished pedigree. In its evident distaste for radicalized and egalitarian
problem-solving practice and democratic life, the Reentry Policy Council
aligns itself with Federalist Founders, with Joseph Schumpeter, with
modern pluralist theorists, and with Judge Richard Posner.570 That's a
first-rate rate crowd of intellectuals to be running with, perhaps nearly ideal
for bipartisan mainstream reformers.
Besides, most people in the United States behave as if the reigning
vision suits them plenty well. Democracy is an election time responsibility
for everyday citizens. Choose who among the competitors shall govern,
then observe those elected officials and appointed officials (and all the
others they directly collaborate with) engage daily in the deeply conflicted
messiness of political problem solving of everyday life.57 ' What else could
most folks want-at least that they're willing to do?
Still, choosing to operate within the reigning vision begets
consequences. And those consequences pervade every aspect of the Report.
In everything from the framing of the problem through the policy
statements and recommendations to the identification of obstacles, we can
detect a form "perceptual segregation"-seeing through selected eyes and
certainly not through excluded eyes.572 In a Report formulating a national
569. Such charges, of course, have been made against the rebellious vision, always through a
vulgar distortion of assumptions and aspirations and methods, most often made by those who have
proven unwilling to learn despite carefully detailed efforts to explain their misapprehensions and
mistakes, For an superb analysis of such misleading literature, evaded and never rebutted by
those who have distorted and would again, see Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative
Lawyering, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 427 (2000) and for an illustration of my own occasional response
to intentionally misleading accounts of the rebellious vision, e.g., Gerald P. L6pez, An Aversion to
Clients: Loving Humanityand Hating Human Beings, 31 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 315 (1996).
570. For examples of the views of these influential figures, see THE FEDERALIST No. 10, AT
82 (JAMES MADISON) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM,
SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1942); ROBERT A. DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION? 24-25 (2D ED. 2003) RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL
TRADITION: AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT (1989) (1948); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW,
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 112 (2003).
571. See Piomelli, supra note, at 569.
572. For one illuminating analysis of the perceptual differences between insiders and
outsiders, see Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1093. (2008).
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codification of how best to approach ambitious reentry, the Reentry Council
chose to exclude as of equal importance the experiences and insights of
those incarcerated, those living with criminal convictions, those in families
and kinship networks struggling with daily adjustments and inadequate
resources, those in community-based organizations and others militantly
opposed to targeted mass incarceration and social control. This decision
proves telling.
B. Framing the Problem
From the vantage point of the Reentry Policy Council, the problem is
that states can no longer afford the incarceration costs of the "tough on
crime" approach to criminal justice. In search of some means of reducing
those costs without sacrificing (and perhaps enhancing) the safety achieved
over the past thirty years, elected and appointed officials and all those they
collaborate focus on the approximately 97% of those incarcerated who will
be released. They do because technical parole and probation violations
represent the fastest growing category of admissions to prisons. Improving
the rate of successful reentry can generate meaningful savings
Such savings, says the Report, are unavailable through other options.
Cutting services within and outside of prisons and jails would render
already minimal availability even more threadbare. Cutting correctional
staffing would only render threatening environments even more threatening.
And, unlike previous years, enhancing "tough on crime measures" which
would only lead to larger numbers incarcerated almost all of whom return
to the communities. 5 74
Off the table, of course, are the two options that obviously would cut
costs: Consciously choose to incarcerate far fewer people and deliberately
design to decarcerate as many feasible. Doubtlessly both options were
indeed far outside the bipartisan consensus. And they represent, I admit,
the views of militant opponents rather than avid fans of the current criminal
justice system. But, as scholars now have begun to assert, without pursuing
both options with decided vigor the chances of decreasing the costs of
targeted mass incarceration and social control are dim.575
The bias in favor of the current approach to criminal justice runs so
573. The best thinkers about problem solving stress how, across professional and lay
domains, we spend far too little imaginative energy and time experimenting with various ways of
"representing" (in today's rhetoric, framing) a problem and least understand this step in the
problem-solving process. See e.g., Herbert Simon et al., Decision Making and Problem Solving,
Report of the Research Briefing Panel on Decision Making and Problem Solving, in RESEARCH
BRIEFINGS 1986 at 29 (1986), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?
record id=91 I &page= 17
574. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 2-6.
575. Rosemary Gartner, Anthony N. Doob & Franklin E. Zimring, The Past as Prologue,
Decarceration In California Then And Now, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUBLIC POLICY 291 (2011).
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deep than it skews not simply how the Reentry Policy Council frames the
problem but even how it assesses strategies available for addressing the
problem it has formulated. Even on its own terms, the Reentry Policy
Council failed frontally to evaluate how even dramatically improved reentry
would measure up as a cost-reduction strategy when compared to
significantly less incarceration and more decarceration.
Especially the idealist among the Reentry Policy Council might
respond, in confidence, that framing the problem in terms of cost-reduction
was the only way finally to urge ambitious and effective reentry. In this
way of thinking, some among the many working on the Report pulled a fast
one. They convinced everyone that reentry can solve a fiscal problem when
the real aim all along was to transform reentry programs both within prisons
and jails and in the communities to which inmates return. If that's true,
then their policy statements and recommendations matter no less and
arguably more. The authors were responding to a moral and not just a fiscal
crisis.
Yet others on the Reentry Policy Council might all along have
appreciated the varied aims of the bipartisan reformers, including the
aspirations of the idealists. They cooperated because they wanted their own
cover. If reentry were being pitched publicly as a wise response to the
fiscal burden of targeted mass incarceration and social control, they might
go along with the Report precisely to buy time before again urging, after
recovery from the recession, the practical wisdom of utterly tough-on-crime
policies. They had their own reasons for taking off the table reduced
incarceration and enhanced decarceration and for backing the time-
consuming production and wide dissemination of a 632 page Report.
All in the name of cost-saving and safety-enhancing reentry.
C. Combining Right People and Data
The Report emphasizes, from the outset and throughout, the Reentry
Policy Council's central message: Combine the right people and the right
information and enhanced and effective reentry programs will follow. That
message may well be correct. That seemingly banal platitude may turn out
to define in the trenches whatever we may define as success. But the
Reentry Council's answer to the right people and the right data seems
hugely skewed, possibly contradictory, and ultimately misguided. Despite
exhorting others across the country to remain open to possibilities, the
Report takes a decided view on exactly who should be included and
excluded and what data should be pursued and respected and what not.
In practice, what turn out to be Report's answers to these questions?
The right people turn out to be existing stakeholders. And by the Reentry
Policy Council's own definition, these people and organizations and
institutions may have been created through and certainly depend upon the
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status quo both for influence and even for livelihoods. Though the Report
warns about the bias of favoring large organizations, they define "quality
organizations" everyone should seek out as those that demonstrate the
capacity to collect data, to comply with performance indicators
contractually imposed, to provide effective service delivery systems
adhering to existing evidence-based practice.576 The Report can often feel
out of touch, but it's fairly astonishing to think (in 2005 or in 2013) that the
smaller less favored organizations already can demonstrate such evidence-
based practice. Even if they agree with this approach, it's very expensive
and still-too-few funders actually provide the dollars to generate the data
they may themselves insist on seeing.
But unreality does not stop there in the Report's exhortation to pull
together the right people and the right data. The Reentry Policy Council
acknowledges that policy makers may encounter "reluctance" by service
providers to be pulled into ambitious reentry collaborations.577 Though
noting that some outfits work in isolation, the Report attributes this
reluctance limited budgets and scarce resources.57 8 Reluctance? Limited
budgets and scarce resources? That feels both too delicate and too familiar,
not just for me but for anyone experienced in everyday field work.
The fundamental dilemma we face in asking individuals to work
collaboratively and accountably is that far too often they are embedded in
overwhelmingly uncollaborative and unaccountable systems.579  Existing
institutions reflect the reigning vision of problem solving, and that vision
always has talked wildly more about collaboration and accountability than
most operating within it ever intended to make real. Despite evident and
important pockets of radicalized democratic practices, individuals can find
around them and doubtlessly have internalized at least some of the moves to
evade even brilliantly designed exhortations and mandates to collaborate
and to be accountable.
To make matters worse, the Report is asking diverse service providers
to work, often for the first time, with incarcerated and formerly incarcerated
men and women. Especially in these circumstances, instead of describing
them as reluctant, why not depict them as perhaps ideologically opposed?
Why not declare them perhaps deliberately indifferent to the well-being of
these men and women, their families, and their communities? We portray
576. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 46.
577. Id. at 38.
578. Id.
579. For how this view served, in part, as the point of departure for an earlier generation's
philosophical pragmatists as well as (to take only one of many examples) contemporary
"democratic experimentalists, see e.g., JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION (1916); Michael C. Dorf& Charles F. Sabel,
A Constitutions ofDemocratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM L. REv. 267 (1998).
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those we incarcerate as monsters and these portrayals stick with service
providers as well as they stick with others.
The Report's answer to this challenge (and to most others) is data.
What the "right data" means is both vaguely and narrowly defined. The
Report routinely and exclusively refers to "hard empirical data"
("criminogenic," "therapeutic," and the like) as the data of choice. In the
judgment of the Reentry Policy Council, these data are produced by robust
and demanding standard-to be respected, required, followed. Since I
routinely consume studies of every sort as an essential aspect of my
lawyering, and since I have led research teams that have undertaken large
empirical studies producing mountains of valuable quantitative as well as
qualitative data, I do not want to be understood as in any way opposed to
the promise or payoff of hard empirical data. Such data has helped to
shape and evaluate the effectiveness of our problem-solving practices and
continues to do so. 5 8 0
But the Reentry Policy Council never usefully describes how all data
in every sort of research reflects assumptions, aspirations, methods,
interpretations. The Report fails to effectively focus attention on the need
not only to gather but to scrutinize data. All data, hard and soft and
intermingled. Insisting on the "right data" and repeating robust and
demanding standards does not substitute for insisting on a diagnostically
discerning eye about all evidence. Worse still, being deeply predisposed to
accept-to insist-that "hard data as such" will overcome the challenges of
reentry is itself a persistent false belief in the face of strong contradictory
evidence.
This apparent delusion directly intersects the Report's bias in favor of
evidence-based strategies. What might be the reason the Reentry Policy
Council ostentatiously genuflects before the idea of the "right data" and, in
the Report, ferociously proselytizes for (a particular brand of) evidence-
based strategies?
580. In most circumstances, these studies and problem solving efforts remain confidential,
but for published illustrations of data we gathered and analyzed in working with undocumented
Mexican in New York City, particularly around health; see e.g., Arijit Nandi, Sandro Galea,
Gerald L6pez, Vijay Nandi, Stacey Strongarone & Danielle C. Ompad, Access to and Use of
Health Services Among Undocumented Mexican Immigrants in a U.S. Urban Area, 98 AM. J.
PUBLIC HEALTH 2011 (2008); Craig Hadley, Sandro Galea, Vijay Nandi, Arijit Nandi, Gerald
L6pez, Stacey Strongarone & Danielle Ompad, Hunger and Health Among Undocumented
Mexican Migrants in a U.S. Urban Area, II PUBLIC HEALTH NUTR. 151 (2008). See e.g., Gerald
P. Lopez, Shaping Community Problem Solving Around Community Knowledge, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 59
(2004); Gerald P. L6pez, The Health of Undocumented Mexicans in New York City, (FORTHCOMING
UCLA CHICANO/LATINOREVIEw 2013). For a published illustration of data we gathered and analyzed
in working with Asian Pacific Islanders and reentry challenges, Michelle Tseching Fei & Gerald P.
L6pez, Learning How Regularly to Improve Our Capacity to Meet the Challenges of Asian and
Pacific Islander Reentry, 31 AMERASIA JOURNAL 61 (2005).
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D. Insisting on Evidence-Based Strategies
Here is my answer, my hypothesis: In stressing evidence-based
strategies to achieve cost-reducing and safety-enhancing reentry, the
Reentry Council aims to lend its approach the reassuring (and hierarchically
valued) feel of "science." Nothing is inherently wrong or ill about the
Report's narrow brand of evidence-based strategies any more than anything
is inherently wrong or ill about science. But the Reentry Policy Council
aims to associate itself with, to be categorized within, science in order to
benefit from the mythology of technocratic problem solving. How better to
justify the rule of experts?
If this hypothesis strikes you as curious, certainly those in law should
appreciate the power of 'hard methods and data." Some strands of the
modem law and economics movement and even some claims made about
legal reasoning have aimed to legitimate themselves as superior analysis
precisely by invoking scientific status. The trouble with the Report's
scientific pretentions is not so much that they are inane as the fact that they
can be so effective. Witness the standing of law and economics within the
legal academy and the especially exalted status still often accorded legal
reasoning.
"Hard methods and data" should not be unfairly or cheaply belittled,
nor should they be thrown out as worthless. But especially when a crowd
with the conventional power of the Reentry Policy Council aims to extend
its influence by pretending to be doing what it is not, then it is line-drawing
time. Even the most illuminating "evidenced-based strategies" are subject
to questions and doubts. And most of what the Report counts as quality
evidence-based work can be, on close analysis, stripped of the self-
importance the Reentry Policy Council would like to give these programs,
strategies, interventions and themselves. To root an entire approach to
comprehensive reentry in such a bias justifies neither confidence nor
acclaim.
If anything, matters only get worse when closely inspecting the text of
the Report. Of the many exhortations in favor of evidence-based programs,
interventions, treatments, and decisions in the 632 pages, here is perhaps
the most revealing, quoted in full with my italicized emphasis:
The definition of an evidence-based program differs depending
on the field. For example, Dr. Robert Drake, a national leader
in the movement towards evidence-based practices, defines
evidence-based programs in the mental health field as
standardized treatments and services which are subjected to
controlled research and involve both objective outcome
measures and more than one research group. The National
Institute of Corrections, on the other hand, defines evidence-
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based programs as interventions that reduce offender risk and
subsequent recidivism and, therefore, make a positive long-term
contribution to public safety. Regardless of the field in which
they are applied, evidence-based programs are built on rigorous
demonstration of program effectiveness. While evidence-based
programs are supported by certain values and assumptions, they
are not themselves values; rather, programs built on an evidence
base are specific interventions and treatment models that have
been shown to improve outcomes for both the client and the
system.ss'
Can it be that the Reentry Policy Council actually believes what it
writes? Does calling a program "rigorous" mean that it has escaped the
decisions of what to measure and how to measure it? And how to interpret
the data produced? Does it mean the decisions do not entail choices? Of
certain assumptions and not others, of some goals and not others still, of
some methods and still not others? And those choices themselves reflect
contestable possibilities. And embody everything from political ideology,
to spiritual faith, to personal preference, to mindlessness flows into and gets
reproduced in the process.
It's not at all my view that we can escape such choices or what they
represent. To the contrary, my point (about biases, about much else) is that
we should openly acknowledge our choices, explicitly articulate our
explanations, and search for (rather than evade) evidence that may teach us
we are wrong. We should anticipate even unfathomable surprises. To
insist, as the Report does, that value-supported evidence-based programs
are "are not themselves values" as if that claim proves anything about
"neutrality" or "science" or "escaping choices" is weird. Or to circle back
to a definition that evidence-based programs are those "shown to improve
outcomes for both the client and the system" as if that somehow magically
erases value-pregnant choices is absurd.
It does not reduce skepticism that the citation at the end of the final
sentence, the one I've italicized, is to Criminal Justice/Mental Health
Consensus Project (New York, NY: 2002), another publication of the
Council of State Governments. That the authors of the Report endorse what
the CSG says has already been amply demonstrated. That the Report does
not hold itself open to how feedback might transform its baseline
convictions offers a perplexing depiction of an evidence-based system.
581. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 54.
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E. Requiring Cost-Benefit Analysis
A report wishing to be understood as requiring-and itself reflecting-
scientifically-based problem solving (technocracy) must perhaps
unequivocally endorse cost-benefit analyses. Having evolved from a tool to
illuminate government decisions about whether or not to build dams and
highways into a ubiquitous method employed to forecast and measure the
efficiency of rules and seemingly all else, cost-benefit analysis has become
intimately linked with the proudly vigorous practice of technocrats.582 Not
to require cost-benefit analysis as pivotal to any comprehensive approach to
reentry would be tantamount to abandoning in advance the very effect the
Report aimed to most to achieve.
The deep predisposition in favor of 'hard methods and data"-
emulating the time-tested and the newly endorsed--can be discerned in the
Report's straight-ahead treatment of the necessity for and payoff of cost-
benefit analysis. As part of both process and impact evaluations, the Report
requires a cost-benefit analysis to quantify whether a program is operating
efficiently. 583 Do a program's benefits outweigh its costs? Especially in a
recessionary period and a fiscally conservative environment, cost-benefit
studies must ensure efficient allocation and expenditure of funds. Because
such studies are expensive and typically beyond the means of many local
community-based organizations and agencies, the Report emphasizes the
necessity of developing relationships with cost-benefit analysts employed
by government and colleges and universities.5 84
But cost-benefit analysis faces serious critics. Consider only two
clusters. To formulate and manage reentry in terms of cost-benefit analysis
requires converting concrete human circumstances (of often harsh and
painful realities) into abstracted technical categories. The bloody turned
bloodless, the priceless monetized, the sacred commodified.s5s In the
582. For extensive and insightful discussion of cost-benefit analysis in government decision
making and beyond, mainly from the perspective of mainstream scholars who produce and
support such hard methods and data see generally, RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A.
LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: How COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT
THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (2008); MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW
FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006); and ANTHONY E. BOARDMAN ET AL., COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2006). The modern origins in the United States of cost-benefit
analysis can be traced back to early technocratic efforts (economists, engineers, and the like) to
devise methods for how best decide whether or not to build dams, highways systems, and the like;
see e.g., ROLAND N. MCKEAN, EFFICIENCY IN GOVERNMENT THROUGH SYSTEMS ANALYSIS,
WITH EMPHASIS ON WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT (1958); E. J. MISHAN, ECONOMICS FOR
SOCIAL DECISION: ELEMENTS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (1973).
583. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 93.
584. Id. at 93
585. For only a sample of significant literature, scholarly and popular, see e.g., MARGARET
JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE WITH TRADE IN SEX, CHILDREN, BODY
PARTS, AND OTHER THINGS (1996); ROBERT KUTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES
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process of the conversion of human experience into abstruse jargon, cost-
benefit analysis tends to obscure political and moral choices unavoidably
involved in such methods.5 86 Particularly in a scientific method, why bury
from view exactly the noneconomic decisions involved in choosing what to
measure, what proxies to employ, and how to weight? Finally, should even
an entirely transparent and superbly executed cost-benefit analysis serve as
the measure of reentry programs, interventions, and decisions?
The Report never mentions these objections, much less explores them.
Indeed the sure-footed treatment of cost-benefit suggests a deep confidence.
The Report believes in cost-benefit analysis and in its centrality to
transformed reentry. The Report demands, too, everyone else understand
the conviction they too must develop (or at least perform as if they too
believe). Without such analysis, of both process and impact, policymakers
and service providers cannot ensure a program is operating efficiently.
Only sophisticatedly powerful analysts can determine and ensure efficient
allocation and expenditure of funds. The high price of such studies will
itself be wildly outweighed by benefits they provide everyone involved in
transforming reentry. Who could possibly oppose making ourselves face
whether benefits outweigh costs?
It is possible that cost-benefit analysis has become so commonplace,
so much the default, that the Reentry Policy Council would never have
thought twice about unequivocally building its approach around such tried-
and-true science-based methods and goals. Besides, beginning in the
Reagan Administration and stretching forward through 2013, the federal
government began to demand cost-benefit analysis of federal regulatory
regimes, including those implicating state and local governments .5 " In this
environment, with common sense and government advances reinforcing one
another, not to require cost-benefit analysis would be for the Reentry Policy
Council to acquiesce further in the less-than-robust approach to reentry the
Report means to displace. And when the problem as framed is cost-
AND LIMITS OF MARKETS (1997); MICHAEL SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN'T Buy: THE MORAL
LIMITS OF MARKETS (2012).
586. For a compelling articulation of the indeterminacy of cost-benefit analysis, particularly
as formulated by many modem economists, including many of the early founders of law and
economics and many other liberal law and economic thinkers, see Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit
Analysis ofEntitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981). For related critiques
from this era, focusing more exclusively on law and economics scholars, see C. Edwin Baker, The
Ideology of the Economic Analysis ofLaw, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3 (1975); Morton Horwitz Law and
Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905 (1980); Mario Rizzo, The Mirage of
Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641 (1980).
587. Across the Reagan, Bush, Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations, cost-benefit
analysis became far more prominent, perhaps embodied by best by the increased insistence by the
Office of Management and Budget to require such reports about all federal regulations. See e.g.,
Office of Management and Budget Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal
Regulation (2002)
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reduction, how can anyone imagine getting to that goal without routinely
implemented cost-benefit analysis. Policymakers must know "what works"
in allocating and spending reentry funds.
But the Report's faith in cost-benefit analysis, like its proselytizing for
evidence-based programs, betrays a lack of intellectually curiosity and
sophistication. It's not just that there is no mention in 632 pages of the
important critics concerned with everything from heterodox lives being
converted into uniform units of measurement to political choices buried
beneath the technocratic jargon. There is no mention, either, that critics
include prominent economists who value the contributions of high-quality
cost-benefit analysis and who can be justly regarded as among the most
influential in teaching such methodology. These economists stress the
limits of cost-benefit analysis (and of economic analysis), the openness with
which it should be undertaken and reported, and the inevitable moral and
ideological choices made in generating and interpreting cost-benefit data."8
Why wouldn't the Report acknowledge and deal with these highly
regarded and influential views about how cost-benefit analysis ought to
work and the role it out to play in political decisions? Why not adopt
explicitly in the Report an attitude toward the use of this method in its
comprehensive approach to reentry? Cost-benefit analysis becomes more
(and not less) important when undertaken openly, ambitiously, aware of
what the best international economists' advise about its role and its value.
Why not subject the methods of cost-benefit analysis to the same intensive
scrutiny that, ostensibly, cost-benefit analysis imposes upon every reentry
decision, intervention, and program? Why not openly evaluate the very
means of evaluation, in just the way many cost-benefit advocates regard as
pivotal to improving the quality and payoff of such a methodology?189
F. Dodging Graphic Details of Incarcerated Life and Life in Targeted
Communities
Many might think the Report is too long. Indeed, many might regard
my summary as too long. I hear complaints about the length of documents
588. Among those economists who aim both to improve cost-benefit analysis and limit its
role, we can count Edward J. Mishan, the original author and now co-author of perhaps the most
influential guide for sophisticated cost benefit practitioners, see EDWARD J. MISHAN & EUSTON
QUAH, COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS (Routledge 5th ed. 2007) (1976). For only a sample of the
preeminent economists who have voiced such views, see Kenneth Arrow, et al., Is There a Role
for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation? 272 SCIENCE 221
(1996); Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal
Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis 150 U. PENN. L. REv. 1489 (2002).
589. For a sober and revealing assessment of the quality of these analyses conducted in the
Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations, by an advocate of cost-benefit analysis, see Robert W.
Hahn & Patrick M. Dudley, How Well Does the U.S. Government Do Benefit-Cost Analysis?, 1
REv. ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y 192, 192 (2007).
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all the time-about fifty page documents, even twenty page documents,
much less a 632-page document. A terrifically able and experienced editor
could shorten the Report, perhaps considerably, without losing conceptual
sophistication or illustrative detail. So shortened, the Report might feel less
imposing for many and acceptably lengthy for those whose job it is to read
such documents (for those who, experience tells me, all too frequently skim
reports and perform as if they have read them carefully).
Or perhaps we should all accept that most people, even those who get
paid to study reports and articles and books, will not read even a freshly
edited Report. What we should expect (and what perhaps certainly appears
to have become the norm in private, public, and civil circles) is that
everyone will skim the "executive summary." If that's true, the Report
Preview plenty ably fills that role. Still, only some will read that document.
Others will continue to act as if they have read the entire Report, through a
modestly clever set of maneuvers. Still others will unabashedly proclaim
that they have read nothing and see absolutely no reason why they cannot
still ask as many questions as they please, and offer anything on their mind
as penetrating insights. Perhaps the Reentry Policy Council knows all this,
perhaps helping to explain a 632-page Report.
But length is not my issue. Or if it were, the concern runs in the other
direction. After painstakingly reading and studying-many times over-
these 632 pages, I want to know where the other pages are. Truly, I do.
Where are the pages filled with probing depictions-mind-numbing
schedules, everyday fears, routine risks-of all the people locked up and
living with criminal convictions? Where are the pages identifying-yes, in
vivid detail-all the hideous atrocities of prisons and jails? And the banally
brutal revocation decisions made by parole and probation officials? Where
are the pages bringing to life all the neighborhoods where disproportionate
numbers of inmates-low-income, of color, and immigrant communities-
come from and typically return?
And where are the graphic explanations of how, in these
neighborhoods, disparately frequent stops lead to seizures, frisks, arrests,
prosecutions, pleas, to doing time for stretches too stupefyingly long to
regard as sensible unless you're a penal zealot without a trace of fiscal
accountability? Where are all those communities whose daily lives remain
beyond the experience or even the imagination of most Supreme Court
justices, most prosecutors, most who lead correctional departments, most
who serve as Mayors and Chiefs of Police? Beyond the experiences and
imaginations, not because these various officials haven't ever engaged in
illegal activities themselves, but because they rarely, if ever, get scrutinized,
much less routinely stopped and frisked, arrested, prosecuted, and
incarcerated. These live in neighborhoods and communities-and operate
within circles-Mayor Bloomberg just "knows" are all law abiding.
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Where in the Report are all of the thoroughly slipshod government
agencies and community-based organizations, all of which claim to be
doing ambitious and effective reentry work and that get rewarded year after
year with sizeable governmental and foundation grants, including those
awarded by CSG? Those agencies and organizations that do not even
accurately describe on their websites or materials what they do and do not
do? Those agencies and organizations that dismiss routine evaluations of
their services (through robustly researched, designed, and tested survey
instruments and the like) as inconceivable or impracticable by those
incarcerated, by those living with criminal convictions, by their friends,
families, and kinship networks?
Where are all the elected and appointed local, state, and federal
officials-and their staffers, consultants, and collaborators-who for
decades have ardently supported tough-on-crime programs? Who by now
instinctively think and act in terms of-and act to further legitimate-
targeted mass incarceration and social control? Who almost never question
and almost always routinely implement the micro-practices that, at the
ground level, put into action this approach to criminal justice? The same
officials, staffers, consultants, and collaborators who mainly lie low these
days, hoping the economy will soon rebound enough to permit targeted
mass incarceration and social control once again to grow?
Where are those elected and appointed local, state, and federal
officials-and their staffers, consultants, and collaborators-who now and
then have nullified particulars and dimensions of tough-on-crime programs
through their decisions? Who refuse unequivocally to acquiesce in targeted
mass incarceration and social control, intermingling rebellion with
obedience? Who hope secretly to fight off and delegitimize a criminal
justice system they cannot abide even as their jobs require them to execute
orders in its name? Where are the direct and often militant challenges to
targeted mass incarceration and social control, authored by everyday
people, and notable law enforcement, correctional, judicial personnel, and
prominent public intellectuals?
Are all the pages I'm yearning for in another book issued by the
Reentry Policy Council? In several other books? Are they meant to be read
together with the Report? Did someone forget to tell us? And if all this is
meant to be in one and the same report, then, by all means, these 632 pages
are way too short, not way too long. If CSG and the Reentry Policy
Council insist they need all 632 pages to describe and prescribe what
readers can now find in this Report, then they need at least as many pages
(and likely more) to describe everything they so assiduously omit and
downplay and cover. That 1,200-plus-page document-complete with
explicit biases, evocative themes, and grippingly accurate details-should
be strongly recommended reading for everyone. And that enhanced
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document should be mandatory reading for everyone claiming to be a
"stakeholder" in reentry, corrections, the criminal justice system, and in all
the systems (foster, child welfare, immigration, and the like) that intersect
criminal justice.
But simply making this 1,200-plus-page-document mandatory reading
cannot be enough, can it? At least not if we are to begin holding people
accountable, even now, for how targeted mass incarceration and social
control works. After reading this enhanced report, shouldn't everyone be
required to take a set of well-designed and well-implemented oral or written
tests? Tests robustly designed to measure that anyone claiming stakeholder
status actually knows what has been going on since the late 1970s? All of
which has now become so fiscally pricey and criminologically dubious that
some on the right have prominently legitimated (made "on-the-wall") ideas
that the great majority of bi-partisan mainstream reformers still treat as
beyond what they can say and perhaps even think? Isn't testing that
requires working knowledge of the 1200-plus-plage document the least we
can do to make certain CSG and all others working with them feel some
ongoing obligation to reconsider what they regard as "off-the-wall" in their
approach to comprehensive reentry?
But length is not my issue. And my yearning for more pages - in the
same report or in other books-should absolutely not be understood as my
belief that, if the Reentry Policy Council would only more deeply and
thoroughly "humanize" their report, then all would be well. If "humanize"
means to make humane, kind, or gentle, then that aim lies near the opposite
of what I am insisting upon. Indeed, through various techniques, the Report
already makes living in prisons and jails and living on the "outside" with a
criminal conviction far more civilized than it almost ever is. My desire for
the graphic details the Report dodges-about systems, institutions,
agencies, organizations, communities, neighborhoods, individuals-is a
longing for particularized categories, stories, and arguments that can help
expose the ideological predispositions embedded in the current Report. My
yearning is for exactly what would help challenge the empirical and
normative convictions so seamlessly hidden or woven into the codification
of policy statements, recommendations, and the comprehensive system.
What the Reentry Policy Council dodges absolutely tilts what it
declares as truth. When the Report states decisively, "understand who is
being released from prison," it lists factors such as demographics, criminal
histories, medical health, substance abuse, housing needs, and level of
employability. 590 The impression is of building a "360 view," gathering
with curiosity and energy all the relevant details within all the relevant
categories. But I find myself flabbergasted about what never gets noted,
590. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 26-27.
91
much less discussed in depth. I want to know, right at or near the top,
where has this man or woman been incarcerated? Under what conditions
and for how long? What was the medical care like? Did he or she work-
for pay or not?591 What were the prison guards like? And the discharge
planners? And what were race relations like? Within the incarcerated
population? Within the larger population of correctional employees and
inmates? And much more.
Of the many possible pathological possibilities routinely ascribed by
the Reentry Policy Council to inmates, the Report studiously evades the
those attributable to prisons and jails themselves. To particular penal
systems, to particular prisons and jails, to particular regulations and
practices, to particular individuals employed by corrections to impose
distinctive order on inmates. In any modestly ambitious appreciation of
"understanding who is being released," anyone with any savvy would want
ask where did he or she do time? For how long? Ever lockedown? In the
hole? You learn that much as a young kid growing up in East L.A., East
Harlem, and East St. Louis. Can it be true that elected and appointed
officials-and their expert staff and collaborators-do not know how to ask
these questions?
And if we were to guess about deeply dysfunctional and damaging
attributes potentially to be found in a man or woman being released, would
we ever imagine not asking and examining closely the consequences of
incarceration itself? It's as if the Reentry Policy Council never had seen the
inside of prisons or jails. Never had taken a close look at medical wards
and solitary confinement. Perhaps never even had read any prison journals
or epidemiological reports about torture. It's as if the Reentry Policy
Council has never known directly about health conditions like those
condemned as unconstitutional in California. And if they had not known
directly, then they never took the time to read and absorb any of the lengthy
judicial opinions about those conditions-opinions written after lengthy
trials, after thorough investigations by Special Masters, after detailed
briefing not just by plaintiffs and defendants but by numerous ideologically
diverse amici, after careful consideration by individual judges and panels of
judges, after review by the Supreme Court?59 2
591. For those who have not studied or thought through the question of prison labor, the
place to find powerful questions and penetrating analysis is Noah D. Zatz, Working at the
Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the Economic Dimension ofEmployment Relationships,
61 VAND. L. REv. 857 (2008).
592. For only some of what should be required reading among the opinions and reports in
the cases holding California prison's medical care and overcrowding unconstitutional, see e.g.,
Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011). And most court documents before and after the
Supreme Court decision can be found at Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, including those
related to overcrowding and health conditions at Plata v. Brown/Coleman v. Brown Three-Judge
Court Proceedings, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12280; Plata v. Brown, 01-cv-
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But that's not all the Reentry Policy Council dodges. When talking
about identifying "where released prisoners are returning" and
understanding "the characteristics and service capacities of those
communities, the Report creates the impression that many (including those
within and collaborating with CSG) have gotten their hands dirty
developing just such information.5 9 3 The Report speaks of the frequency
with which state prisoners return to only a small number of communities,
and even within certain cities within states (Baltimore, for example) to a
very small number of neighborhoods. The Report encourages the use of
sophisticated mapping software (Geographic Information Systems (GIS)),
complete with common-sense directions about the promise and limits of
such mapping.
The Report speaks of identifying "mismatches" between the needs of
the reentry population and the availability and location of providers offering
such services. And to develop comprehensive data banks, the Report
encourages the use of "public resources (such as United Way's "First Call
for Help" database or the yellow pages)" and contacting the state
corrections agency or partner agencies for lists of commonly used
services. 594 Particularly to develop a "service directory as a resource for
returning prisoners," the Report speaks about gathering information about
program goals, target population, client eligibility, services offered, fees,
and programmatic capacity for each available service.595
From this confident presentation, the Report would appear to grasp the
importance of highly detailed information about the local-from the
concentration of those living with criminal convictions in certain cities and
neighborhoods to the presence of diverse service providers to the
geographic proximity of those services most needed by all those facing the
challenges of reentry. Exhorting others to gather, assemble, and make
readily available such information is, still today, ambitious and pivotal.
Indeed, every item identified by the Report has been part of a larger slate of
demands made by militant opponents of targeted mass incarceration and
social control who always aimed toward credibly effective reentry as part of
dismantling the current criminal justice system. The absence of high
quality local information about community-based service providers can be
described-has actually been described by everyone from Martin Horn to
Eddie Ellis-as among the principal reasons highly regarded pilot reentry
01351 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 1990), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=589;
Coleman v. Brown, 90-cv-00520 (E.D. Cal. June 6, 1994), available at http://www.clearing
house.net/detail.php?id=573. Other reports can found at http://www.CALRealignment.org/.
593. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 30.




What the Report fails to concede, however, is that that not many
jurisdictions in the entire country had, as of 2005, carried out such highly
specified mapping, much less developed credibly comprehensive and
routinely updated directories to reentry services. What the Report further
fails to acknowledge is that almost certainly very few on the Reentry Policy
Council had ever undertaken such a job themselves, large in scope and
demanding in detail. Indeed, the Report's endorsement of the importance
of such localized information marks a decisive break from what had been,
among most government officials and diverse funders, a routine
indifference to the pivotal nature of knowing the local. So little had most
within CSG circles thought about reentry, so little perhaps had they cared
about reentry before they began to consider it as a cost-reduction strategy,
that they often scoffed at the very notion that ambitious gathering and
assembling of neighborhood-level information could possible prove
essential to reentry success.
These are strong claims, I realize. But they reflect direct personal
experience and the experiences of others I know well. During the very
same years the Report was being researched, developed, and finalized, I
lived in New York City and served as the Director of the Center for
Community Problem Solving (the Center). The Center worked directly
with residents of those low income, of color, and immigrant New York City
neighborhoods particularly targeted by mass incarceration and social
control policies. In our efforts to "map" those neighborhoods through what
we named our Neighborhood Legal Needs and Resources Project, and in
our efforts to work with those incarcerated and those living with criminal
convictions, we sought funding from state and local correctional officials,
596. For perhaps the most prominent example, see the description of and discussions about
Vera Institute's Project Greenlight, at the Queensbororgh Correctional Facility in Queens, New
York, in such work as Benner Brown, & Robin Campbel, Smoothing the Path from Prison to
Home: A Roundtable Discussion on the Lessons of Project Greenlight Vera Institute of Justice,
(2005), available at http://www.vera.org/pubs/smoothing-path-prison-home-evaluation-project-
greenlight-transitional-services-demonstration-1. (particularly noting the comments of Martin
Horn (Commissioner, New York City Department of Corrections) and Eddie Ellis (Chair,
NuLeadership Policy Group, Medgar Evers College, City University of New York); Benner
Brown, Robin Campbell, James A. Wilson, Yury Cheryachukin, & Robert C. Davis, Smoothing
the Path from Prison to Home, Vera Institute of Justice (2005), available at https://www.
ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/213714.pdf. For a sample of still continuing scholarly commentary,
see e.g., James A. Wilson & Robert C. Davis, Good Intentions Meet Hard Realities: An
Evaluation of the Project Greenlight Reentry Program, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUBLIC POLICY 303,
(2006). See also Douglas B. Marlowe, When "What Works" Never Did: Dodging the "Scarlet M"
In Correctional Rehabilitation, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUBLIC POLICY 339 (2006); James A. Wilson
& Christine Zozula, Risk Recidivism, and (Re)habilitation: Another Look at Project Greenlight,
92 THE PRISON JOURNAL 203 (2012).
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including some involved with the Report.
Even through well-connected New Yorkers, and despite repeated
efforts, we could rarely get any official to meet with us. Those who did
often looked at us uncomprehendingly as we described our local mapping
project and, among other things, our effort to write and widely disseminate
a directory of reentry services. Those few displaying any interest in seeing
what we could produce would pointedly emphasize that there was
absolutely no money in either state or local correctional budgets for such
projects. Our insistence that reentry could never consistently succeed
without intensely detailed and routinely updated local information
(including "Zagat-like" consumer reviews of all services provided) got us
absolutely nowhere with these officials.
In several meetings that became infamous within our Center and those
with whom we collaborated, several funders differentiated, in absolute
terms, the "policy work" they were interested in supporting and the
"community work" we were doing. When we pressed about this
dichotomous way of thinking and doing, they appeared dumbfounded. The
very idea that "community work" and "policy work" could be intimately
related-should always inform one another be for either to be effective-
struck the funders as unintelligible. We offered example after example,
across diverse areas of work (criminal justice (including reentry), delivery
of health services, economic development, financial literacy campaigns, and
more and more). They would only repeat their regret that we could not
comprehend how they and others did policy work and the high-level policy
they produced. In one important sense, obviously, they were right.
We persevered. With the extraordinary voluntary contributions of
many (neighborhood residents, clergy, cultural anthropologists, community
organizers, epidemiologists, graphic designers), we published THE CENTER
FOR COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOLVING REENTRY GUIDE-FIRST NEW YORK
EDITION in 2005, the same year the Report was released.59 8 With the aid of
librarians, we distributed the REENTRY GUIDE to those incarcerated in
prisons up and down the state. Through individual correctional officials,
597. For an account of the vision of rebellious practice that shaped the Center's work,
especially the Neighborhood Legal Needs & Resources Project and others products still, see
Gerald P. L6pez, Shaping Community Problem Solving Around Community Knowledge, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 59 (2004).
598. See Gerald P. L6pez, The Center for Community Problem Solving Reentry Guide: a
Handbook for People Coming Out of Jails and Prisons and for Their Families and Communities,
New York, N.Y.: The Center for Community Problem Solving Press (2005). For other
illustrations of the Center's published community guides, see e.g., Gerald P. L6pez, The Center
for Community Problem Solving Guide to a Fair & Just Workplace, New York, N.Y.: The Center
for Community Problem Solving Press (2006); Gerald P. L6pez, Streetwise About Money-The
Center for Community Problem Solving's Financial Educational Guide to Budgeting, Banking,
and Credit, New York, N.Y.: The Center for Community Problem Solving Press (2006).
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we conducted live reentry workshops in those same prisons. And with the
support of Martin Horn and especially Kathleen Coughlin, we offered a full
day's reentry training for Riker's correctional officers and senior staff,
focusing on how the Reentry Guide could help inmates and discharge
planners prepare and deal with the challenges of reentry.
We did this all for no compensation from New York state or New
York City officials. We did this all without any discernible interest, much
less support, from various individuals working or collaborating with CSG.
Through various intermediaries, we tried, time and again, to secure funding
for new editions of the Reentry Guide, for live prison and jail and
neighborhood workshops, for routinely updating and sharing neighborhood-
level information. Perhaps our openly resolute opposition to targeted mass
incarceration and social control doomed all such efforts, certainly many
speaking off-the-record told us as much. In any event, we failed, with all
government funders, including officials working for and collaborating with
CSG.
Perhaps, then, you can imagine the befuddlement and disbelief among
those working at and with the Center upon first reading the Reentry Policy
Council Report. How could the very same people dismissive of and
unmoved by our approach to reentry and, more generally, problem solving
now proclaim themselves the leaders in connecting neighborhood-level
information to a comprehensive approach to transforming reentry? How
could those who could not fathom how local information and policy work
must shape one another now present themselves-and be regarded by
others-as mobilizers of a new correctional reentry movement?5 99 The
Reports's emphatic exhortation about the importance of localized mapping
and reentry directories for cities and neighborhoods with disproportionate
numbers facing reentry seemed more like an attempt on paper to get out
ahead of critics without any grounded experience or perhaps even interest in
what everyday people know.
Even accepting at face value the Report's enthusiasm for learning in
detail about those neighborhoods and communities most affected by
incarceration and reentry, the emphasis is again familiarly myopic. In
posing and answering the question, "What are the neighborhood
characteristics in areas with high concentrations of releases?," the Report
speaks of "neighborhood indicators," representing both basic demographics
and the welfare of the community. 600 Those indicators include, in the
Reentry Policy Council's view, housing tenure, percentage of female-
headed households, vacant housing, education attainment, marital status,
fertility, infant mortality, place of birth, language, and ancestry-those
599. See Rhine & Thompson, supra note 48.
600. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 33.
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variables that "can aid in developing a measure of social capital, which will
help determine the extent to which communities are equipped to address the
challenges that prisoner reentry raise."601
The impression, again, is of a Report unreservedly recommending
building a "360 view" of those neighborhoods and communities to which
most return after being released from incarceration. But how can anyone
claim plausibly to be constructing a candid appraisal about the resources
and risks presented by these neighborhoods and categorically exclude just
how much the criminal justice system-in particular, law enforcement-
targets these communities for special surveillance? We cannot know
anything like what we need to know about the chances of those living with
a criminal conviction "making it" unless we know exactly what sort of
"special attention" law enforcement (and others) give that neighborhood.
That's as true of Baltimore's communities as it is Mayor Bloomberg's New
York. It is inconceivable that at least some among the many contributing to
the Report did not comprehend this basic truth. Yet the Reentry Policy
Council chose entirely to omit this "neighborhood indicator," and the
ideological bias could hardly be more flagrant.
Of the many predictors of recidivism, can there be many more salient
than the relative "stop and frisk" practices of local law enforcement? I say
that not as a matter of demonstrated social science, though certainly as the
grounded empirical view of a criminal defense and civil rights lawyer. And
I say that at least as much as someone who grew up in a neighborhood
targeted and devastated decades before the advent of the late 1970s "tough-
on-crime" movement. If anyone still doubts the direct relationship between
such "stop and frisk" practices and seizures, arrests, prosecutions, and
incarceration, then let's insist again on mandatory readings and mandatory
oral and written tests. There's a mountain of literature, popular and
scholarly, nonfiction and fiction. There are movies and television shows
that, in various ways, get all this exactly right. But why not begin with a
document offering precisely those graphic details the Report meticulously
avoids in its ostensibly "360 view" of neighborhoods facing
disproportionate reentry challenges, a report in the form of a judicial
opinion written by Judge Shira Scheindlin-yes, the very one Mayor
Bloomberg so despises. 60 2
If a comprehensive report aims candidly to dig for and make visible
the dysfunctions of neighborhoods and of those living with criminal
convictions, then it cannot exclude the pathologies imposed by and
embodied in the criminal justice system itself, particularly in the practices
601. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 33.
602. See her 198-page opinion and her thirty-nine page order in Floyd v. City of New York,
No. 08 Civ. 1034(SAS), 2013 WL 4046209 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013), see supra note 12,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/08/12/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-decision.html.
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and views of local law enforcement. 6 03 The fact the Report does exactly
that comes with the loss of still more integrity for the Reentry Policy
Council in proposing as persuasive its comprehensive system of reentry.
How can any account that utterly avoids the role of incarceration and law
enforcement in creating systemic problems be regarded as a reliable guide,
much less as possessing transformative power about reentry?
What today we see all around us are the effects of targeted mass
incarceration and social control. By that I mean the criminal justice system
that has reigned for forty years largely produced what we see in
incarcerated men and women, in those living with criminal convictions, and
in those neighborhoods and communities regarded presumptively as law
breaking. But, with the same conviction, I mean to declare that the reigning
criminal justice system has largely produced what we see in all those who
are have never been locked up for their illegal acts, who do not live with the
stigma of criminal convictions, and whose neighborhoods and communities
remain virtually immune from the targeted profiling of law enforcement,
prosecutors and judges, and the correctional industry.
All we see in the criminal justice realities within and around our lives
in the United States are not brute facts without origins. They reflect the
conscious choices of many, including CSG and its collaborators. The
overlapping ideologies and on-the-ground electoral politics of bipartisan
mainstream elected and appointed officials helped to produce-hugely
helped to yield-the very embedded circumstances and opinions we must
now transform.
G. Espousing Absolutely One Utopian Vision While Nodding Now and
Then Toward Another
Scattered here and there in the Report are riffs and allusions that would
appear to cohere around a certain discernible utopian vision. In this vision,
the Reentry Policy Council warns policymakers and practitioners against
waiting for perfect circumstances.60 4 Certainly to get started, and often to
603. The case law and the literatures available for report authors to read are both wide and
deep, but for superb recent scholarly investigation and analysis by Joanna Schwartz and Ingrid
Eagly of local law enforcement practices, including the relationship of the criminal justice and
immigration systems and the protection (and indemnification) afforded by local governments of
those who behave unconstitutionally and abusively, see e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, Police
Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); Joanna C. Schwartz, What Police Learn
from Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 841 (2012); Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and
Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA
L. REv. 1023 (2010); Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation
in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126 (2013); Ingrid V. Eagly, Local Immigration
Prosecution: A Study ofArizona Before SB 1070, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1749 (2011); Ingrid V. Eagly.
Prosecuting Immigration, 104 N.W.L. REV. 1281 (2010).
604. Prominently featured, in Chapter A Getting Started, are ways of moving no matter the
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keep moving, scavenge around for resources, leveraging what you may
already have and what you can discover among others. Pull together people
and organizations, perhaps unfamiliar with any collaboration, much less this
particular one. Rope in even those inexperienced in working with the
reentry population, with their particular challenges, with their lack of
conventional clout and connections. Try out what together you can manage
to pull together, not always confident what you put into action will
immediately work, perhaps even knowing it may backfire in the short run.
To connect these riffs and allusions in such a fashion gains some
support from the Report's insistence that collaborative teams create
feedback loops.605  Employ only evidence-based programs and make
decisions about past performance and future adjustments only after cost-
benefit analysis. Especially in early iterations, breakdowns and failures will
occur. But across the United States, in varied environments, reentry
policymakers and practitioners will be beginning to build people and
knowhow. They will be on their way, through localized trial and error.
Over time, this combination will yield a greater number of successes. The
Report's ideal rather distantly resembles the democratic experimentalism
championed by many modem thinkers, if admittedly it's a strain
wholeheartedly inclined to wrap itself within the aura of science, with
experts ruling top-down.606
But these riffs, allusions, and feedback loops mislead, I think.
Through and through, the Report seems the product of an opposing utopian
vision. In this vision, the Reentry Policy Council offers the ideal form of
institutional and social arrangement to define and address cost-saving
reentry-ideal in the strongest sense of once and for all putting an end to
the recidivism that haunts the criminal justice system. In this utopian
vision, the Report's policy statements collectively entail the plan for the
safe and successful transition of a person from prison or jail to the
community. Each community must make local circumstances (institutions
and individuals) fit within this plan. But the payoff is huge. If the policy
statements and recommendations are effectively implemented (through
evidence-based programs evaluated through cost-benefit analysis), the
Reentry Policy Council guarantees the safe and successful return of
607individuals from prison or jail to the community.
Taken at face value, such a guarantee might well seem preposterous.
No one seriously ensures the elimination of recidivism. Treated as puffery,
local circumstance; see REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 16-22.
605. The feedback loops are often featured in the course of describe "evaluation," to use the
Report's rhetoric; see Id. at 88.
606. For a prominent example of the more radically egalitarian democratic experimentalism
advanced in recent years, see Michael C. Dorf& Charles F. Sabel, supra note 579.
607. REPORT OF THE REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 2.
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the warranty seems needlessly overstated, at odds with the prudence the
Report often reveals, perhaps especially in identifying likely obstacles to
implementation. But what if we see this guarantee through a utopian lens
that has searched for, discovered, and now aims to impose a totalizing
system? Understood in this way, the guarantee might well be utterly
solemn. The Report does mean to say this system, the Reentry Policy
Council's system, CSG's system, will work: If everyone else does as they
are instructed, we guarantee successful reentry. We can move toward an
unassailable future in accordance to scientifically produced and measured
commands. This is utopia as coherent technocratic totality, managing to
substitute each individual human part to its scientific system of logic. 608
Understood in this utopian sense, the Report should evoke both
comfort and alarm. To believe that bipartisan mainstream reformers have
derived and shared directives that, if followed, guarantee successful reentry
would appear to solve the problem of recidivism and its fiscal impact on
state and local governments. To realize that many believe the CSG can
develop a comprehensive system that could ensure successful reentry, once
and for all, would appear to confirm some massive delusion has taken hold.
It is entirely possible, even likely, that large numbers can feel both
reassured and distressed by the Report. Such can be the impact of kindred
utopian visions.609
At the same time, it is entirely possible that this utopian vision serves,
for CSG, as both forthright statement of its bipartisan ideology and deep
rationalization of the biases that shape the current criminal justice system.
The Reentry Policy Council, and CSG more broadly, indeed can believe
what otherwise sounds incredible, yet not all expect to succeed in ensuring
successful reentry (at least not in the foreseeable future), and still provide
bi-partisan elected and appointed officials' evidence that they are attacking
out-of-control costs while securing (and perhaps enhancing) safety. With at
most status quo-plus changes ensuing, with biases strengthened and not
compromised, targeted massive incarceration and social control can
continue to thrive.
Utopia as hyper-rationalized technocratic totality may explain why the
Report altogether evades a question that pervades every policy statement
and recommendation: How can we credibly believe that the same exact
608. The literatures on such utopian visions are huge, across categories and ideologies, but
one place to begin is with certain classics such as KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS
ENEMIES (1945) and HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1948). For a
provocatively insightful account and critique of sexual abuse understood in this totalitarian sense,
see Duncan Kennedy, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing, and the Eroticization of Domination, 26 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 1309 (1992).
609. For one too often neglected exploration of the simultaneously soothing and disturbing
aspects of democratic life, variously construed and imposed, see e.g., CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL
THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (1985).
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people in charge of implementing targeted mass incarceration and social
control are suddenly suited at all (much less best suited) to be in charge of a
fundamental reorientation toward reentry? Even reentry carved out and
isolated as a cost-savings and safety-ensuring dimension of the reigning
criminal justice system? But through the Report's "once and for all"
utopian lens, the human characertistics of personnel in time fade and even
vanish. The comprehensive approach to reentry manages somehow to
convert each human into functional operatives within the totalizing system.
Meanwhile, interim failures only help to ensure the reproduction of the
status quo. Even an ultimate success of the fundamental transformation
aims only to create status quo-plus changes in targeted mass incarceration
and social control.
IV. Have We All Become Invested in Targeted Mass
Incarceration and Social Control?
I am among those who consider the prevailing approach to criminal
justice-targeted mass incarceration and social control-wrong. By wrong, I
mean it is both descriptively inaccurate and morally misleading. And I am
among an apparently much smaller group of people who consider the vision
of reentry articulated by the Reentry Policy Council likely doomed by its own
inability or unwillingness to expose these biases. I would have thought this
fundamental fact-the tension between the utopian aspects of the Report and
the continuing biases that likely nullify those aspirations-would have been
immediately grasped by most, questioned by many, and condemned by some.
But that has not been true, and we must wonder why.
Perhaps those who do apprehend the design of the Report avoid
speaking out about it, probably to remain in good standing with CSG, federal
funders, and the bipartisan mainstream reformers of the Reentry Policy
Council. Their interests overlap, plain and simple. But that may not be all
that's happening. Perhaps fewer "see" these status quo tilt of the Report than
I first imagined. Targeted mass incarceration and social control may have so
normalized deep denial about exactly how we practice criminal justice that a
wide range of people (and their offices, organizations, institutions, and
systems) no longer can spot the background rules that define the ideological
tilt.
Certainly, it's true that even some who have criticized mass
incarceration now no longer see how they too have become invested in the
status quo. They heartily endorse the Reentry Policy Council's vision of
reentry while warning only that it is an uneasy coalition and difficult
enterprise. In so doing, they may regard themselves as practical. They keep
themselves in good standing with the only federalized game in town, one that
happens to possess dollars to offer and prestige to lend. Or they may see
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themselves as keeping a hard-to-secure seat at the table with bipartisan
establishment players, (in the Beltway sense of "we're getting something
done and the rest of you are just spitting in the wind"). Or these folks may
label themselves "pragmatic" in the very same very thin scientific sense
evident in the Report's unalloyed insistence on "evidence-based" programs
and treatment.
In any event, the strong endorsement of the Report by those who may
still regard themselves as critics inescapably strengthens the biases favoring
targeted mass incarceration and social control. If those who once appeared to
resist the fanatical "tough-on-crime" ideology intentionally aim to reinforce
its biases, they can hardly be regarded any longer as serious opponents of the
status quo. Perhaps they never were. But if their support of these deep
status-quo reinforcing predispositions is only inadvertent, then all the more
reason to regard the ideological biases as successfully legitimated, as deeply
rationalized and denied even by some militant opponents of the reigning
criminal justice system. They're in way deeper than they think and we would
like to believe.
But matters may be more entangled still. I have tried so far to unpack
what might be regarded as "the interests of the bipartisan mainstream
reformers." Again, I do not believe those "interests" are a monolithic
whole, somehow seamlessly woven together, without divergent origins and
trajectories. I have aimed to sketch in various ways the possible investment
of those working of the Reentry Council itself (including any utopians
among the staff and collaborators). And I've aimed to emphasize the
possible (likely) interests of all those who want to remain in good standing
with CSG and its wide circles of influence and dollars. Even my
description of the militant opposition is designed, in part, to emphasize that
despite the evident ideological power of targeted mass incarceration and
social control, we're not living within some thoroughly triumphant
totalitarian regime. You can diverge in your thinking, and you can act on
what you think.
But in sketching as needed the overlapping interests of the bipartisan
mainstream reformer, and in describing the aims and methods of militant
opponents, I do not at all mean to suppress or sidestep a crucial question:
After so many decades, have we all now somehow become invested in
targeted mass incarceration and social control? What might even limited
particularities about some other clusters reveal about how we might have
internalized and relate to current "tough-on-crime" criminal justice? As we
all have known it for several decades and as the younger generation among
us have been born into it?
To begin with one example among dozens that we might readily name
and examine, let's consider Michael Bloomberg, perhaps the most
prominent registered Independent in the United States. In proudly
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defending and upping his wager on "stop and frisk" in mainly Black and
Latino New York City neighborhoods, Mayor Bloomberg regards himself
as the only (certainly one of the only) truth-speaking public servants.
Crime must be stopped and he knows how to do just that. Forget that the
evidence reveals an unwarranted invasion of Black and Latino
communities, producing "positive outcomes" that might achieved through
any number of radically less racist and disruptive means.
Sticking to his story, digging deeper into his well-defended biases
about Blacks and Latinos and their neighborhoods, Bloomberg just
"knows" that some commit crimes and others do not. And he can and
should encourage the NYPD to profile those who commit crimes and their
neighborhoods, making the people of those communities and all of New
York City safer. And by "uncovering" some illegalities, he can
demonstrate that suspending allegiance to the constitution, and "letting cops
be cops," can work crime-fighting wonders. The categories are tight, the
story straightforward, and dissent can be dismissed as clueless or
dissembling.
Bloomberg's immediate political and legal collaborators, those within
and around City Hall circles, feel much the same way about themselves.
Unafraid of attacks from the "politically correct," they proclaim the NYPD
simply targets "behavior" and not race. They have developed "stop and
frisk" programs for neighborhoods many can name without knowing much
at all about New York City. Or maybe only racially defined demographic
concentrations within each borough. They have worked very hard to
legitimate as utterly rational and even scientific all that they undertake. In
their minds, they and the Mayor have combined sophisticated empirical
methods and street smarts to enhance their capacity to make New York City
far safer than ever before.
But there is more still that Bloomberg's supporters and Bloomberg
himself gain from targeted mass incarceration and social control. They get
to classify themselves as "law abiding," and their neighborhoods and
communities as meriting inattention from the NYPD's "stop and frisk"
patrols. If some commit crimes and other do not, and if we know who's
who, then the criminal justice system should declare in advance some
targets of and others immune from scrutiny. NYPD does not aim its patrols
at all neighborhoods and all groups equally. Not even close. And the
reasons for profiling are compelling, Bloomberg and his folks would
respond. Some engage in illegal acts and others do not. 10
610. Of course law abiding and law-breaking informs and reflects parallel divisions, not least
the deserving and undeserving distinction, about which there is a significant decades-old
interdisciplinary literature, recently examined in the illuminating work of Noah Zatz. See e.g.,
Noah D. Zatz, Poverty Unmodified?: Critical Reflections on the Deserving/Undeserving
Distinction, 59 UCLA L. REV. 550 (2012).
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But what if we examine almost at random one of dozens of examples
that immediately come to mind? What if in the effort to enforce drug laws,
Mayor Bloomberg concentrated NYPD personnel on all private schools and
all the kids going to private schools and all those they ever associate with
and all those neighborhoods where they travel and live. And what if cops
zoomed in with the same vigilance they bring to Black and Latino
communities? What we know about who uses and distributes drugs, and
perhaps insider knowledge about drug use among those who attend New
York City's private schools, would strongly predict the NYPD would
uncover serious drug violations at least as often as the "stop and frisk"
programs uncover serious crimes in Black and Latino neighborhoods.
Or consider just one more example. What if in the effort to enforce
drug and gun laws and, well, all sorts of other laws (theft, spousal abuse,
assault and battery), Mayor Bloomberg used his billions to hire military
personnel to target New York City's finest-all the thousands who work for
the police department. And what if military personnel ardently profiled law
enforcements' friends and associates, their families and kinship networks,
the neighborhoods they travel to and the communities in which they live?
Were the practices that NYPD pursues in current "stop & frisk"
communities applied with equal conscientiousness to cops on the beat and
their networks and neighborhoods, do we actually believe we would
uncover fewer serious crimes than law enforcement currently finds in the
Black and Latino communities of New York City?
But none of this appears ever to occur to Mayor Bloomberg. Or if it
does, he deflects or denies, avoiding the risk of cracking open his tidy airtight
categories (law abiding and lawbreaking, most obviously). Indeed, the
Mayor's faith in his convictions seems so absolute I am amazed the New
York Times isn't even more weirded out. And the fact that such convictions
legitimize, as almost "natural," targeted mass incarceration and social control,
suggest other deeply unnerving possibilities. So strong is the Mayor's secular
faith that it's impossible not to consider the deeply disconcerting likelihood
that ugly self-justifying rationality and damaging biases may have spread
further than we routinely acknowledge. Have an even wider range of us
become blind to biases of the criminal justice system that has reigned for
nearly four decades?
Certainly, at least some members of New York City's plutocratic class
continue to believe targeted mass incarceration and social control made
New York City safe and clean and attractive (Well, that and their own
contribution on Wall Street, of course). But if you believe these Wall Street
elite are just others in the Mayor's circles of friends, you should realize
these plutocrats are not alone in believing targeted mass incarceration and
104 HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11I
Winter 2014] AMBITIOUS REENTRY PROGRAMS DOOMED TO FAIL
social control-yes, those "stop and frisk tactics" and Rockefeller Drug
Laws and more-are what made New York City magnetic to transplants
and tourists from around the globe. Others classes far distant from
plutocrats (though perhaps dreaming of the day) join in voicing their belief
in the wild successes of "tough on crime" practices and policies. They
market panic messages about, say, Bill de Blasio's "liberal politics"
undermining all that has made New York City safe and successful.61' And
from the perspective of New York City's plutocratic class and so many who
yearn to be them, what's good for New York is good for the nation.
Even if "wanna-be plutocrats" are indeed different from a billionaire
mayor and his Wall Street dinner companions, their united voices may not be
terribly revealing of a distinctively wider set of people invested in targeted
mass incarceration and social control. Let's get further away, by some
distance. Might those invested include even those whose communities are
profiled and devastated by these policies and practices? Blacks, Latinos,
Natives, and poor women and men and children of every race, for example?
Consider young women and men of color, especially Black and
Latino/as, who make their way to college. Even if they grew up far away
from any tough low-income neighborhood, even if they were the straightest
arrow in East L.A. or Bed Stuy, they might still get profiled by the criminal
justice system. ("Driving While Black," "Driving While Brown"). But they
may be said to benefit too. As needed or desired, they can claim they're not
like "them," portraying themselves as law abiding, as might Mayor
Bloomberg, though to different effect.
But that may not be the distinctive investment. Especially around their
white college classmates, and even within their groups of color, they have
learned to perform "gangster." Precisely in order to project being "bad," they
need a criminal justice system that both presupposes all young men and
women of color are or at least readily can be lawbreaking, a system that gets
deep inside the heads of everyone around them, of all colors. They stage
their bad-ass identity by projecting street cred that only a terribly biased
system would make at all plausible. If you're thinking "no way," then you
don't know young college people of color or even what they post. 6 12
Let's get further away, in a related but special case. Might those
invested in targeted mass incarceration and social control include even those
who fight vigilantly against injustices of every sort. Even those who, in
particular, challenge discrimination in all its varied ugliness? Even those
611. See e.g., Wooing 'Hometown Industy,'de Blasio Meets Wary Wall Streets, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/12/nyregion/wooing-hometown-industry-de-
blasio-meets-wary-wall-st.html?hp&_r-0&pagewanted=all.
612. See e.g., Acting Like Cholos/as, Stuff Educated Chicanos Like: Information on Those
Kids from Aztlan, (Nov. 20, 2011), http://stuffeducatedchicanoslike.wordpress.
com/2009/11/20/11 -acting-like-cholosas/.
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people of color who valiantly fight against race discrimination wherever they
find it? How about Paul Butler and Michelle Alexander, two remarkably
gifted and skilled lawyers, both deeply identified with the Black community,
both able to "see" much that the rest of us may fail to identify, and both
demonstrably capable of making converting their striking insights part of the
national conversation about justice?
In the overlapping stories of personal and professional and ideological
transformation, both Butler and Alexander describe how much and for how
long they accepted as true the fundamental justice of the "tough-on-crime"
regime. In some mix of conscious and unconscious legitimization, they
wanted to believe cops, prosecutors, judges, correctional officials and
everyone else aimed and mainly succeeded in formulating and enforcing
criminal laws even-handedly. In so doing, they might well have been
speaking for or alongside so many others in the tri-partisan mainstream.
Far more than most, however, both Butler and Alexander appreciated
that this fundamentally just criminal justice system produced disturbing
exceptions. Far more than most, they could spot these deviations, especially
racially-charged dynamics and consequences. And, far more than most
(including those who proudly classify themselves as progressives or on the
left or radical), they would battle racist policies and practices, modem
variations of centuries-old bigoted behavior targeting people of color. Butler
and Alexander may have regarded racism as a pathology in an otherwise
healthy criminal justice system, but they threw down with all their might in
the struggle to fight the disease.
Alexander and Butler can be described, accurately, as not about to
compromise their Blackness, even and especially as they rose through
professional ranks. But even for them, the very idea that the criminal justice
system might be built upon and propelled by race-, class-, gender-, and
geography-biased ideological convictions proved for the longest time, well,
too off-the-wall to take seriously. In time, even perhaps through epiphanies,
they found such depictions increasingly credible and, then, the truth they
must embrace and speak. (Alexander tells stories about her "awakening to
the new Jim Crow"613 and Butler describes himself as a "recovering
prosecutor." 6 14  Such transformations are themselves important and
intriguing. But for now, all I mean to emphasize is just how much even these
two remarkable souls had been utterly invested in defending the basic fairness
of the "tough-on-crime" criminal justice system.
613. Michelle Alexander, Awakening to The New Jim Crow System, UNITARIAN
UNIVERSALIST ASSOCIATION OF CONGREGATIONS (July 6, 2013) http://www.uua.org/
multiculturalism/271760.shtml.
614. For only one illustration of Butler's label for himself, See e.g. Paul Butler, Jury
Nullification: Power to the People, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, available at https://www.prison
legalnews.org/displayArticle.aspx?articleid=21341&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport-1.
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I can offer still more examples of people, of clusters who might (for
ideological, material, aesthetic, erotic, identity, and other reasons), be more
tangled up with targeted mass incarceration and social control than they
may realize or we may commonly acknowledge. But Alexander and Butler
demonstrate, at least for me, how much even the most rebellious among us
may be entwined with precisely what we would aim to transform. And they
permit us to grasp a bit more lucidly certain bewildering aspects of how we
react both to the current criminal justice system and to bi-partisan
mainstream reform, including the Report.
Closing
Measured by its own stated goals for reentry, much less as cunning
utopian instrument designed to change the reigning criminal justice system,
the Report seems demonstrably a failure.6 15 People need to lose their jobs
and the CSG its funding. Yet assessed as a legitimizer of the status quo,
fortifying existing biases and producing at most status quo + changes,
perhaps the Report should be regarded as a smashing success. If the
Reentry Policy Council and CSG are to be measured only by how well they
reinforce and reproduce precisely what through the Report they claim they
shall transform, then we should perhaps pause to consider whether their
current government, foundation, and private funders will reward them (yes,
including the utopians in their midst) with only a small raise or a sizeable
one.
That merit raise does not at all reflect anything original about the
Report. In the fashion characteristic of mainstream reformers, the Reentry
Policy Council and all with whom they collaborate claim to transform what
they only further fortify through familiar means. They serve their own
(varied yet overlapping) interests. They offer prescriptions that, even on
their own terms, often seem questionable and even sometimes laughable.
And, far less often noticed, they engage in analysis that by virtue of the
categories, stories, and arguments deployed in the reasoning process offer
ambitious (even utopian) recommendations built upon the very
predispositions that gave rise to and reproduce the status quo ostensibly
targeted.
Even the considerable preoccupation with cost-saving and safety-
enhancing reentry triggered by the publication and marketing of the Report,
and by the grants awarded to all those who vow allegiance to its dictates, is
615. Even close allies and former funders of CSG have recently begun to challenge basic
aims, claims of success, and likely trajectory. See e.g., James Austin et al. Ending Mass




part of a recognizable pattern. Mainstream reformers across realms
(immigration, legal education) routinely get others to focus on some
dimension of what they perhaps want or at least are willing to change.
Meanwhile, the transformative proposals categorically exclude or bury or at
least obscure from scrutiny precisely the predispositions that reinforce the
very system in crisis. To produce status quo + changes turns out to
represent perhaps the way mainstream reformers catapult "what is" (almost
entirely unaltered) into the future.
But familiarity may well be a virtue not a vice. Were CSG too
original, too notable in its formulation of the problem or the solution, more
constituencies might well have paid far closer attention than appears to have
been true. That attention might well have stirred controversy, certainly
among militant opponents, perhaps from the fiscally conservative right,
perhaps even among those who ally themselves with state elected and
appointed officials. Instead the Report's recognizable design appeared to
have dampened and perhaps even preempted growing concerns over the
cost of mass incarceration.
Its considerable length, its apparent scientific sophistication, and its
seeming attention to detail proved confidence-inspiring. Even perhaps the
Report's strong totalizing utopian vision (experts providing a plan that, if
enforced, guarantees success) generated more reassurance than alarm. That
will likely continue to be true so long as few actually study the Reentry
Policy Council's message, which history suggests seems likely. Perhaps
what it means to believe in the United States is to accept that when bi-
partisan mainstream reformers like CSG finally get down to business they
really mean what they say and do what they mean.
I have no illusions about just how significant a contribution results
from any sustained effort to unmask this or any other status-quo reinforcing
document-be it a constitution, a piece of legislation, a judicial opinion, or
a prominent policy proposal. The work should be done and plays a role.
Just as other work must be done and plays a role in challenging the reigning
criminal justice system. We should industriously lobby for still more "ban
the box" laws; 6 16 we should painstakingly research and produce routinely
updated local Reentry Guides;617 we should design ever more accurate and
616. For recent news coverage of the successful spread of "ban the box" laws, see e.g., Brent
Staples, Target Bans the Box, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2013, http://takingnote.blogs.
nytimes.com/2013/10/29/target-bans-the-box/?hp&rref-opinion&_r-1. And for a description of
All of Us or None, the grassroots civil rights organization that has led this "ban the box" and other
campaigns, see Legal Services for Prisoners with Children, All of Us or None,
http://www.prisonerswithchildren.org/our-projects/allofus-or-none/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
617. With the remarkable contributions of community residents, law students in various of
my clinics, Rusty Klibaner, Robin Lee, Frank L6pez, and Shauna Marshall and with a grant to
cover publishing costs from the Rosenberg Foundation, I wrote and published a guide for those
facing reentry in Los Angeles. Gerald P. L6pez, The Center for Community Problem Solving
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revealing survey instruments that aim, at some point, to permit all those
most directly affected by targeted mass incarceration and social control to
evaluate services provided;6 18 we should create and recreate ever better
workshops for prisons and jails and neighborhoods, all to better equip
diverse people to understand particular challenges and ways of effectively
dealing with them.619 And so much more.
Meanwhile, we should not trust, in any way, those who claim we need
only modest changes in an otherwise just criminal justice system. Make
absolutely no mistake. The Report is written by presumptively law-abiding
people for other presumptively law-abiding people to provide a
comprehensive system for how to treat convicted law-breakers and those
living in neighborhoods and communities presumptively (categorically)
more inclined to commit crimes. The biases that drive the Report, all of the
Reentry Policy Council's work, all of CSG's work, utterly reinforce
precisely the brutally punitive and phenomenally expensive system of
targeted mass incarceration and social control.
We all carry the shame of the continuation of the current status quo-
yes, including even the most militant among us. We must do all within our
powers to nullify its effect, informally, and formally, each and every day
and over time, through every big collective action and through every
individual exercise of informal discretion. Nothing less stands a chance
against so deeply rationalized and well immunized a regime. We must
abolish targeted mass incarceration and social control and in its place begin
to configure a criminal justice system deserving of a radically democratic
and egalitarian world. And we shall do so only if we are able and willing to
change ourselves.
Reentry Guide - Los Angeles: The Center for Community Problem Solving Press (First Edition
2011).
618. For a brief description of years of work developing such consumer surveys, evaluations,
and tester schemes during the life of the Center for Community Problem Solving, see e.g., The
Center for Community Problem Solving, http://communityproblemsolving.org/
projects/consumer/index.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
619. For only one example among many across the country of grassroots organizations
providing such workshops and services, see A New Way of Life Reentry Project
http://anewwayoflife.org/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
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